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SUMMARY 
This study constitutes an exploration of the role of the experience of loss in the 
social processes of meaningmaking - regarding self, other and the world -
especially as it applies to therapists. 
Traditionally a focus on loss has entailed a description of the mourning 
processes brought about by this inevitable but dreadful event. Here the lens is 
widened to evolve a description of how the loss experience can contribute to a 
transformation of a person's sense of her self and of her patterns of relating. 
This description. rests on a social constructionist understanding of the 
experience of self. A person's sense(s) of self is seen to evolve within the usual 
and seemingly predictable patterns of connecting and disconnecting that 
constitutes the social webs of the discursive communities that people move in. 
Thus her sense of I is indelibly linked to 'Nho and 'Nhere her Yous are. Indeed, 
all meaning is proposed to evolve from a template of connection-disconnection 
patterns. The experience of loss is seen to be able to disrupt these seemingly 
stable patterns within such a community sufficiently, as to be able to bring about 
in depth transformation of the meanings evolving from these habits of relating. 
One nuance of these meanings in transformation, entails a person's sense of 
her self. 
Experiences of, and struggles around connection and disconnection are 
centrally important in the world of therapists. It does not only constitute a basic 
focus of their 'M)rk, but is also the template in their personal lives that 
contributes to their O\Ml evolution as therapists. Thus the experience of loss is 
specifically explored as potentially transformational - on a personal and 
professional level - in the lives of therapists. 
INTRODUCTION 
Some years back I was sitting in a group of therapists from many different parts 
of the world, sharing versions of life stories, therapeutic impasses and life-
altering experiences. Again and again I heard stories of loss come up, in many 
forms, but relentlessly. In this seemingly varied group - an international training 
group attending a practicum with Maurizio Andolfi in Italy - I expected to 
encounter epistemological sameness and personal difference. Yet there 'Nere 
many threads defying the apparent boundaries of time and space. Amongst 
these, it was the rhythm and also centrality of the loss story that seemed most 
apparent to me. 
I reflected on questions of co-creating a context within which certain issues 
emerge most easily. Certainly my O'M1 stories derived from experiences with 
loss and violence contributed strongly to this lens. The very painful 
encountering of losing important people in, and aspects of my life has made 
loss a very salient issue to me over many years. Ho'Wever, this aspect of the co-
creation could (and should) not invalidate the rhythm with which I heard the 
story of loss being brought forth by therapists. I was reminded of how often 
before I had also heard therapists refer to personal experiences of loss within 
different contexts in my O'M1 country. I started trying to make sense of what the 
role of experiencing loss is - an experience that seemed to be so central and 
prevalent in people's and especially therapists' evolution of themselves in 
·relationship. 
This issue connects to some of the central questions that arise when thinking 
about therapy. One question concerns the elements that ensure · the 
maintenance and the development of relationships in the therapeutic realm, 
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including those formed and forming around the therapist. Another question is, 
how does one construct the meanings attributed to these elements. 
Many authors acknowledge that one of the most important of these elements 
concerns the personhood of the psychotherapist. She herself also emerges 
from, moves in and co-creates intricate webs of relatedness. These patterns of 
which she is such an intimate part play out on personal, as well as wider social, 
cultural and societal levels. Here she, like her clients, encounters the nuances 
of struggles like those for self-preservation and loyalty, separateness and 
belonging, and authenticity and acceptance, that can mark the struggle of living 
and dying. The experience of living and dying is translatable to being an 
indivisible part of a relational domain, implying that the experience of 
connection-disconnection and the inescapability of the interpenetration of world 
and individual form the basis of all human existence. 
It is through movements in the web of connection and disconnection that a fuller 
awareness of these patterns - also their previously hidden sides - and with that 
of self within this relational domain, can emerge. The experience of loss 
represents an important punctuation of these relational shifts and the meanings 
attributed to and during this process. It is a moment where a person finds 
herself distanced from a part of her own history, having less to do with the 
people with whom she has constructed it - a moment where narratives (also 
new and/or hidden ones) of her own connection and disconnection, and thus of 
herself within the relational domain of living, emerge more fully and strongly, 
even if painfully and confusedly. 
Thus, from the therapist's constructions of the shifts in relational patterns (also 
those she has inherited familially or culturally) - as punctuated by the 
experience of loss - emerge and transform her everchanging sense of self 
which is crucially important to the live process between people in the 
therapeutic relationship. 
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The centrality of the personal experience of loss also emerges in the literature. 
Many therapists punctuate in their. 'Nriting their experiences of loss. Whitaker 
( 1991) 'Nrites in the preface to his book Midnight musings of a family therapist 
(vvhat he calls a how-I-think-I-learned-to-do-it book): 
I 'Nrote this Preface at 4 o'clock in the morning on 
the 50th anniversary of the day I sat by my father's 
hospital bed and watched him draw his last breath. 
How does life happen to me? How can I get more 
to happen? May more and more happen to you. 
(p.xi) 
Sluzki ( 1991) reflects on how his sense of vvho he himself is, changes at the 
point vvhere a long-time friend of his dies. McGoldrick ( 1991 b) describes how 
damaging it was for her and her 'vVOrk to try and avoid, through professional 
calmness, the awful reality of the death of her mother. She also describes the 
different experience W'len her father dies later. 
Most often efforts at describing the dynamics of the loss experience, focus on 
the issue of dealing with this as an inevitable but dreadful event. However, this 
lens seems too reductionistic W"ten considering a few factors. Firstly, the stories 
people and therapists tell seem to hint at a far greater complexity. For example, 
one can hypothesize from listening to these stories that the experience of loss 
is in some way connected to an altered experience of self. Secondly, seeing the 
rhythms of an ecology of connection-disconnection as the template for all 
meaningmaking, implies that an unexpected experience of loss must also in 
some way affect existing sets of meanings. If meaning and growth is rooted in 
the patterns of human relationships, if human participation in the life cycle is 
inevitable, and if the human life cycle is one of crisis and re-creation, then loss 
does perhaps play a seminal part in a process of meaningmaking. 
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This study, then, will constitute an exploration of the role of loss in the social 
processes of meaningmaking - regarding self and other - especially as it applies 
to therapists. In the study, processes involved in the social construction of the 
psychotherapist's sense of self will be considered. More specifically, the study 
will concentrate on experiences of loss as a focal point or punctuation of the 
therapist's experience of being and not-being with other people, bringing forth 
and transforming her constructions of self within a relational domain. 
This theme embodies many important nuances of relatedness within and 
without the therapeutic domain, which will need to be considered. Such an 
exploration can contribute usefully to the way work on the self of the therapist is 
approached and thought about, for example, by recognizing experiences of loss 
as (possibly) important entrances into the intricacy of processes playing out in 
the personal/professional domain. It can also contribute to the ways in which 
the experience of loss is approached by proposing a hopeful story about the 
possibilities of transformation around this painful experience. 
This exploration of loss and sense of self will be done here firstly (and mainly) 
within the ambit of an academic language, and then through the language of 
personal experience. 
The academic exploration will be done within three sections: firstly, the 
theoretical evolution of the construct self will be discussed; secondly, a 
reflection on issues around the therapist using her self in healing will be given; 
and in the third section the process of loss will be explored. Within each section 
the same funnel will be used: first considering moves around that area that shift 
away from more traditional (modernist) thinking, and then reflecting on the 
moves around that theme once crisis (in some form or another, but most 
specifically connected to the experience of disconnection) is encountered. 
SECTION I 
IN SEARCH OF SELF - A THEORETICAL JOURNEY 
In this section the move towards a view of the self as co-construction will be 
discussed. Firstly, an overview of traditional empiricist views of the self and a 
perspective on the social function of these notions will be given. Then a 
contextual understanding of the origins and content of a move towards 
postmodernism will be proposed. A more detailed discussion of the social 
constructionist view of the person (as a specific example of postmodern 
thinking) ensues. This perspective is also proposed as the theoretical basis for 
this study. 
CHAPTER 1 
TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF SELFHOOD 
One of the basic tenets of traditional vievvs in psychology is the idea that the 
individual person is the proper object of psychological inquiry. This stems from 
the influence of the Newtonian understanding of science and endures in many 
professional conversations in the field. It is understood that, vvhatever else it 
may do, psychology's task is to study the individual and to develop the lavvs of 
her functioning (Kvale, 1992; Shatter & Gergen, 1989). 
These conversations are of course imbued with historical emanations that do 
not only stem from vvhat is described as the field of "psychology". Gergen 
(1991) states that cultural life in the twentieth century has been dominated by 
t'M:> major vocabularies of the self. Largely from the nineteenth century, we have 
inherited a romanticist view of the self, one that attributes to each person 
characteristics of personal depth. In the early twentieth century a modernist 
'M:>rld-view arose that threatened the romanticist language with a central focus 
on the person's ability to reason - her beliefs, predictability and conscious 
intentions. 
(This differentiation of periods in history is arbitrary and only one of many vievvs. 
Some maintain, for example, that romanticism is truly part of modernity and 
ranges from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries and that post-modernism 
has been evolving over the last 150 years. Others contend that postmodernism 
only originated in the late 1960's and 1970's (Rosenau, 1992). 
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In this study the romanticist and modernist periods are distinguished in a 
particular way for the sake of stressing the development of different traditional 
conceptions of self, first in the hermeneutic tradition and with a focus on 
kinship. and later with an adherence to the machine metaphor.) 
The Romanticist View of the Self 
In this vocabulary dimensions of passion, soul and creativity are explored 
(Gergen, 1991 ). This is, for example, expounded by Keats (in Gergen, 1991) 
whose belief that beauty is truth emerges strongly in the following passage from 
Complete Poems: 
I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the 
heart's affections and the truth of imagination. What 
the imagination seizes as beauty must be truth -
whether it existed before or not - for I have the 
same idea of all our passions as of love: they are 
all in their sublime, creative of essential beauty. 
(p.78) 
The romanticists see the truly important feature of the person as lying beyond 
the bounds of observation. It cannot be ensnared by the simple practices of 
reason. Wordsv.<>rth refers in this vein to his internal functioning as "a presence 
· that disturbs me", while Shelley refers to an "unseen po""9r'' (Gergen, 1991, 
p.20). 
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Furthermore, the person is seen as inherently good and corruptible by nature. 
Living is responsive and not about the accumulation of knowledge. Wordsworth 
( 1954) in Expostulation and Reply says: 
The eye - it cannot choose but see; 
We cannot bid the ear be still; 
Our bodies feel, whe'er they be, 
Against or with our will. (p. 77) 
In his preface to his own lyrical ballads, he describes his 'N.Jrk as a homage 
paid to 
the native and naked dignity of man, to the grand 
elementary principle of pleasure, by which he 
knows, and feels, and lives, and moves . ... We have 
no knowledge, that is, no general principles drawn 
from the contemplation of particular facts, but what 
has been built up by pleasure, and exists in us by 
pleasure alone. The man of science, the chemist 
and mathematician, whatever difficulties and 
disgusts they may have had to struggle with, know 
and feel this. (Wordsworth, 1954, pp. 16-17) 
The work of Freud (1954) needs to be mentioned Wien discussing the 
romanticist vocabulary of the self. According to Gergen (1991), Freud can be 
· seen as a transitional figure between the romanticist and modernist tendencies. 
Like the romanticists he saw the main driving forces behind human functioning 
as lying beyond the reaches of consciousness. Accordingly he saw the inner 
resource essentially as the energy of desire. 
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However, his intellectually sophisticated efforts at describing the dynamics, 
explaining the content and looking for subjective proof of the unconscious, joins 
in the modernist reaction against the mystification of the self. 
The Rise of a Modernist View of Self 
Early in the twentieth century a new form of consciousness and description, 
termed modernist, began to emerge and replace the romanticist views of the 
person. (Friedman (1993) distinguishes between modernity and modernism. 
According to him, modernity refers to the social organisation which released the 
individual from the ideologies and beliefs which compelled personhood to be 
dominated by the ideas of kinship. Modernism he sees as modernity's dominant 
epistemology. This form of enquiry proceeds from the assumption that our 
rationality, if carefully applied, will provide a complete and appropriate 
understanding of being.) 
While the roots of this thinking can be found as far back as in the dualistic 
theory of Descartes (Storig, 1979), it is during the first parts of this century that 
it can be described as becoming the dominant language of the moment. Much 
has been 'Mitten about the timing, reasons for and qualities of this shift (Rorty, 
1991; Storig, 1979). It is not the intention here to join into this debate. Suffice to 
say that these changes in vocabulary and thinking accompanied a time 
characterised by expansionist Western economic markets, mass production 
· and impending war. 
The grand narrative of modernism can be described as one of continuous 
upward movement, of improvement, conquest and achievement (Gergen, 
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1991 ). The quest for (an ultimate) truth was informed by a belief in the ability to 
reason. Truth could be reached by achieving or inventing the appropriate 
method. Modernist theories sought external legitimation by emulating scientific 
theories and in that way aimed to formulate universal la\NS (Kvale, 1992). 
The development of a broad array of social sciences was thus invited. 
According to Russel ( 1956), these sciences would produce "a mathematics of 
human behaviour as precise as the mathematics of machines" (p.27). This 
machine metaphor is central to modernist thinking. Beings are connoted as 
having a mechanical essence and fields of study become knowledge factories. 
The field of psychology gained a distinctly positivist flavour. At first it was 
clearly declared that this field could be best served as a science if the focus 
was on what Wundt (1904) called a psychology without a soul. What emerged 
were increasingly detailed fragmentary representations of the person. Later on, 
many psychologists and researchers grappled to find a concept or 
understanding which could account for the integration and organization of the 
human person. Many terms were coined, such as ego (Freud, 1954), proprium 
(Allport, 1950), and perhaps most widely used of all, the term personality. Many 
'Miters also started using the term self. The danger in the use of many of these 
phrases were that they could simply be regarded and used as a deus ex 
machina. In that way they would be terms invoked to reassemble the 
dismembered parts of the human system - a phrase simply fitted to an external 
set of co-ordinates. Allport most pointedly warned against the "lazy tendency to 
employ self or ego as a factotum to repair the ravages of positivism" (Allport, 
. 1950, p.37). 
This problem was addressed in many different ways by different authors. Adler 
( 1927) contended that what is frequently labelled the ego, is nothing more than 
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the individual's life-style. In his understanding of the term life-style, it could 
adequately include most of the aspects and interrelations of life. This term is 
thus much more widely encompassing than the ego or self which seem to refer 
to a homonculus. 
Similarly Allport drew on James's (1890) taxonomic scheme in an effort to be 
more respectful of the complexity inherent in any term such as ego or self which 
is supposed to refer to the sense of what is peculiarly ours. James 
distinguished between two possible orders of the self: an empirical self (the Me) 
and a knowing self (the I). The former also comprises the following subsidiary 
selves: the material, the social and the spiritual self. Al I port ( 1950; 1961 ) chose 
to formulate the complexity of aspects ·of the self in terms of the variety of 
functions of the proprium, such as a bodily sense, self-identity, rational process, 
ego-extension, self-image, and so forth. 
Whatever the difficulties inherent in this work, attention to the concept of self 
grew during the modernist era. By the end of the 1960's more than 2 000 
publications on the self could be accounted for by psychology and sociology 
alone. Some studies tried to identify the basic nature and properties of the self, 
while others tried to link it to limited aspects of behaviour. The concept of self 
started featuring prominently in theory and research on areas as diverse as 
social control, economic behaviour, psychotherapy, social deviance, personal 
aspirations, and so forth (Gordon & Gergen, 1968). 
Thus a great deal of modernist literature on the concept of self evolved. While 
· a vvhole array of different theories on the functioning of the self can be 
distinguished as all fitting under modernist thinking but with content differences, 
central assumptions about the individual can be identified. 
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A main dimension of the modernist view is that a person's essence is seen to 
be rational and open to observation. The self is viewed as an entity that can 
form and function more or less independently from society, as a distinctive 
whole (Gergen, 1991; Kvale, 1992; Sampson, E.E., 1989). 
These and other key issues that recur in various forms in the vast body of 
modernist literature on the self, can be differentiated as follows: 
The Self as Observable Fact 
There is a persistent tendency to speak of self as an existing entity. The self is 
discussed as if it were part of the individual's possessions. Self-esteem is 
referred to as if it had substantive properties located in time and space (Gordon 
& Gergen, 1968). 
The Self as Structure 
The self is seen as a universe of Wiich the different dimensions can be 
coherently and mostly hierarchically organized. 
For example, Lewin (1935, 1938) chooses to make a spatial presentation of the 
· structure of the person. This allows him to attempt to "mathematesize" his 
concepts. In what has come to be known as his ''field theory" Lewin 
differentiates the person into a perceptual-motor region and an inner-personal 
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region. The inner-personal region is again divided into peripheral cells and 
central cells. 
Cattell ( 1946, 1957) concerns himself with the empirical mapping of the 
personality domain. Focusing [like Allport (1950, 1961)] on the idea of "traits" 
as mental structures, he distinguishes between common traits and unique 
traits, surface traits and source traits, environmental-mold traits and 
constitutional traits, and so forth. 
The focus on and efforts at analysing the structure of the self (or "personality" 
to use the modernist language}, led to an ever increasing number of categories 
of personality structure seemingly waiting to be discovered and named. Hall 
and Lindzey (1970) comment on the number of neologisms and Allport (1955) 
refers to the hyphenated elaborations appearing out of the personality research 
- compare, for example, the work of Cattell ( 1946, 1957) and Murray ( 1938, 
1968). Once a (mostly esoteric) name had been attached to one of the large 
number of constructs of personality that 'Here emerging, the perceived entity's 
objective existence seemed all the clearer. 
The Self as Independent from the Environment 
The first step in defining the person as a structural concept is to represent her 
as an entity apart from everything else in the world. In the modernist 
· vocabulary, the person is seen as a bounded, unique universe. She is seen as 
the dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action (Geertz, 
1979; Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Marcuse, 1964 ). 
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This assumption puts strong emphasis on the autonomy of the self. The person 
as a seemingly autonomous being has ontological primacy. She is seen as the 
prime mover. The whole into which she is organised is set contrastively against 
other such wholes and against a social and natural background (Geertz, 1979; 
Shetter & Gergen, 1989). 
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Lewin (1935), for example, draws an enclosed figure, called "P", for the person. 
The boundary of the figure defines the limits of the entity knovvn as person. 
Everything lying outside the boundary is "non-P". While he allows for the 
possibility that the environment may influence the person, the person still has 
primacy. His theory explains how different inner dynamic constructs in 
conjunction with structural constructs, determine the specific "locomotions" of 
the individual which serve to structure her environment. 
Allport (1937, 1950, 1961 ), like many other W"iters, implicitly diminishes the 
importance of environmental factors by focusing almost exclusively on the inner 
regions of the person, or in his 'M:>rds, her psychophysical systems. His widely 
discussed concept of functional autonomy refers to the fact that a given 
behaviour, complex or simple, may be capable of ~ustaining itself indefinitely in 
the absence of biological reinforcement. His well-knovvn definition of personality 
sees the latter as something that determines the individual's "adjustments to his 
environment" (Allport, 1937, p.48). This underlines once again the notion of the 
person as a mostly autonomous being set contrastively against her social 
environment. 
· This assumption also makes it possible to simply infer that pathology is located 
in the person. Slugoski and Ginsburg (1989) note that the notion of the 
autonomous self serves to put the blame for any problems people encounter on 
their personal deficits (rather than, for example, the power relations in the 
broader context). 
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The Self as Stable and Predictable 
The machine imagery that lies at the centre of the modernist conceptions about 
the person has as one implication that autonomous reliability should be the 
hallmark of the mature person. The modernist person should be trust'M>rthy, 
predictable and consistent. Knowing her should mean knowing 'Nhat to expect 
of her. Her vvords should be an authentic expression of 'Nho she truly is and 
these expressions should be the same in the future (Gergen, 1991; Rose, 
1990). 
This idea of a fixed personal essence is reflected by many modernist witers. 
Erikson (1959) sees the major achievement of normal development as the 
formation of a firm and fixed sense of identity. For Rogers (1951) the quest for 
essence takes the form of becoming the self one fully is. Allport changed his 
definition of personality (referred to above) in 1961 to stress that the person's 
psychophysical systems determine her characteristic behaviour and thought 
(Allport, 1961 ). 
The fact of viewing the psychological system as a series of structural parts in 
itself has particular implications when dealing with the stability of the individual 
over time and circumstances. The person's internal and external actions are 
seen as the outcome of the interaction of all these parts. These elements 
constituting the system are largely considered stable and unchanging. 
Changes in the self or the person's tendencies are then by implication less 
· likely and will be the result of long-term influences (Gordon & Gergen, 1968). 
A powerful reinforcer and tribute to the rhetoric of personal essences, stable 
character traits and enduring dispositions were furnished by the personality and 
mental testing movements. If the person indeed possesses machinelike 
qualities and they lie not too far from her psychological surface, it should be 
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possible to measure them. And if this can be measured, these results can be 
used to predict the actions of persons and groups. 
Gergen ( 1991 ) points out how such psychometric predictive successes sets the 
stage for a "rhetorical sleigh-of-hand so subtle that it remains undetected even 
by most investigators themselves" (p.47). He shows how predictive successes 
are called "evidence" that a test measures what it says it measures. 
"Something" is said to make the person score the way she does. If the test 
seemingly accurately predicts the future, then that something must actually 
exist and be what it says it is. 
The Self as a Unitary Entity 
In the modernist metaphor, the self is most often spoken of in the singular. "The 
self-concept", "a person's identity", "one's cognitive style" , "her self-esteem", 
and so forth are all common expressions. There is a strong commitment to the 
view of the self as a single entity or gestalt (Gordon & Gergen, 1968; Sampson, 
E.D., 1989). 
Gergen ( 1991) points out how the modernist aspiration for truth required an 
object and how the quest to discover this necessarily led to evolving singular 
answers. The search for knowledge proceeded toward an essence, a 
"fundamental thing-in-itself' (p.32). Similarly twentieth-century physics 
·rediscovered the atom, the seemingly irreducible particle, a metaphor for the 
seemingly ultimate and singular answer. 
The view of the self as a singular essence easily lends itself to, as wen as 
emanates from, a structural orientation. Many theories on the structure of 
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personality imply a hierarchy within which multiplicity at a baseline level 
gradually integrates into an ever increasingly singular dimension of selfhood. 
Thus wholeness and integration come to be seen as ideal states of personhood 
to be attained. Compare Maslow's (1954) theory on personality and motivation. 
He constructs a hierarchy of needs (for example hunger, the need for affiliation, 
and so forth) that should be solved in order to attain the goal of identity, namely 
self-actualization (Maslow, 1954). This, to Maslow, simultaneously and 
necessarily implies autonomy, individuation and authenticity (Maslow, 1962). 
An important implication of this assumption is that opposing or contradictory 
forces can and should be solved in order to attain a higher level of ego-
functioning. Compare Erikson's (1959, 1963) and Loevinger's (1976) 
developmental theses. Erikson (1959, 1963), for example, sees the whole life 
cycle as consisting of stages of dialectical tension between different and 
opposing needs. These have to be integrated and synthesized to make a 
higher level of ego-functioning possible. The very young child has, for example, 
to integrate her tendency to trust and her tendency to distrust in order to be 
able to experience hope, as well as to move on to a new phase consisting of 
another dialectical tension. This human situation of moving between two 
seemingly opposite poles, Erikson formally connotes as psychosocial crises, 
stressing in these semantics as well as through the hierarchical nature of his 
theory, the undesirability of simultaneously having seemingly contradictory 
experiences. 
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Considering the Social Function of the Modernist Western View of Person 
Sampson ( 1987) suggests that all concepts and ideals of personhood are 
cultural constructions that are designed to serve certain social purposes and 
encourage certain kinds of social practices and institutions. Similarly, the 
modernist narrative of self simultaneously arises from the underlying structures 
and practices of a hegemonic patricentric Western culture, as \Nell as operates 
to sustain these very features that give rise to it. 
To summarize the central modernist view of self (as discussed above), it can be 
said that the Western world tends to emphasize a self-contained ideal. This 
does not only imply a strong self-other boundary, but also the ideal of self in 
control. 
The question to be asked is: wtlat is the social function of this modernist 
Western construction of self? The obvious ans\Ner is clearly that the ideal of a 
bounded, self-contained, autonomous person is held out as the only way to 
accomplish social harmony and cohesion. 
Erikson (1959} explains in no uncertain terms that only after a person has 
managed to integrate her many prior selves into a unit that is clearly 
distinguishable from others, is genuine intimacy possible. Full individuation 
needs to occur before secure and useful bonds between people can be built. In 
this a major theme of the Western world-view is contained : first me, then us. As 
· Sampson (1987} puts it: the social bond can only be built after the fully self-
contained individual has been established. 
In keeping with the modernist notion of ultimate truths, this notion of the 
building of a \Nell-functioning social order is seen in the mainstream Western 
vocabulary to be the naturally ordained sequence of human growth. The 
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challenge to this ideal as not following the natural order of things but rather 
being a socially constituted version of reality, will be discussed in the next 
section. 
CHAPTER2 
THE EMERGENCE OF POSTMODERN APPROACHES TO THE WORLD 
The mostly unchallenged dominance of a modernist vocabulary in the sciences - as 
much as its self-perpetuation might have seemed to be guaranteed by the meta-
narrative of ultimate truths - did not last. Different signs started to emerge of. an 
awareness that the modernist commitment to the idea of an objective and knowable 
wor1d (and to the possibility of finding singular truths about this wor1d) might be seriously 
problematic. 
Signs of Unease with the Modernist Legacy 
The unprecedented student revolts in predominantly America and France during the 
1960's and ear1y 1970's can be considered as part of the growing unease with 
modernist narratives about the wor1d and people. Some of the important trends of 
these revolutions were contained in the seminal Port Huron Statement which was 
brought out by Students for a Democratic Society in 1962. These included a revulsion 
against the prevailing notions of quantity and materialism; a revolt against uniformity, 
standardization and homogenization - especially in the technologization of the person; 
a struggle against different forms of rigidity, such as rigid prescriptions for institutions or 
for living, or a singular1y defined ideal adult role; a strong protest against centralized 
power; and a complementary demand for participation (Bierman & Gould, 1970; 
Keniston, 1970). 
21 
Another example is the fact that Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, a 
work attacking the deterioration and rigidity of higher education in the United 
States, became a best-seller (Gergen, 1991). Gergen (1991) also refers to the 
prominent coverage that was given in the New York Times to the emerging and 
growing rejection in the field of literary studies of the idea that there are truly 
great works of English literature. 
All of these examples are manifestations of an increasingly pervasive doubt in 
the modernist view of objective truths, rational foundations of knowledge and 
the grand narrative of progress. The emergence of this doubt can be traced to 
a steadily increasing awareness and respect of other voices, other 
perspectives and other points of view (Kvale, 1992). 
Gergen ( 1991 ) points out how the tyranny of one dominant majority voice [see 
for example Mill (1970)] was diminished by the increasing ease with which 
other viey,,points could be accessed. Technological advances opened up the 
possibilities for easier travel, more and widely attended conferences and the 
emergence of a multitude of journals. Throu¥h all of these the communal 
insularity which helped to preserve the believe~· in theoretical truths became 
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increasingly difficult to maintain. The coalition of subjectivities vvhich made the 
belief in objectivity possible was thus seriously challenged. 
The awareness of different perspectives was further enhanced by the growing 
emergence of minority voices. The tendency was for these voices to start 
organizing, use technology to be more widely heard and also to enter institutes 
. of learning in a manner vvhich clearly defined them as minority group members 
or alternative voices (Schaul!, 1970). 
Ironically, the structure of knowledge in the modernist ethos has done much in 
itself to generate competition among truths (Gergen, 1991; Kvale, 1992). From 
the modernist perspective the world is filled with natural kinds, each with a 
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character of its own and deserving a separate study. This view led to the 
growth of an enormous array of self-sustaining disciplines. Each of these did, 
however, not stay content with its own little slice of reality. As disciplinary 
viewpoints became accepted realities, and as seemingly opposing realities 
came increasingly in contact with one other, the modernist assumptions about 
ultimate truths helped to fuel a growing suspicion of alternatives. Modernism, 
then, according to Gergen (1991), served to help create the multiplication of 
competing perspectives. 
As the different perspectives became more self-perpetuating, expansionary and 
hierarchical, the dilemma grew of who was to declare the ultimate truth. This 
impossibility laid the groundwork for serious challenges to the very form of 
modernist thinking which helped to create this chaos of competing voices. 
Important Shifts in Ways of Viewing the World and the Person 
Some major shifts in thinking about the \NOrld started emerging. (There is no 
consensus on whether postmodernism has transcended the modernist. 
paradigm or evolved from it (Friedman, 1993; Kvale, 1992). My suggestion is 
that postmodernism can be seen as a product of modernity.) These posed 
serious challenges to modernist presumptions about objective knowledge. 
Some central (but overlapping) trends in these shifts can be discerned 
(Gergen, 1991; Kvale, 1992; Rosenau, 1992; Stam, Rogers & Gergen, 1987). 
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Moving away from Logocentrism and Mastercodes 
Postmodemists moved away from systems of thought that claim legitimacy by 
reference to external, universally truthful propositions. Derrida (1967), for 
example, says that such systems are grounded in self-constituted logic. He 
considers them circular, self-referential and self-satisfying. According to the 
postmodemists no grounds exist for clear, universal and external validation 
(Kvale, 1992; Rosenau, 1992). 
This means that severe criticism is levelled at the use of meta-narratives or 
global 'WOrld views. Grand narratives ,(Hassan, 1987), meta/mastemarratives 
(Lyotard, 1984) and narratives that claim to be scientific and objective, that 
serve to legitimize modernity and assume justice, truth, theory and hegemony, 
are rejected. Such mastercodes are seen to assume the validity of their OWl1 
truth claims. They are expected to make it possible to anticipate all questions 
and to provide predetermined answers to all of these. However, renewed 
relevance and meaning is attributed to the traditional, the sacred, the particular 
and the irrational (Lyotard, 1984; Rosenau, 1992). Mini-narratives, micro-
narratives, local narratives or traditional narratives are seen as just stories that 
make no universal truth claim and are, therefore, more acceptable to the 
postmodemists. 
Postmodemism also challenges the assumed metanarratives within different 
disciplines. For example, within the field of architecture, the challenge is to 
. abandon the quest for efficient, pragmatic layout with an emphasis on space, 
bare structure and functionality [like the modem architectural traditions 
developed by Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright where the clarion call is 
that "less is more" (discussed in Morrison, 1935)], and rather give people 
buildings that look the way they feel, for example, fragmented or chaotic 
(compare the 'WOrk of Francesco Gaudi in Barcelona or of Ricardo Bofill in 
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France) (Cooke, 1990; Kolb, 1990; Papadakis, 1990). In the field of political 
science the assumption of the authority of a hierarchical, bureaucratic decision-
making structure is questioned. Within the field of literature the challenge is to 
abandon the adherence to strict lineality of pJot. Within psychology the 
assumption of a conscious, logical, coherent subject is questioned (Henriques, 
Holoway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Kvale, 1992; Rosenau, 1992). 
Moving from Facts to Perspectives 
Modernists a$sumed - as implied in the notion of mastercodes - that there 'Nere 
basic "somethings" or subject matters to be known about and that it was the 
task of scientists and academics to produce accurate accounts and 
explanations of these domains. Similarly it was seen that proper research 
should produce true portrayals of these matters-out-there. 
According to Rorty (1991), the idea of the mind as an internal and 
uncontaminated mirror of the external v.<>rld was largely the product of 
seventeenth-century philosophers. According to him this idea was developed in 
that time to defend the purpose of philosophical inquiry from the successful 
sciences of the day. 
Heisenberg, ho'Never, was one example of a scientist to bring a hint of trouble 
into this modernist v.<>rld -Miera it was understood that the requirements for 
. subject matter to be shO'Ml to be existing (and thus "real") subject matter, 'Nere 
that it should be definable in tenns of time and space. He shO'Ned that all units 
of matter cannot be defined in this way. The essential aspects of a particle can 
never be observed at once - the act of observation itself irretrievably distorts at 
least one of these aspects. For example, the very attempt to measure the 
position of a particle changes the position of that particle. This led to the 
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maverick implication that no subject matter can be observed without taking into 
account those who make the observation (Capra, 1996; Storig, 1979). 
This conscious concern with the observer's position and perspective continued 
to mount in academic and scientific dialogue. It was increasingly acknowledged 
that people come to every situation with practised ways of perceiving, and thus 
in the act of perceiving, actually help to produce the events punctuated by f 
consciousness. 
The move thus was from seeing so-called objective knowledge as facts-in-
themselves, to viewing it as the product of perspectives. 
Moving from Knowledge as Products of the "Real World" to Knowledge as 
Products of Social Negotiation 
Doubt was increasingly cast on the idea of the existence of a real world 
independent of experience. A renewed respect for the subjective and an 
increased suspicion of reason and objectivity emerged. This new stance carried 
the implication, amongst others, that bodies of knowledge are not verbalized 
mirrors, reflecting the actual essences of people and the world, but products of 
socially negotiated perspectives, that is, a collusion of subjectivities. 
This view offers an answer to the question of how it happens then that certain 
· views are generally taken as knowledge Yklile others are seen as erroneous. 
This becomes possible because scientists exist in communities Wiich have '"', 
their OVvfl rules of functioning and survival. What is connoted as truth becomes 
a product of the power and social negotiation within this community in contrast 
with other communities. 
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Thus it is not the world-out-there, but social processes within science and 
society that determine scientific description and explanation (Foucault, 1973, 
1979, 1980, 1982; Gergen, 1991). 
Challenging the Knower's Position as Demagogue 
Those groups to 'Nhom knowledge is attributed are usually granted the privilege 
of making decisions. Thus educational, mental health and other systems come 
to serve the interests of the~ existing power elite (Foucault, 1982; Gergen, 
1991 ). 
Foucault, in his work during the 1970's, focused on this relation bet\iveen forms 
of power and forms of knowledge. He poses a serious challenge to the 
functioning of 'Nhat he terms the regimes of truth (Foucault, 1980). Similarly, 
Marcuse (1964) saw the political content of modernist technical reason as 
domination. 
This challenge to the so-called knower's powerful position was also reflected in 
the French student uprisings. According to Foucault (in Dews, 1987), one of the 
major detonators of these revolts was the view that the university had 
transformed from a site for the transmission of liberal culture to a self-
perpetuating elite to a mass university producing the scientists and social 
engineers required by an advanced capitalist society. 
Similarly, a spreading recognition of the heterogeneity in and bet\iveen groups 
about the definition of reality, led to claims to knowledge and rights to power 
becoming points of contention (Gergen, 1991 ). Efforts at demystifying ·the 
singular voice of authority and at multiplying the voices in the wider social 
dialogue, increased. 
27 
Challenging the Knovver as (Only) Expert 
The assumption that if vve perceive the 'vVOrld correctly, and express our 
knowledge accurately, others will gain in objective knowledge, started 
floundering. 
Firstly, the idea that being trained in the right method could enable the (now) 
expert to have a duplicating and objective inner picture of some subject matter 
in the external 'vVOrld, was seriously challenged. Secondly, the notion that her 
(trained) expressions of thought, that is, her (scientific) 'vVOrds, could furnish 
suitable guides and uncontaminated pictures of the 'vVOrld-out-there, was 
increasingly seen to be problematic. Postmodern thinkers try to show that it is 
impossible to replicate something, to replace one 
object/concept/person/place/time with another, without loss of content or 
violation of intention. 
Thus, the basis for the faith in the ability of the defined knovvers to furnish 
objective knowledge of the 'vVOrld, people and even ourselves, and in the higher 
degree of trust'vVOrthiness of this knowledge, floundered. The clear modernist 
hierarchy of knowers - v.tlere, for example, a scientist's expertise is seen to be 
more useful in understanding the act of living than the contributions of a poet -
was thus challenged. This placed more emphasis on the ability of different. 
people to have and evolve their O'WTl and often different forms of expertise, and · 
ultimately, the ability of each person to think and feel for herself (Freire, 1972). 
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Moving from Ultimate Truths to Multiple Voices 
The objectivist model promises an attainable ultimate truth, a standard beyond 
time and place, a firm reality against which any form can be judged. This 
comfortable certainty was challenged by the notion that the view vve might hold 
so dear is but one of several alternatives, neither natural nor inevitable in the 
larger scheme of human possibilities. Thus the move is from singular truths to 
groups of ideas that have been historically constructed and serve social 
functions; from monotheistic centres to pantheons; from concrete, dichotomous 
entities to co-0>nstructed, dialectical relations (Byrne & McCarthy, 1988; 
Cilliers, 1995; Keeney, 1983; Sampson, E.E., 1989). 
One implication of this is that questions are posed concerning the possibility of 
rigid disciplinary boundaries between the natural sciences, humanities, social 
sciences, art and literature, and so on. Postmodernism also questions the 
boundaries read between culture and life, fiction and theory, image and reality 
in nearly every field of human endeavour (lyotard & Thebaud, 1985). 
Challenging the Social Usefulness of the Ideal of the Autonomous Integrated 
Individual 
The Western ideal for personhood of self-0>ntained individualism came to be 
. widely challenged as being a very questionable idea on wtlich to pin the hopes 
of social cohesion and harmony. 
Geertz (1973) refers to the Western view of personhood as peculiar in that it 
deviates from the more embedded kind of personhood one finds worldwide. 
Sampson ( 1987) takes this point further in suggesting three thorough 
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contradictions in the notion that this kind of personhood is socially useful. 
Firstly, he points out that constructing a character who is purported to be the 
source rather than the product of the social order inverts the sequence that 
actually occurs. In this way a rather shaky foundation for the building of society 
is established. Secondly, he criticizes the notion that social cohesion and social 
order can only appear after a firmly formed individuality has been established. 
He suggests that this kind of adherence to the ideal of firm individuality 
permeates the very conditions that interfere with social harmony rather than 
facilitate it. Thirdly, he maintains that following the Western ideal of personhood 
advances conditions that facilitate domination. This ideal holds the goal of 
maturity to be autonomy, that is inward (rather than external) control. Ho'W0ver, 
Sampson points out that autonomy masks the underlying reality of a character 
constructed on behalf of po'W0r, and that indeed, highly independent characters 
demand more external control rather than less for the social order itself to be 
maintained. 
Foucault adopts a similar stance in viewing the Western construction of the 
individual as a construction of po'W0r. He considers three great forces of 
Western civilization - rationalization, bureaucratization and individualization - in 
a thorough historical analysis of key social institutions involving discipline, 
confession and sexuality (Foucault, 1973, 1979, 1980, 1982). It is not the aim 
here to go into the full details of Foucault's argument. It will suffice to focus on 
his conclusions of a clear connection between individualization and social 
control (Foucault, 1979, 1980). He points out that the social forces that 
disembedded persons from their contexts of living and created the individual as 
. the so-called atom of society, also created a host of problems for the societal 
management and control of these newly constituted characters. In order to 
manage and control individuals, ways of measuring and assessing human 
characteristics had to be invented, thereby further extending individualization 
as an aspect of po'W0r. This extension of individualization and its function for 
governing po'W0r coincided with a growing discourse on individual autonomy. 
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Foucault points out that this both masked the reality that individualization is part 
of a process of power, management and control, and helped contribute to still 
further individualization (Dreyfuss & Rabinow, 1982). 
Many other writers join in the argument that the idealized push for increased 
differentiation and individualization was part of a process seeking the growing 
standardization and, in that, management and control of human action, in order 
to increase the certainty and predictability of human action. The Western 
person-self-ego-individual is viewed as a character designed to desire her own 
domination, a character constituted to be self-defeating, who must invariably be 
at war with society and herself (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; Parker, 1989; Scott, 1 
1981 ). This is a process through which a person seeks to be the very thing that 
further enslaves her (McCulloch, 1995). 
These v..iriters view the individual as a product of a system of exploitation and 
see this feature as being masked in the discourse of autonomous self-control. 
They join the antistructuralists in emphasizing the importance of a move toward 
a very different kind of individual, one who is multiple, more fluidly bounded and 
interconnected (much like reality itself is vie'Ned} (Sampson, 1985). 
These shifts in the ideas about ideal personhood manifested in different 
academic discourses, some of which will be discussed in the next section. 
Important Markers in the Emergence of Different Ideas of Selfhood 
A science of the person that emphasizes the current form of individualism is 
and was more likely to gain widespread acceptance because of its congruence 
with the rest of Western culture. However, different discernible challenges to 
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the discourse of autonomous self-control as an ideal has appeared (Sampson, 
1987; 1989). Some of these will be revie'Ned. 
Systems Theory 
Systems theory has presented an epistemological position in which ontological 
primacy is given to relations rather than individual entities. In contrast to lineal 
epistemology, it is attuned to interrelation, complexity and context. Bateson 
( 1972) observes that the unit of natural survival is neither the individual nor the 
society. In fact, there is no homogenous unit of survival at all, only a system, 
termed the ecosystem which comprises both organism and environment. An 
organism which manages to destroy its environment, manages to destroy itself. 
Thus Bateson suggests that only in thinking in both/and terms can one see that 
the issue of living is not one of opposition (between person and environment -
thereby delineating them as separate entities) but of differences. Importantly, 
these differences are not seen to inhere in the entity, but rather in the relations 
among the parts of the system (Bateson, 1972; Keeney, 1983). 
Thus the focus is on connectedness, relationships and context. The essential 
properties of a living system are properties of the whole, which none of the 
parts have. These properties arise from the interactions and relations bet\Neen 
the parts. This also implies that these properties will be lost when the system is 
dissected (physically or theoretically) into isolated parts. Although it is possible 
· to discern separate parts of a system, these parts can never exist or be studied 
in isolation. Similarly, the nature of the whole will always be more than the sum 
of its parts (Bateson, 1972; Capra, 1996; Keeney, 1983). 
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Cross-cultural Enquiry 
Cross-cultural work has suggested significant variations in personhood around 
the world. Different writers (Gergen & Davis, 1985; Heelas & Lock, 1981; 
McCulloch, 1995; Sh'Neder & Bourne, 1982) offer many illustrations of the rich 
cultural variety in personhood, lending further credence to Geertz's reference to 
the peculiarity of the still dominant Western form. 
In general cross-:-eultural enquiry has brought a contextual sensitivity in its 
process and has - in content - uncovered several significant instances of much 
less individuated understandings of self (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 
1992; Bucher, 1980; Dunham, 1984; Geertz, 1973; Miller, 1984; Sampson, 
E.E., 1989). 
Kotze (1993), for example, discusses in great detail the way in 'A'hich a 
collective consciousness permeates the understandings of world, others and 
self found amongst many black South Africans. Such collective constructions of 
personhood will appear almost incomprehensible if interpreted with the 
intellectual tools formed by an individualistic consciousness (of 'A'hich traditional 
psychological theorizing about personality is a prime example). 
Lower-class African-American families 'Nere also found to typically differ 
markedly from the implicit but prevailing model of the ideal nuclear family as 
found in mainstream psychological theories (Skolnick, 1973). Similarly, Fisek 
· ( 1991 ) shows how proximity plays a very different role in the functioning of 
Turkish families than 'A'hat is usually conceptualized as good family functioning. 
Tamura and Lau (1992) also show how Japanese families differ significantly 
from British families in their preference for connectedness. The Japanese 
person is seen (in that society) as a part of the embedded interconnectedness 
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of relationships, whereas British norms prioritize separateness and clear 
boundaries in relationships, as well as individuality and autonomy. 
A criticism of the Western notion of a person as individually bounded being set 
off contrastively against other such beings, is also given by Credo Mutv.ia in his 
teachings about the universe, as contained in Yena Lo! My Africa. (Substantial 
verbatim quotes are used here in order to show to what an extent the kind of 
language used in this text differs from typical modernist Vvriting in the social 
sciences. The different kind of discourse also serves to set completely different 
parameters for the way personhood is understood.) He Vvrites (Mutv.ia, 1964, 
pp.458-459): 
My son, you have been a Christian ... you have 
been one of those who have turned their backs on 
the religion of their forefathers to follow the religion 
of the aliens, and so you will understand so much 
better the vast difference that exists between the 
beliefs of your forefathers and that of the aliens, 
and also that of the Hyena people, whom you know 
as the Arabs. 
They tell you that God created Man in His image; 
they also tell you that God gave Man a special, 
separate soul... My son, the aliens are misleading 
our people. 
Man doe~ not possess a special soul, exclusive to 
himself. All . souls are the same... The soul of the 
impala that you have seen disappearing into a thick 
bush while walking in the forest may once have 
been a tenant in the body of someone you knew. 
The crocodile that nearly ate you while you were 
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crossing the river, may have been carrying the soul 
of one of your ancestors ... 
He also expands on the nature of a soul and in that gives an account as 'h'ell as 
judgement of what motivates people's living that contrasts strongly with rational 
and logical Western explanations of, and prescriptions for, personhood (Mutwa, 
1964, p.460) . 
... The two worm-like creatures you saw in each 
soul 'h'ere Good and Evil. .. The red worm stands 
for all the bad things in a man or a woman -
dishonesty, cruelty, pride, low cunning, spiritual 
and corporal perversity, cowardice, low morality. 
The royal blue worm stands for all the good in a 
human being or an animal - loyalty, courage, 
honesty, love and charity. These worm-like 
components help to balance the soul. A 
combination of good and evil, equally balanced, is 
essential - for all souls that exist. .. must have a 
perfect balance betvveen Life and Death ... 
This is why people Wio are really good, never live 
long. The two '"M:>rms" are always quarrelling and 
Wien the one hurts the other, the soul is 
temporarily unbalanced. If it happens to be the red 
'M>rm that hurts the blue 'M>rm, then the man 
inhabited by the soul becomes evil - he becomes a 
thief, a murderer and even 'M>rse. The laws of our 
fathers say that \Ne must kill such a man, kill him so 
that the soul may also be destroyed. If a man 
becomes very good, the highest example of virtue, 
then \Ne must pray to the gods to bring this man to 
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an early grave, because although he is good, his 
body and soul have lost their balance and such a 
man has forfeited his right to exist in a world in 
which anything can happen when people are not 
normal and balanced. I have spoken. 
In addition to a soul, a person is seen to possess a self, or Ena. Some 
understandings of the qualities of this self includes the following (Mutwa, 1964, 
pp.461-462): 
When the person is born, it does not possess a 
self. The self builds up slowly of the memories and 
thoughts and the experiences as it grows up ... The 
Ena is not immortal; it lives on for some time after 
death of the body and can often be seen ... The 
Ena [self] rides across the lake of time on the 
Soul. .. Ho'Never, both the Soul and Ena (character 
is a combination of the t'NO) are always a few days 
ahead of the body ... These go through experiences 
first, which afterwards overtake the body. For 
instance, if a man is going to fall victim of an 
accident in one or t'NO days' time, the soul and the 
Ena are the first to fall victim of that accident. And 
when this happens the soul sends a warning to the 
body through the mind, in the form of a premonition 
or dream. 
These widely accepted understandings illustrate conceptions of self far 
removed from the modernist conceptualisations and ideals of personhood. It 
also raises a suggestion of the limitations and arrogance inherent in modernist 
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Western thinking's ascription of absolute truth to its own theories, as succinctly 
pointed out by Mutwa, ( 1969, p.148): 
There is nothing more saddening than a man 
deliberately blinding himself to the shimmering lake 
of reality. There is nothing more pathetic than the 
sight of a man who, on beholding the frowning 
mountain in the purple distance yonder, still insists 
that the mountain is not there - a man who, though 
standing knee-deep in a roaring river, insists with 
stubborn conviction that he is standing on a sand 
dune in the Ka-Lahari. 
Such a man is the typical scientist in Africa today. 
Feminist Alternatives 
Feminist writings (Gilligan, 1982; McGoldrick, Anderson & Walsh, 1989; 
1 Weingarten, 1991) suggest that alternative views of personhood exist within the 
dominant Western culture. This notion of what Gilligan ( 1982) calls the different 
voice of women is seen to strongly call into question the modernist theories of a 
singular ideal personhood. She writes: 
The failure to see the different reality of women's 
lives and to hear the differences in their voices 
stems in part from the assumption that there is a 
single mode of social experience and 
interpretation. By positing instead two different 
modes, VoJe arrive at a more complex rendition of 
human experience. (p.173) 
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//Understandings of what the differentness of various women's voices entail, 
focus strongly on patterns of relating. Writers such as Chodorow ( 1978), 
Gilligan (1982) and McGoldrick (1989) suggest a basis for women's greater 
concern with relationship and connection and men's preference for separation 
and individuality. Thus men have difficulty with relating, females with 
individuation. The male identity domain holds tight boundaries for the exercise 
of exclusion, the female identity domain has loose boundaries for the process 
of interconnection. Males tend to believe that there is one right way to live and 
their task is to find it. Females tend to believe that there are many right ways to 
live and their task is to find the right one for now. 
Following this notion Gilligan (1982) not only criticizes Piaget's theories for 
being based on male models and standards, but also revises Kohlberg's male-
centred theory of moral reasoning. She points out women's greater concern 
with caring and with maintaining connections in grappling with moral dilemmas. 
Thus responsibility is understood in the context of relationships. This is in 
contrast with the male concept of morality which emphasizes fairness and ties 
moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. 
The feminine alternative is thus seen as follows: because women's sense of 
self is defined in terms of relationship and connection rather than separation 
and individuality, being defined relationally is not experienced as a threat to 
autonomy or as a frustration to personal growth and self-development. The 
latter stems from the male 'herld-view with its more egocentrically separating 
·self-definition (Imber-Black, 1988; Lykes, 1985; McGoldrick, 1989; Sampson, 
1987). 
Additionally the feminists suggest that the silencing of the female voice through 
ignoring 'hemen's different development has resulted not just in harm to women 
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but is an impoverishment of our ability to understand humanity (Collier, 1987; 
Gilligan, 1982). 
Deconstruction ism 
Deconstructionists have challenged all notions that give primacy to the subject 
or author. Without proposing to explain the complex theories of deconstruction, 
brief focus will be placed on some of the challenges these 'Miters have posed 
to the Western person and world-view. 
They argue that persons as subjects are constructed in and through a symbolic 
system that fixes the subject in place while remaining beyond the subject's full 
mastery. In other words, the person is not at the centre, fully aware and a self-
present master, but has been decentered by these relations to the symbolic 
order. This notion thus challenges the idea of the Western subject as one who 
is at the centre of awareness (Derrida, 1978, 1981; Wilden, 1980). 
Deconstructionism also challenges the Western concept of self as integrated. 
This modernist notion is seen to be underpinned by the tendency to break 
reality do'Ml into paired opposites (for example central versus marginal, truth 
versus falsehood), one of which is seen as hierarchically higher or better than 
the other. The aim of deconstructionism is not to abolish such opposites or to 
show that the second tenn is in fact better than the first. Rather, it is to show 
. that the differences between the tenns mask a mutual dependency or 
sameness. Given these assumptions, the Derridian view proposes a subject 
that is multi-dimensional, decentred and without hierarchical integration. It 
proposes a process and a paradox, but never a beginning or an end (Derrida, 
1967, 1981; Macrone, 1994; Ogilvy, 1979; Sampson, 1987). 
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As shown above the Western subject is built on an either/or notion and uses 
the logic of identity. It builds its notion of autonomous personhood on the idea 
of one entity being set contrastively against other entities. By contrast, Derrida's 
(1967) logic of the supplement (of differance, rather than of identity) is a 
both/and logic. He shows that the first term of the seeming dualism (for 
example centre/margin, presence/absence) is never self-sufficient, but always 
only understood in relation to the second term. This implies that what 
something is also thoroughly inhabited by what that something is not. Thus the 
Derridian subject can never be set apart from the multiple others who are its 
very essence (Derrida, 1967, 1978; Macrone, 1994; Sampson, 1987; Wilden, 
1980). 
Social Constructionism 
Social constructionists have argued that selves, persons and psychological 
traits are social and historical constructions, not naturally occurring phenomena 
(Gergen, 1971, 1985a, 1985b, 1989, 1993; Gergen, Greenberg & Willis, 1980; 
Hoffman, 1993; Stam et al., 1987). 
The theory of social constructionism and its implications for the emergence of 
selfhood will be discussed in more depth in the following section. While this 
theoretical stance serves as epistemological basis for this study, it does not 
exclude many of the ideas referred to above. Systems theory, 
· deconstructionism, and so forth, may be discernible thought systems, but their 
contributions, also to the topic under scrutiny here, flow usefully into the same 
intellectual landscape. 
CHAPTER3 
SELF AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
The Theory of Social Constructionism 
A Brief Historical Perspective 
The rise of the constructionist movement can best be understood against the 
backdrop of the continuous disputation between two very different basic 
epistemological orientations (Gergen, 1982, 1985b; Shatter & Gergen, 1989). 
These two perspectives, like all epistemology, set out to elucidate the processes 
by which people come to describe, explain or otherwise account for the mrld in 
which they live. 
On the one hand, there is the exogenic perspective which sees knowledge as a 
pa'Ml of nature. This view, as expounded by philosophers such as Locke, Hume 
and Mills [see for example, Locke (1979)], sees proper knowledge as mirroring the 
actualities of the real 'M:>rld. This tradition forms the basis of much of modernist 
thinking (for example, behaviourism) as discussed above. The exogenic 
perspective can also be described as forming the metatheoretical basis of the 
science of psychology itself (Gergen, 1982). 
On the other hand, philosophers such as Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche [see for 
example, Spinoza (1956) and Nietzsche (1968)] and various phenomenologists 
have adopted an endogenic perspective which sees knowledge as endemic to the 
organism. Human beings are seen to possess certain tendencies and/or abilities 
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to think, categorize and thus process information. Thus, according to them, it is 
these innate tendencies and abilities, rather than the world out there, which is of 
paramount importance in fashioning knowledge (Gergen 1985a, 1985b; Shetter & 
Gergen, 1989). 
The endogenic perspective has emerged in the field of psychology in a few guises, 
most notably in phenomenological psychology, and cognitive and social 
psychology. For example, concepts such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), emotions as perceived (Schachter, 1964) and the transactional model of 
stress (Lazarus, 1980) all carry the premise that human action is dependent on the 
world as processed rather than the world as it is. 
Gergen (1985a), however, sees this exogenic-endogenic antimony (as witnessed 
not only in psychology, also in philosophy and other social sciences) as an 
ongoing pendulum of which the movement can be recapitulated again and again. 
The challenge accepted by many, such as the constructionist thinkers (Rorty, 
1979), has been to rise above this subject-object dualism. Knowledge is neither 
something that is inherent and attainable in the 'MJrld out there, nor something that 
individuals possess, but rather something they do. This perspective of knowledge 
as social achievement is what social constructionism sets out to explicate. 
The Basic Tenets of Social Constructionism 
Gergen (1985a) summarizes a central theme of social constructionism succinctly 
when he states that it rests on a "radical doubt in the taken for granted mrld" 1 
(p.6). This theory challenges the objective basis of conventional knowledge. It 
does not accept that commonly accepted knowledge, beliefs and understandings 
can be clear mental representations of the 'Mlrld and achieve their validity through 
appropriate observation of the world out there (Gergen, 1971, 1982, 1985a, 
1985b). 
', ( ,,_ 
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Rather, social constructionism sees the terms in which the world is understood as 
"social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges between people" 
(Gergen, 1985a, p.6). Thus, seemingly objective criteria for identifying behaviours, 
traits, events or entities (which much of psychology endeavours to achieve in 
various specific inquiries) are always highly circumscribed by history, culture and 
social context. 
In this way a recentering (Gergen, 1981) is achieved, a move from a concern with 
~gnitiv~ ~rocesses to one of social exchange. Cognition is not seen to essentially . 
determine social activity as much as -~o~i~~~~ivity is see_n to __ deterrnine what we . 
~~~~ve to constitute cognitive processes. Terms of understandings within groups 
and societies are, therefore, the result of an active, co-operative enterprise of 
persons in relationships. Languages of understanding are employed by persons 
in their attempt to carry on mutual enterprises (Gergen, 1982, 1985a, 1989; 
Gergen et at., 1980). 
These constructions that are socially negotiated can undergo significant changes . 
i 
across time. Such change is not seen to reflect alterations in the object of concern, 
but is once again based on other historically significant social or cultural factors. 
Thus, the degree to vA'lich a given form of understanding prevails across time is 
not a functipn of its empirical or objective validity. Rather, it depends on the 
I ' ' , · t { ~"'-l\;)"·~1 S'\. , , 
vicissitudes Gf 'social processes. (This view can, for example, be illustrated through 
the argument that the epistemology of modem science and its accompanying 
description of person and the ideal of individualization were developed largely as 
a means of social control.) Likewise, vA'lether an act is defined (for example) 
content-wise as sex or violence or morality-wise as appropriate or not, rests on a 
myriad of social exchanges and negotiations. Thus, communities of interpreters 
evolve through vA'lom reality is essentially negotiated (Gergen, 1985a, 1989; 
Hoffman, 1993). 
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These forms of negotiated understanding are critically significant in social life in 
that they are integrally connected to many other activities in w'hich people engage. 
Specific descriptions and interpretations invite specific actions (Gergen 1985a; 
Hoffman, 1993; Shatter & Gergen, 1989). This also explains the concern among 
certain writers (such as Foucault) with the specific conventions of discourse that 
psychology, for example, chooses to employ around the understanding of persons 
and their actions. These invented categories could have broad social implications. 
Consider, for example, the possibly damaging and limiting effects on children of 
certain constructions of how a child's mind 'MJrks (Walkerdine, 1984) or the effects 
of a now intellectualized sexism inherent in the assumed superiority and 
universality of patricentric principles in moral decision-making (Gilligan, 1982). 
The theory of social constructionism, then, emphasizes the contextual nature of 
truths w'hich abide in multiverses. Situations and interactions generate their o'N!'l 
truths, and one cannot argue that one universe exists. Constructionism basically 
proposes that the 'MJrld may not be the same if \NS do not interact or are not in it 
any longer - \NS co-construct the universe. 
The Centrality of Language 
The poststructuralists, in their effort to dismantle the traditional foundations of 
Western thought, challenge the notion of a structure inherent to any entity in 
question, \\tlether it be a text, a family, the self, or a specific understanding of the 
'NPrld. (There is an ongoing debate about the difference, if any, between the ~-
concepts "postmodern" and "poststructural". For the purposes of this argument, 
ho\NSver, the t'MJ are used synonymously inasfar as they denote the challenge to 
any frame'MJrk that posits some kind of internal structure.) This defection from the 
focus on structure - for example, the cybernetic view of the family as a homeostatic 
system or the empiricist concept of knowledge as mental representation - has 
made it necessary to consider alternative conceptions of wtiat passes as 
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knowledge in human affairs. One major candidate that has been receiving much 
attention is that of the linguistic rendering (Gergen, 1985a; Hoffman, 
1993).(According to Hoffman (1993), it is because postmodern and poststructural 
ideas were originated by people in semiotics and literary criticism, that it started 
becoming increasingly common in talking of social fields of study to use the 
analogy of a narrative or text.) 
Wittgenstein's ( 1953, 1969) w-itings have contributed greatly to moving beyond a 
view of our vocabulary and discourse as derived through observation and 
representative of internal or external phenomenological givens. Instead, he sees 
mental predicates as semantically free-floating. In addition, he views linguistic 
discourse as essentially part of a social process. Words gain their meaning not in 
their capacity to reflect reality, but through their use in social interchange. 
These tenets from Wittgenstein's (1953, 1969) thinking have been extensively 
used by many w-iters in the social sciences in their efforts to find fresh 
perspectives on the origins and evolution of our understandings of the 'NC>rld and 
people. In essence, language is conceptualized as the mechanism through which 
meaning and reality are negotiated. Furthermore, the conventions of the discourse 
are seen to guide the possibilities that open for people to engage in specific ways 
with self, each other and the v.orld (Geertz, 1986; Gergen, 1989; Harre, 1985, l 
1989). 
Writers like Anderson and Goolishian (1988, 1992) have done much to develop 
the idea of reality as constituted through language and of groups as constituted. 
through consensual languaging (into communities of interpreters). Accordingly, the · 
social constructionist theorists see ideas, concepts and memories as arising from 
social interchange and mediated through language. 
It is also in this that the "social" part of social construction theory lies. The 
categories into which we divide the 'NC>rld and according to which we act and 
attribute meaning are not prescribed by natural law, vicariously received or 
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individually invented. They evolve in the space between people and are 
transmitted, communicated and passed on through symbolic action, such as 
language (Gergen, 1985a, 1989; Harre, 1984, 1985, 1989; Wittgenstein, 1953, 
1969). 
For example, Averill (1982) questions the assumption that common categories for 
classifying emotions reflect real or fundamental differences in biological 
functioning. Laing (1969) and many others challenge the so-called objective 
criteria for diagnozing schizophrenia as a genetically transmitted and biologically 
based mental illness. Hoffman (1993) sees the rush to define treatable mental 
conditions and the expanding of DSM-IV labels as due to the present economics 
of mental health. According to her, the diagnosis industry is at the heart of the 
reimbursement system in the USA, as health insurance coverage is only 
forthcoming if problems can be properly labelled, preferably as biological illnesses, 
and thereby defined as treatable. All of these vvriters illustrate a profound criticism 
of the objective criteria for identifying behaviours, events or entities, as they find 
these criteria to be highly circumscribed by history or social context, or altogether 
non-existent. 
An important implication of this view is that language is not only ·the medium 
through which interpretations of the Vl.()rld is carried, but constitutes social action in 
itself. Conventions of discourse also guide social exchange. 
An indeterminate array of understandings/constructions may be derived for any 
given situation. Some voices/understandings/categories, hO'Never, are granted 
superiority over others on the basis of socially derived criteria. Which voice 
prevails in the sea of alternatives, may be critical to the fate of the person, 
relationships, family life, community, or even to the Mure of humankind (Gergen, 
1989; Harre, 1989). Gergen (1989) refers to the process through which certain 
linguistic constructions are granted superiority by offering certain rationales or 
justifications, as achieving warrant. 
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Gergen ( 1989) also argues that one of the most typical social conventions of 
warrant is the reference to mental events. For example, one may claim superiority 
of voice by virtue of your claim to possessing certain characteristics of mind 
yourself, or by denigrating your "opponent's" inner inferiorities. You may also claim 
warrant on the basis of possessing privileged mental representation of the outer 
world (for example, "I saw it with my own eyes"). In the battle for warrant of a 
certain voice that ensues from the preceding kind of positioning, claim is also 
made to historically supported or institutionalized warrants (such as the body of 
knowledge in psychology Wiich has developed over time and Wiich, through 
repeated and particular use, is regarded as "proven knowledge"). This 
accumulated armamentarium of centuries of debate thus become symbolic 
resources in the battle of linguistic constructions of world and person. 
All of the above suggests that self-knowledge (for example) is not the product of in-
depth probing of the inner recesses of the psyche, or adequately controlled 
experimentation with emotions and the like. Rather, functional self-knowledge 
entails a mastery of discourse - knowing how rather than knowing Wiat. The 
challenge in the experience of self is to find the linguistic skills that can make the 
inner world come to life. Full social functioning is thus a product of the dance 
achieved with symbolic resources, that is, linguistic constructions that have been 
and are being socially negotiated. 
The Social Construction of the Self 
Within social constructionist thinking, as noted in the previous section, the construct 
self-concept is removed from the head and placed within the sphere of social 
discourse. The locus of individual functioning is removed from the interior region of 
the mind to the processes and structure of human interchange. The question ''why" 
is answered not with a psychological trait, state or process, but with consideration of 
people in relationships (Brighton-Cleghorn, 1987; Gergen, 1971, 1985a, 1985b, 
1989; Gergen & Davis, 1985; Hoffman, 1993; Lynch, Norem-Hebeisen & Gergen, 
47 
1981 ). 
This implies that the person is not conceptualized by herself or others in specific 
ways because they can (more or less correctly) through observation or other 
methods, approximate the way she intrinsically is. A sense of self is developed in 
conjunction with others. There is a constant recursive process bervveen our defining 
of ourselves in interaction with others' perceived definitions of us. Furthermore, the 
way -we perceive, describe and explain our O'M1 and others' behaviour is decisively 
influenced by received conceptualizations of the person in relationship to the 
existing and historical moral-social order(s) and the perceived natural order. In this 
way constructed self-concepts differ radically within different kinds of societies. 
[Compare, for example, the prevalence of individual goals and habits in self-
descriptions in Western societies with the more communal self-conception in other 
societies where anything idiosyncratic is muted in favour of the person's assigned 
place in the continuous communal saga (as described by Geertz, 1973). It 'NOuld 
ho-wever be a mistake to assume that the one language here (the Western one) 
comparatively allows "more" freedom in the construction of who you want to be. As 
pointed out in an earlier section, the vociferous adherence to individuality can also 
be seen as a very effective means of social control that is disguised in the discourse 
of individual freedom.] In all cases though, conceptualizations of ourselves and 
others is in some way presupposed by our constructed social orders and is a 
requisite for its functioning (Lax, 1992; Shweder, 1984; Shweder & Miller, 1985). 
A sense of self not only arises through our discourse with others, but is our 
discourse with others. Thus -we shape the realities -we encounter by co- and re-
constructing the communities of interpreters within which our definitions of self, 
other and the 'NOrld are negotiated (Lax, 1992). 
Thus, the person is seen, not as the autonomous foreground against a social and 
natural back.ground, but as the mediated product of society who can also in her 
acting, reproduce or potentially transform that society. Furthermore, people can 
transform themselves by transforming the structures by which they are formed 
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(Gergen & Davis, 1985; Lax, 1992). 
Basic Tenets Around the Construct "Self' 
As discussed above, the social constructionist perspective has far-reaching 
implications for understandings of the emergence and functioning of self. Some 
basic assumptions underlying a constructionist discourse of self can - in 
summarized form - be distinguished as follows. 
The Self as Construction Rather than Fact 
Constructionism rejects the idea of self as an entity or physical thing that can be 
studied scientifically. The conception of self as if it has substance is seen as the 
result of a reifying empirical discourse 'htlich serves the function of buying scientific 
respectability (Kvale, 1992). 
Instead, it is proposed that ideas of self are the products of the discourse that 
emanates from the processes and structure of human interchange. There is no 
hidden self to be discovered. We reveal ourselves in every moment through the 
ongoing narrative that we are developing with others. Lax ( 1992) refers to the 
philosopher Levinas who states: ''the I does not begin with itself in some pure 
moment of autonomous self-consciousness, but in relation with the other, for 'htlom 
. it remains forever responsible" (p.71 ). 
In the same vein Harre (1989) states that the 'NOrd "I" does not have a referent and 
does not reflect ontological occurrences. Rather, 'htlen people are making 
attributions according to a first-person epistemology, they are correctly playing a 
language game. This specific language game adheres to the assumptions of 
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modernism, for example in the extent to vvhich agency is ascribed to the individual 
and the role of social processes are denied. Through these games, our intentions 
and private experiences are acquired and given meaning. 
Similarly, the idea of will is an outcome of a language game rather than an 
ontological construct. Psychology, ho\Never, has given this concept scientific 
legitimacy and facilitated its adoption as a prerequisite for being human. The idea of 
will also allows people to perceive themselves as agents, responsible for the 
choices they make - a process that contributes to the perpetuation of a certain 
social order (Friedman, 1993; Harre, 1989). This view is in keeping with Sampson's 
perspective on personal choice as a fallacy and on people as existing within a set of 
symbols vvhich they cannot fully master (Sampson, E. E., 1989). 
The Self as Process Rather than Structure 
The notion of the self as a thing also implies that it has structural properties vvhich 
give it stability over time and that these should be the focus of study. 
By contrast, the constructionists focus on process, that is, the principles of operation 
or forces at play in the ongoing social construction of self. Thus the focus is not on , 
an ontological given, but on a multifaceted being continuously being constructed out , 
of historically situated social relations. 
In fact, it is modernist language games that enable us to understand the human 
interior as if it is a fragmented, isolated and static centre of being (Shatter, 1989). 
This understanding emanates from the idea that language does not only have a ? 
representational, but also a rhetorical function. In other w::>rds, language is used in 
such a way that the social order that it evolves from will necessarily be confirmed. 
Thus the way in which seemingly objective research questions are asked already : 
pre-empts the anS\Ner. 
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Traditional research about the self reflects language patterns which adhere to the 
rules of positivistic, empirical science, which in turn emanates from the social order 
of modernity. Modernity, again, can be seen as a cultural practice that adulates 
hypothetical deductive reasoning as a means of understanding the world (Jordaan 
& Jordaan, 1994; Kitzinger, 1989; Parker, 1989). Here empirical research is posited 
as the advanced technique through which the real truth about the world and people 
can be discovered. 
This kind of research is a form of communication that usurps credibility through the 
rhetoric devices employed. For example, in this research system, the researcher 
positions his subjects by asking acontextual questions about them and submitting 
them to what Rose (1989) calls the gaze. This kind of surveillance - the use of a 
third person in referring to the subjects of the research as \!Veil as the avoidance of 
any use of the first person - creates a context within which the perspective of all 
human functioning (including the research act) as social process is denied. Harre 
(1989) notes that this kind of language game allows us to understand the self as if it 
is a separate entity that exists with stable characteristics. (It is also a rhetorical 
device that allows for the acknowledgement of po\IVer relations to be sidestepped.) 
The moment that the researcher's perspective is acknowledged and the subjective 
reality of the research is incorporated in the language patterns and ascriptions, all 1 
i 
meanings are constructed as a social process. Then the I which evolves from being 
a you in relation is included in scientific statements on personhood (Shatter, 1989). 
When perspectives are included, processwise, contextual, temporal statements of 
self replace static universal laws of human functioning. 
Then the self becomes seen as process, a contextual, co-constructed identity in 
continual motion. It is an ! defined by its everchanging relation to an-other and by its 
position within a social and linguistic context. 
I , 
( 
I 
I. 
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The Self as lntersubjectively and Interdependently Created 
The modernist view of self proposes an autonomous being which has ontological 
primacy and which is set off contrastively against others and the environment as 
background. 
This view is rejected in constructionist thinking where the reality of self is seen to be 
intersubjectively created through the negotiation between participants. This implies 
an interpenetration between person and the natural and social environment in which 
neither has ontological primacy. 
In this vein Friedman (1993) refers to the other as the space within which we know 
how we exist. Thus to develop the experience of an I is wholly dependent on the 
experience of being addressed as a you. 
In this view, the /, when posited as an independent being, becomes an empty sign 
with little substance, despite research and empirical construction to the contrary 
(Gergen, 1989). Rather, it is all the roles people are recruited into, all the yous 
people are co-opted into being, that form the matrix from which the ! emerges 
(Shatter, 1989). 
The Self as Multiple and Fragmented 
The details and terminology of traditional discourse about the conception or view a 
person can have of herself suggests a strong tendency to think of the self in the 
singular. Constructionism, however, replaces this notion of the self as a single, 
global and unified entity with a view of self-conception as fragmented and multiple. 
Personhood and its ideal is seen as a multi-dimensional, decentered self rather 
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than the integrated, hierarchically arranged traditional conception (Derrida, 1978). 
Following from this, the person is conceived of as an essentially dialectical being. 
Thus she is not seen to display opposing forces that need to be solved in an 
either/or way, but rather experiences and processes that always exist in both/and 
counterpart. (This notion is in keeping with the general attempt to transcend 
dichotomies, which, according to Kvale (1992), unites all manifestations of 
postmodern thought.) This rests on the assumption that what something is, is 
always thoroughly inhabited by what that something is not. 
The person's construction (or development) of a sense of self thus does not depend 
on the successful solving of inner conflicts. Rather, it is embedded in the tension 
that emanates from the simultaneous experience of a variety of counterparts. The 
existence of a-more open manifestation of one pattern in the experience of self does 
not deny the presence of a number of seemingly opposite patterns. What becomes 
more apparent is rather the result, once again, of complex negotiations between 
participants and with environments. 
This account of self brings with it the implication of an incoherent experience of 
personhood, in which it is not possible to experience a constancy of self (Young, 
1989). 
The Relationally Constructed Self : Self Implies Participation in Community 
As noted above, the sense of a self (or selves) is intersubjectively created. Such an 
emphasis on the relational domain within which knowledge is constructed, directs 
our attention to the notion of a community of interpreters and observers. Gaining a 
sense of self implies participation in centralized local communities of significance. 
It is within the interactions and negotiations within such a community that verification 
is sought and gained about the meaning of things, about what is appropriate and 
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inappropriate and so forth. Moving through discursive communities provides us with 
the opportunities for certain interpretations, explanations, descriptions and lines of 
action to emerge, and for others to be constrained. In this way every 
meaningmaking community and process necessarily contains some form of 
censorship. As Rushdie puts it, the telling of one story makes the telling of another 
impossible. Thus certain interactive patterns are created through which seemingly 
coherent versions of reality, that is, the 'M:>rld, others and self, emerge. What people 
do together provides not only the viability but also the sustainability of particular 
lines of action and interpretation. Furthermore, the patterns of certain meanings and 
actions that develop, again construct the dominant or interactive patterns in a given 
community, thereby defining what will be considered important, central, marginal, 
and so forth. (Gergen, 1989; McNamee, 1992). 
Thus, developing a sense of self necessarily implies interaction and co-creation with 
(and in that membership of) specific discursive communities. I implies living in local 
or significant communities within which meaning or practices emerge within certain 
patterns. Moving within these communities also provides the opportunity of 
sustaining meanings. Should any of the interactive patterns change, movements in 
the patterns of interpretation of self and the 'M:>rld will result, and vice versa. 
The Role of Difference in Experiencing the Relational Self 
The perception of difference serves an important function in the modernist 
perspective on self-conception. In this traditional view it serves to set whole beings 
contrastively off against each other. In this way, individuals/selves become more 
definable in a process that serves the ideals of autonomy and separateness. 
In constructionist thinking, however, the perception of difference is equally if not 
more important, but serves a completely different function in this very alternative 
scheme of things. 
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The experience of difference Jalso in the form of change) is conceptualized as the 
points at which the relations amongst the parts of a system are described. At these 
points, then, a relational or contextual sense of the parts can emerge more clearly 
(Bateson, 1972). 
To apply this idea more clearly to self, when a person experiences a punctuation of 
difference bet\veen herself and others or in her usual pattern of relationship, she is 
bumping up against a sense of her experience of the relationship itself, of the 'NOrld, 
as well as of whom she senses herself to be as participant with the other in some 
kind of bigger dance. 
The Role of Crisis in (Re)Constructing Self: Separation as Crisis, Crisis as 
Separation 
As noted above, the experience of difference in usual patterns of relationship 
becomes an important moment for the invocation of a discourse about the sense of 
the self~ The experience of crisis can be seen as such a moment. 
In folklore, as well as traditional thinking in psychology, t'NO positions can be 
distinguished around the conceptualization of crisis. Firstly, crisis is seen as 
something that happens to the person. Cirrumstances are seen to bring crisis to her 
(Hoff, 1984). Secondly, crisis is often understood as a natural extension of who and 
v.tiat she is. It is something about the person that causes her to be in crisis. Both of 
these positions imply an individualistic focus. It also conceives of crisis as a thing 
we can have or possess and per implication also get rid of (McNamee, 1992; 
Sampson, E.E., 1989). 
However, .from a constructionist position crisis is not seen as an individual's 
problem, but a communally constructed phenomenon. Similarly, it is not something 
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that can be gotten rid of, but is rather a moment of reconstructing our webs of 
meaning (Lifschitz, 1988, 1991 ), for example, our sense of identity. 
How we know that we are in crisis is made possible by our particular movements 
through our specific discursive communities. In our interactions with others and the 
context at that time, we can participate in either the continuation or the 
reconstruction of the crisis as well as our "knowing" up till that point. Even though 
reconstruction as such is not apparent, the experience of crisis brings us 
(interactively) to new ways of knowing vvhat we thought we knew previously. In that 
way, our world of meanings necessarily shifts at these points. 
Crisis can be conceived of as a boundary experience vvhich simultaneously implies 
our usual full participation in a centralized, local discourse about ourselves and the 
world (McNamee, 1992). 
The "boundary" quality of the constructions around this moment is manifested in 
typical languaging or expressions people tend to use at this time, such as "it pushed 
me to the edge". Other expressions that typically emerge are ones of feeling 
unanchored or unattached, such as "I feel lost" or "I felt that I had lost myself'. 
These reflect to vvhat an extent this moment challenges the meanings, identities and 
sense of self that we usually hold on to and find safety in. 
Here it is important to remember the previously made point that it is in the evolution 
of patterns in our participation in centralized local communities that we manage to 
build a seemingly stable and sustainable web of meanings. When these seeming 
consistencies are shaken in an unexpected way, crisis can ensue. This 
conceptualization of the experience and ramifications of crisis in terms of a sense of 
self, deserves further explication. 
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Boundaries and Identity 
The word crisis is derived from the Greek term "krinein" which means "to separate". 
The boundary experience of crisis separates us from others in our interactive 
communities and in that from the sustained meanings (derived from our sustained 
negotiations in these communities) with which \1110 cushion ourselves. 
This idea will be explored further later on. First, it is necessary to gain some 
understanding of how the experience of boundary is so intrinsically important in 
meaningmaking and of how a sense of crisis results. 
Drawing or experiencing boundaries, as in separation, is in all instances a central 
ingredient of the co-creation of identity and meaning. (The centrality of 
conceptions of boundary and separation in understandings of human functioning, 
can be found widely. Compare, for example, Minuchin's (1974) conceptualizations 
of families. He distinguishes healthy and pathological family systems in terms of 
the quality of their boundaries. Families are seen to be in trouble when boundaries 
or separation between subsystems, for example different generations, are either 
too diffuse or too rigid.) A boundary signifies a territory that is "ours/mine". 
Therefore, a sense of boundary implies a sense of identity. (See again the 
previous section on the importance of experiencing difference in attaining some 
notion of the nature and quality of the parts, as well as the relations amongst 
them.) A knowing of the self as \111011 as of the other becomes possible. The 
constructions of and about these entities are made in terms of each other. 
Boundaries also indicate distinctions between vklat is central and vklat is more 
marginal. In this is also implied a value judgement of vklat is more or less 
desirable, appropriate, familiar to this entity or person. The centre is seen as the 
position with priority. Again, these constructions are reflected in everyday 
language: one is supposed to be as "centered" as possible, a loved one is the 
"centre" of your being and so forth. 
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What stays hidden in this focus on the (experienced) centre, is the equal 
importance of centre and margin in constructing identity. It is also the periphery 
that allo\tVS the centre to be seen as such. This recognition implies a move from 
seeing identity as unified, solid and essential to understanding it as constructed 
and relational. Only by setting boundaries can the centre be distinguished and 
gain identity, and boundaries can only be set by defining another (an-other, as 
opposed to an I). This process of definition and redefinition plays out 
simultaneously from many (previously distinguished) points and, therefore, 
necessitates negotiation. 
As noted before, the negotiations in and between discursive communities, 
construct the typical dominant or interactive patterns in a given community and 
thereby define \Nhat will be considered marginal and central. 
Separation from Central Meanings and Others as Crisis 
Being in the constructed centre of a vveb of meanings enables one to move in a 
predictable ecology and to have the sense of living out a preconceived (if as yet 
unknoVvfl to one) autobiography. A crisis-experience ensues \Nhen this seemingly 
predictable ecology moves. 
In that sense it can be said that discontinuity of past meanings and/or connections 
in the consensual domain of the community of belonging leads to a declaration of 
crisis. It indicates perceived threats to the predictability and continuation of an 
ecology of ideas. 
For example, significant moves in interactions (such as separation) can constrain 
one from playing out a particular preconceived story of self and necessitates a re-
authoring (Epston, White & Murray, 1992) of this story. This can be constructed as 
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crisis. As Maturana and Varela (1987) would put it, it is a lived segment in which a 
person's vulnerability is languaged. In this moment the vulnerability entails an 
uncertainty about the sense of self and in that necessarily of one's place of 
belonging. The potential and necessity emerges to redesign and reconfirm one's 
connections and place in some discursive community(-ies) and in this to 
reconstruct one's talk about self and the ongoing life-story. 
Crisis as Separation from Old Identities and Moment for Reconstructing New Ones 
Earlier, it was pointed out how during crisis expressions of being at some edge, as 
well as of being unanchored, are often elicited. This is on the one hand an 
indication of the fact that separation from central others and ideas (as discussed 
above) is intimately connected to crisis. 
At the same time, in some recursive way, at points of crisis identity is questioned 
and the sense of being in the centre is threatened. We are separated from others 
in our discursive communities - for example through the absence of a sense of full-
enough consensual validation. Crisis is a border experience - on the margin of 
what we "know'' and find acceptable. Thus a crisis depends on finding yourself at 
·that moment both in and at the borders of a language community. 
In the crisis-moment the person and ecology is faced with t'M'.l options. Firstly, 
every effort can be made to return to the centre. Secondly, the possibility emerges 
to move beyond perceived boundaries into another domain that has to be defined 
("kno'vVll") - thus reconstructing identities. In this way transformation in the web of 
meanings is effected, making new actions, connections, interactions, meanings 
possible. 
Most typically, the strongest efforts are made in trying to regain previous levels of 
"knowing" in the particular discursive realm within which the crisis emerged. As 
59 
noted earlier, to know that we are in crisis, it also has to be communally defined. 
Thus the person is already partaking in a centralized discourse that constructs the 
particular situation as crisis. To define what is appropriate and inappropriate at this 
moment requires reference to the specific discursive context. Consequently the 
means are ready for "working through" whatever deviations have emerged in 
relation to the constructed common practices. Therapy can be seen as one of 
these readily available social institutions or formations, as can be the law, 
education and so forth (McNamee, 1992). 
Thus the communal defining of crisis embodies a simultaneous tendency for trying 
to realign as close as possible to previous positions. This is, however, not 
necessarily possible, for example when separation from others changes the 
construction of the local community of significance within which meaning is 
negotiated. Then the boundaries which define the centres are altered, 
necessitating reconstruction of identities, relationships and meanings. 
Thus, separation from usual patterns with others and ideas brings about a move in 
what is experienced as a predictable ecology and leads to the communally 
constructed declaration of crisis. Similarly, the experience of crisis brings about 
separation from previously available interactive, discursive communities and levels 
of knowing, bringing about a move in the constructions of self, other and the 'M:>rld. 
This does not only entail the reconstruction of content of meaning and in that of 
sense of self, but also (even if the content does seemingly not change) a move in 
the way of knowing your knowledge of self. 
Foundations for a Textual Analysis of Setfhood 
How to find a frame that 'M:>uld facilitate the interpreta~ion of a person's sense of 
self and experiences in general, is a central question for scientists. lnheritants of 
the positivist tradition have been able to reify and call on ways of speaking and 
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witing that are considered neutral, rational and respectable by emphasizing 
notions of the authoritative account and the impersonal expert view. These 
establish accounts of knowledge or information that are considered to be global 
·and unitary (Foucault, 1980) and linguistically carry built-in injunctions against 
considerations of the social contexts of their construction (White, 1991 ; White & 
Epston, 1990). 
Acknowledgement (as from the social constructionists) that it is the meanings -
interpersonally and historically constructed in a social domain - which people 
attribute to. their experiences, that constitute their sense of self, the 'NOrld and their 
living, however, calls for another frame of interpretation (Barton, 1988; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Reason, 1981; Reason & Rowan, 1981; Rowan, 1981 ). White 
(1991; 1992) and Bruner (1991), amongst others (Freeman, 1993; Hoffman, 1993; 
Pare, 1995; Parry, 1991; Shotter, 1993), proposes that it is the narrative or story 
that provides the primary frame for the interpretation of the activity of meaning-
making. It is through the stories people have about their own and other's lives that 
they make·sense of their own experience. In this vein Ricoeur (1991) asserts that 
''.an examined life is a life recounted" (p.31 ). 
For people to make sense of their own lives and to express themselves, 
experiences have to be storied, and it is this storying process that determines 
which meanings will be attributed to experiences (Novak, 1975; Pare, 1995; White 
& Epston, 1990). People's lives are formed by the stories that they live, and 
conversely, their identities by the stories that they are and become. The quality of 
their experiences attains texture through the stories that they tell and the way in 
which these stories are allowed or not allowed. Mair ( 1990, p.127) says that 
[s]tories are habitations. We live in and through stories. They 
conjure 'NOrlds. We do not know the 'NOrld other than as a 
story 'MJrld. Stories inform life. They hold us together and 
keep us apart. We inhabit the great stories of our culture. We 
live through stories. We are lived by the stories of our race 
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and place. We are, each of us, locations where the stories of 
our place and time become partially tellable. 
This idea of Mair's (1990) also points to the important consideration that stories do 
not develop or endure simply around an individual or in isolation. Stories emerge 
from a reciprocal meaningmaking process. A storyteller finds a voice rooted in her 
own experience and in the connection of her story to those of others, and to larger 
stories of culture and humanity. Also, the realization that we are all characters in 
each other's stories as well as our own, serves as reminder that the value and 
progress of our own stories also depend on the way they impact on and are 
impacted upon, by the value and progress of other's stories (Gergen & Kaye, 
1992; Hare-Mustin, 1994; Kazdin-Schnitzer, 1993; Parry, 1991; White & Epston, 
1990; Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994). 
Most people have a multiplicity of stories about themselves, others and their 
relationships. Some of these stories or narratives are, however, contextually more 
accessible than others. The specific story that prevails within a given context 
determines to a large degree the nature of our I ived experiences and our patterns 
of behaviour (Eron & Lund, 1993; White & Epston, 1990). 
-
A story or narrative can, hO'N0ver, never contain the full extent of our lived 
experience. The structuring of a narrative requires a selective process within 
which those aspects Wiich do not fit the dominant narrative are left out. (It is these 
parts of experience that fall outside of reigning stories about our lives and 
relationships, and their potential narratives, that offer a rich and fertile source for 
the generation or regeneration of alternative stories. Such shifts in the stories that 
are being told can, for example, come about Wien crisis is encountered, as 
discussed in the previous section.) 
Thus stories do not only determine meaning, but also largely determine Wiich 
aspects of experience people select for expression. Thus stories or narratives are 
not only reflective of people's experiences, but have real effects in shaping their 
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lives, in providing the structure of living. 
Thus, in using narratives as a frame for interpretation of experiences of self, one 
not only has access to a medium in w'hich the person's experiences are mirrored, 
but also to the process through w'hich it is organized, framed and given pattern to, 
and w'hich will shape further experience as 'Nell (Fellner, 1983; Freeman, 1993; 
Gergen, 1985a; Harre, 1985; Hattingh & Van Veuren, 1995; White, 1991 ). 
This is because narrative is a discourse tool w'hich people use to elaborate the 
scope of the self (Gergen, 1989).They are the tools of interaction w'hich people 
use to get their version of reality warranted, and through ""11ich they can make 
!-.._---·-··. --
epistemological claims about themselves. Dialogue itself can be seen as the 
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competing of opponents via opposing narratives (Kvale, 1992). Narratives 
themselves and their expression follow certain rules of discourse and emerge 
through interaction styles. These styles that are encountered in the process of 
social exchange can be internalized or opposed. Through all of this, a sense of I is 
established (Harre, 1989; Parker, 1989). 
Lyotard (1984), in his incredulity towards metanarratives, tries to assert the value 
of ""11at he calls "narrative knowledge" (p.27) (as opposed to positivistic scientific 
knowledge). One important assumption underlying his argument is that the search 
for universalism or universalistic criteria is of little importance and can be 
abandoned in considering communicative competence. He joins other sceptics in 
describing truth claims as a form of terrorism. The assumption of truth eliminates 
the argument of the other, another's point of view that threatens to upset w'hat 'N0 
have come to see as the truth, even though it is only ""11at \Ne have come to take 
for granted. 
Thus the legitimation of narrative knowledge, or understandings that emanate from 
the study of people's narratives, do not rely on the ascription of truth. Rather, it 
rests on the assumption [as discussed by Crites (1975)) that the formal quality of 
experience through time is inherently narrative. Thus only narrative form is seen to 
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be able to contain the tensions, the surprises, the disappointments and reversals 
and achievements of lived experience. 
This implies that narratives can determine their own criteria of competence, as well 
as illustrate how they are to be applied. In this way they need not get stuck in what 
Lyotard (1984) calls the language game known as the question of legitimacy. 
Narratives can thus define what has the right to be said and done in the context in 
question, and since they are part of this social order themselves, they are 
legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do (Lyotard, 1984; Rorty, 
1991; Rosenau, 1992). 
This is echoed by Bruner (in White & Epston, 1990), when he makes a distinction 
between t'NO types of thinking, that is logico-scientific and narrative thinking: 
each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of 
constructing reality ... A good story and a well-formed 
argument are different natural kinds. Both can be used as a 
means of convincing another. Yet what they convince of is 
fundamentally different: arguments convince one of their 
truth, stories of their lifelikeness. The one verifies by 
eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and 
empirical truth. The other establishes not truth but 
verisimilitude. (p.45) 
, ... \ 
A Brief Summary and a Moment's Reflection 
In this chapter the background to and the content of the move towards a social 
constructionist view ef the self as an ever-changing and historically influenced co-
construction was described. The tenets underlying and supporting this view will be 
the assumptions underpinning this study. This does not imply that a postmodern 
( 
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position is presented uncritically as a new kind of truth. In Derridian fashion the ) 
ideas in this study are presented as provisional. 
A few problematic issues around a description of postmodern thinking also 
deserve special mention here. 
Firstly, postmodern thinking may appear as completely new in the way it 
constitutes one of the greatest intellectual challenges to established knowledge of 
the tvventieth century. Ho\Never, postmodern arguments \Neave in and out of more 
traditional criticisms of the social sciences. Mention of the perspective of the 
observer and of power issues can be found in many such criticisms which are 
certainly not labelled postmodern. In that way postmodernism is not as entirely 
original as it may appear. It can be stated that instead of signalling a genuine 
break with modernity, postmodernism is simply its logical continuation. 
Rosenau (1992), amongst others, notes in this vein that the emergence of 
postmodernism may simply reflect intellectual and social currents in the larger 
society. For example, the move away from seeing the modernist kno'N0r as expert, 
may have been the product of a broad change in the position of intellectuals in the 
West. A poor job market contributed to unemployment amongst many social 
scientists, increasingly poor salaries for academics and an accompanying 
increase in ineffectiveness and loss of credibility. Thus, what was economically 
initiated may then have taken on paradigmatic proportions. 
Furthermore it may appear that postmodernism is a clear and (again) unitary way 
of thinking. This is certainly not the case. A myriad of positions and perspectives 
can all be deemed postmodern. Indeed, many different voices question not only 
the definition of the term, but the very existence of the concept itself. It is a 
measure of the nature of postmodernism that it generates such intense 
controversy. 
In its more extreme formulations, postmodernism is revolutionary. It goes to the 
very core of what constitutes the social sciences and radically dismisses it. In its 
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more moderate proclamations, postmodernism encourages far-reaching 
redefinition and innovation. 
It is in its (at times) solipsistic character that postmodemism is sometimes 
made out to be morally noxious or excessively dispassionate and remote (see, 
for example, Glass, 1993). Rorty ( 1991) himself criticizes Foucault and Lyotard 
as being so "afraid of being caught up in one or more metanarratives about the 
nature of 'the subject' that they cannot bring themselves to say ''1"9' long 
enough to identify with the culture of the generation to which they belong" 
(p.174). 
The aim in this study is not to evolve a further solipsistic view of self. Rather, a 
specific postmodern position is assumed because, in its move from truth to 
tentativeness, it seems to carry more promise of enabling the writer to enter 
and transmit an experience of being human than a mechanistic and clear 
explication. 
In the following section the investigation of the trails of the construct self moves 
into the domain of therapy. Most specifically, the issue of the therapist's sense 
of her O\Ml self will be explored. 
SECTION II 
TOWARDS HEALING THROUGH THE USE OF SELF 
- THE THERAPISrs JOURNEY 
The issue of self is of central importance and enduring fascination in the field of 
psychology. The debates it has fuelled permeate all of the theorizing that can 
be found in this field - some of 'Nhich was discussed in the previous section. 
More comprehensively, it can be said that the discipline of psychology has to a 
large degree been built through conceptual and pragmatic developments 
concerning themselves with a triad of concepts: self - problem - change. The 
field of psychotherapy grew from this as one of the domains within 'Nhich these 
issues could be thrashed out (and about..) in a more pragmatic fashion. Thus 
the concept of self (especially in connection with problem and change) has 
always been one of the most important concerns in therapy as well. Initially it 
was possible to grapple mainly with these as obviously important issues for the 
patienUclient. Paradigmatic developments in psychotherapy as· well have, 
however, created discursive domains within which it became possible to 
legitimately acknowledge and struggle with the fact of the therapist, even in her 
professional personhood, being intensely human. 
Thus a fundamental issue in psychotherapy became: who is the therapist in 
. relation to her work and how should she use herself in the therapeutic process? 
These questions give rise to strongly opposing answers. One stance regards 
the conscious acknowledgement of personal issues to be contaminating to the 
development of a respectable science. This position contributes to the 
flourishing of new forms of therapy and especially new techniques. Another 
stance pertinently stresses the importance of more fully exploring the role of the 
personhood of the therapist. From this perspective therapy is seen as a deeply 
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intimate and vulnerable experience (to all involved) that requires sensitivity from 
the therapist to her own state of being, as well as to that of the other. The 
divergent beliefs which different exponents hold about the use of self in 
psychotherapy are obviously influenced by different traditions - not only in the 
field of psychotherapy, but in psychology and in the human sciences in general. 
CHAPTER4 
THE JOURNEY TOWARDS ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE 
OF THE THERAPIST"S SENSE OF SELF 
The importance of the therapist's personhood in her 'MJrk is not and has not 
been positively acknowledged by all proponents in the field of psychotherapy. 
Different positions around this issue, as well as contributions to the evolution of 
this acknowledgement will be discussed in this chapter. 
Different Views on the Importance of the Therapist's Self 
Considerations of the use of the self of the psychotherapist are much more 
scarce in the literature than the ovel'Wlelming variety of scripts expounding on 
skills and techniques for the therapist. In this focus on technique the therapist is 
mostly seen as a craftsperson whose aim should be to expand and hone her 
necessary bag of tricks. 
This can be contrasted to later moves to a very different approach - a view of 
the therapist as an artist, for whom the practice of a skill has importance in 
. terms of the way it becomes part of a whole ecology. 
Somewhere inbetween on this continuum other efforts at dealing with the non-
issue/problem/resource of the therapist's sense of self can be distinguished. For 
example, the non-negatable influence of this force in therapy may be 
acknowledged, but still regarded as problematic. This can lead to suggestions 
such as those advocated by Freud that for the protection of the patient the self 
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of the analyst should remain neutral. To achieve this goal, it is mandated that 
the analyst should submit to a training analysis. 
The epistemological roots and some manifestations of these different stances 
can briefly be explored. This will serve to elucidate the way in which these 
discussions fit into different epistemological traditions in the social sciences (as 
discussed in Section 1 ). 
The Therapist's Personhood as a Non-Issue 
A view of therapy as a technical battlefield sees the issue of self to be an 
irritant, a contaminating factor which can successfully be ruled out of the 
(effectively controlled) picture. This view and such efforts at control are 
inextricably linked to an ongoing dream for the field of psychotherapy, namely 
that it will increasingly be recognized as a respectable science in accordance 
with the criteria traditionally spelled out for the natural sciences. 
This positivistic stance obviously stems from the same roots that inform all of 
modernist thinking. Most specifically, it refers back to Descartes' famous maxim 
"cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) and the subsequent spelling out of 
the dualism of body and mind with which he is identified (Storig, 1979). This 
view, of course, serves to draw the battlelines bet\Yeen a concern with the 
objective, external 'M>rld of seemingly natural objects and an inner 'M>rld, less 
. accessible and filled with subjective experience. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the so-called objective and materialistic side of 
life achieved in modernist thinking a commanding lead over the subjective and 
less-demonstrable. This epistemological bias informed not only most of the 
initial development in the field of psychology in general, but also in the realm of 
psychotherapy specifically. Thus the efficacy of therapy came to be measured 
70 
through demonstrable outcomes, that is, obvious changes in the occurrence of 
demonstrable symptoms. This operationalization of the machine metaphor for 
the person thus also adheres to the (modernist) notion that for something to be 
real and valid, it has to be observable and measurable. 
From this perspective the therapeutic relationship is conceptualized as an 
authoritarian doctor-patient, expert-helper-helpless-sufferer one. Identity and 
entrance is gained in(to) this context by the therapist through her accumulation 
of learned techniques, and by the patient through her having an identifiable 
problem -Miich she cannot solve herself. The therapist remains in the 
professional role and the patient is unable to leave the complementary role. 
Keith (1987) sees the model for the role-dominated patient to be the good child, 
socially adapted, but without imagination. 
Thus, the basic elements of therapy are seen to be: an expert therapist, a 
compliant patient, a problem that needs to be changed or eradicated, a model 
for appropriate treatment, a reliance on scientifically replicable techniques and 
a context that confirms the therapist's expertise. The often demonstrated 
tendency for tm people using the same approach in the same situation to 
produce different results is attributed to one therapist being more au fait with the 
specific techniques than the other. Thus the therapist herself enters into a vvorld 
-Miere she is to be and become an increasingly effective scientific intervenor. 
The success of this process is seen to depend on her ability to silence the 
effect of her interfering personal variables by increasing her expertise through 
for example honing her skills (Albee, 1982; Baldwin, M., 1987a). 
· (The extent to -Miich the construction of the therapist as expert can, in itself, be 
a most interfering (even noxious) construction of self in therapy, is 
acknowledged by many and will be discussed later. For the proponents of this 
non-issue stance towards the idea of the therapist's self, the expert role is never 
seen as a possible problem in the therapeutic process. Rather, it is an axiom, a 
sine qua non, in the process of successful treatment.) 
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The 'Nritten legacy of the proponents of this view (well demonstrated in the field 
of behaviour therapy, but also in many other examples, such as multimodal 
therapy} is mostly marked by a focus on skills and diagnosis-specific treatment 
packages, as well as a complete absence of any reference to the personhood 
of the therapist. Compare, for example, Camwath and Miller ( 1986) and 
Lazarus ( 1981). These are clear examples of psychotherapy patterns turning 
into "schools" which escape passivity by turning into models with prescribed 
behavioural sequences, or by seeking validation in science with a database 
from which inevitable conclusions may be derived (Keith & Whitaker, 1978). 
[Keith ( 1987) conceptualizes such models as "myths without divine characters" 
(p.61 ).] 
Thus an emerging field of psychotherapy seeking to establish itself as a 
(traditional) scientific discipline had a vested interest in maintaining the 
Cartesian dualism. This paradigmatic position made it possible to ignore the 
elusiveness and complexity of the concept of. a self (of the therapist 
specifically), complete with philosophical, social and spiritual connotations. 
The Therapist's Personhood as Problematic 
In contrast to the above, many 'Miters have recognized that therapy is a 
relationship between people and not just a context for the implementation of 
skills. This view acknowledges that techniques and approaches are tools that 
. come out differently in different hands. Thus the therapist's self is involved in 
!he therapeutic process regardless of, or in addition to, the treatment approach. 
This recognition of the power of the therapist's personhood led primarily to 
concern for these witers. It was seen that the way the therapist deals with her 
O'Ml inner and outer life could become detrimentally entangled in the 
therapeutic process and thus had to be effectively controlled. This idea clearly 
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rests on tw'O principles: firstly, that therapists have the po""9r to damage 
patients and secondly, that therapists are there to serve patients, not the other 
way around (Langs, 1985; Satir, 1987). 
Freud (1934) is an important proponent of this approach to the issue of \Nhat to 
do with the therapist's personhood. Firstly, his theory in general represented a 
strong attack on the established lines of Cartesian dualism by adding the 
elusive concept of the unconscious to a domain that kept the study of human 
functioning within the comfortable realm of the demonstrable and accessible. 
His thesis of humans carrying the seeds for their own and other's construction 
as v.iell as destruction within themselves, in addition to his notion of psychic 
determinism, served to stimulate a strong and useful debate on the concept of 
self. Secondly, his acknowledgement of the therapist's personal issues was 
infused with a concern about the potential damage this could cause in therapy. 
His idea was that unconsciously, without malice, therapists can cause a great 
deal of harm to their patients through their own unresolved problems (Freud, 
1934,; Langs, 1985; Satir, 1987). 
In this vein Freud (1934) used the term countertransference in referring to how 
therapists can mistakenly and unconsciously see their clients as mothers, 
fathers, sons, daughters or lovers, thereby projecting something onto them 
'Nhich does not belong. In this way the unaware therapist can let her personal 
life become dangerously entangled with the personal life of the patient (Bassen, 
1989; Feiner, 1983; Giovacchini, 1989; Jacobs, 1990; Scharff, 1992; Slakter, 
1987). 
For the protection of the patient, Freud then advocates that the self of the 
analyst should remain as neutral as possible. Doubting the ability of therapists 
consciously not negatively influence their clients, he develops the idea of 
mandatory psychoanalysis for all analysts themselves - especially during 
training. The goal of this analysis is to help the analyst know of and master her 
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own conflicts - thereby enabling her to effectively minimize the effect of her own 
self in therapy (Yalom, 1980). 
For the same reasons, Freud also advocated the neutral and non-personal 
format of the psychoanalytic couch with the therapist out of sight and as non-
active as possible (Yalom, 1980). (This strong emphasis that Freud places in 
the development of his theory on the necessity to rule out the impact of self and 
to achieve neutrality, might indicate how difficult a goal this was for himself. 
Needleman (1985), for example, conjectures that the secret of Freud's great 
therapeutic success was the great force of personal attention he paid to his 
patients. This helped him to create a context of compassion and insight within 
which healing became possible. Similarly Satir (1987) notes that his neutral 
idea of the couch may be ironic since he was also reported to have frequently 
massaged his patients and to have become actively involved in their lives. 
Scharff (1992) notes that Freud's early experience with hysterical patients - the 
'M:>rk through which he developed psychoanalysis - left him "uncomfortably 
exposed, altogether too close to his patients" (p.10). The theory which Freud 
subsequently elaborated helped him - and others, such as his collaborator 
Josef Breuer - to keep an intellectual and emotional distance from patients such 
as Anna 0. who attempted to live out her erotic transference with her 
therapists.) 
A number of other studies on the self of the therapist, while mostly lacking the 
sophisticated paradigmatic intricacy of the psychoanalytic studies, also in 
general acknowledge the importance of the therapist's personhood, but deal 
. with it by simply stressing the importance of therapy for the therapist. [Compare, 
for example, Balsam and Balsam ( 1984)]. This therapy is prescribed to 
therapists for, amongst other things, dealing with anxiety and indecision in the 
therapist. 
Other 'Miters also offer intricate considerations about the role of the active self 
in therapy, but eventually mainly apply this to the client. Andrews (1991), for 
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example, considers how people maintain self-consistency by defining and 
reaffirming their self-images through social interaction and internalized self-
dialogues. While briefly acknowledging that this applies to all of us and that this 
is also the territory of therapeutic intervention, he proceeds to focus on this 
process as something the client has to grapple with experientially. For the 
therapist, it is only necessary to use it as an intellectual template for the 
comparing and integrating of therapeutic styles. The goal of this is to facilitate 
useful self-confirmational processes for the client (who, by implication, is the 
one really in need of it). 
Writers such as these mentioned above move away from assumptions about 
the therapist as (only) master craftsperson or purveyor of wisdom. They still, 
ho'N0ver, see the personhood of the therapist as something that is primarily 
potentially damaging (in therapy). It is something that needs to be dealt with, 
contained and even solved as far as possible, rather than being an 
indispensable part in the construction of the therapeutic relationship as 
transformational context. This approach can be compared to the ways in which 
modernist writers tried to account for the idea of self/ego/personality in their 
theories of human functioning, while still adhering to a mainly mechanistic 
approach and an ideal of predictability in people and their interactions. 
The Therapist's Personhood as Resource 
. In contrast to the above t'MJ positions, writers who fully acknowledge therapy as 
an aesthetic rather than a technical ecology, focus on aspects of the use of self 
in therapy as the most advanced dimension of the therapist's growth. 
Keeney (1983) points out that while therapists as artists and craftspeople utilize 
the same techniques and skills, there is a difference to the artist that extends 
beyond the conscious 'JVOrking out of a means to a preconceived end. Drawing 
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on Bateson's (1972) understanding of art as 'lhe relation between levels of 
mental process" (p.464), Keeney (1983) sees art as concerned with the 
recursive relation between unconscious and conscious orders of mental 
process. 
These views of the therapist as an artist (also see Hattingh, 1996) thus move 
away from notions about the world and people that are informed by all-
encompassing meta-narratives that contribute to predictability and control and 
that adhere to accessibility and measurability as a measure of reality. 
The literature emanating from these proponents is no longer in the form of 
"how-to" manuals focusing mainly or exclusively on technique, but concerns 
itself with discussions of the therapist's use of self as something that she does 
in therapy. These ideas are acknowledged to be strongly connected to the 
writers's emotions, life experiences and belief systems - as is the work of the 
therapist herself. Thus, in true postmodern tradition, the value of the 
interconnection of human uniquenesses, of the weaving together of local 
narratives, becomes the focus for the process and context within 'Which 
meaning and healing can be achieved. 
This is demonstrated by Yalom (1980) Ykto holds that 'Wien technique is made 
paramount, everything is lost because the very essence of the authentic 
relationship is that one does not manipulate but turns towards another with 
one's Yktole being" (p.410). Similarly, Satir (1987) views therapy as providing 
the context for empowering clients and opening up their healing potential. 
. According to her, this goal can be obtained through the meeting of the deepest 
self of the therapist with the deepest self of the client. She pleas accordingly 
that the self of the therapist be considered an essential factor in the therapeutic 
process. 
Thus, within this perspective, technique is not rejected or abandoned, but gains 
usefulness in the way it becomes part of a 'Whole ecology - a process in 'Which 
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the patterns are more dependent on the therapist as a person than the inherent 
effectiveness of the technique itself. This non-negatable influence of the 
therapist's self is seen to happen in any therapy, regardless of the specific 
approach, regardless of whether the focus explicitly only falls on the person of 
the client and regardless of whether therapeutic success is seen to depend on 
technical skillfulness. According to Yalom (1980), it is easy to think that the 
client is responding to some technique, when the crucial variable might have to 
do with our humanness. Thus differences in personal characteristics may be 
more important to effectiveness of therapy than differences in technique. 
This focus on humanness and personhood, which in many ways can be 
construed as reacting to cold mechanistic ways of approaching human 
relationships, and to the way in which we have "grown strangely distant from 
the struggle of individuals to find purposes in their lives" (Simon, 1986, p.34), 
will be discussed in more detail in the rest of the chapter. As Satir ( 1987) puts it: 
We started out knowing that the person of the 
therapist could be harmful to the patient. We 
concentrated on ways to avoid that. Now we need 
to concentrate on ways in which the use of self can 
be of positive value in treatment. (p.25) 
Acknowledging the Importance of the Therapisfs Self - Contextual and 
Conceptual Contributors 
• 
A brief historical perspective 
During the years following World War II, after a period of immense destruction 
brought about by conflict between imposed collective group identities, a 
77 
renewed appreciation of people's uniqueness and of the value of human 
suffering for growth, appeared. [See, for example, the \NOrk of Frankl (1963, 
1966, 1985)]. Duhl (1983) suggests that the realization of people's inherent 
capacity to destroy, not only others through genocide, but also themselves in 
the process, might have brought forth the corrective humanistic psychology 
termed a revolution by Maslow (1962). This Third Force in psychology rested 
on a view of person as a social, interactive being and openly sanctioned values 
and processes that contributed to the self-actualization of people. Similarly, the 
movement towards a more humanistic psychology was accepted by many 
therapists who also found the reductionism and determinism offered by the 
Freudian view unsatisfactory. The authenticity of human experience became 
paramount. Belief in the self-actualizing potential of people led to the formation 
of the human potential movement during the 1960's and 1970's (Graham, 1990; 
Maslow, 1962). A centre point for this was the Esalen Institute in California 
where the development of human potential and the promotion of qualitative 
changes in being vvere emphasized through a focus on concepts such as 
awareness, self-actualization and peak experience, and a synthesis of Eastern 
and Western practices. Proponents of this movement are, hovvever, criticized 
(Baldwin, D.C., 1987; Baldwin, M. 1987a) for carrying the idea of personal 
growth to the limits of personal license without developing a systematic and 
disciplined examination of its assumptions and implications. Each person's 
experience was regarded as valid in itself - a solipsistic approach that did not 
deliberate on social patterns. 
Within therapy, the self of the therapist became an active ingredient, but was 
. sometimes seen to be carried to a level of unrestrained self-expression and 
gratification. In the place of the rigidities of traditional psychology, there 
emerged a plethora of therapeutic philosophies, each based on individual style, 
inclination and popularity. Thus there was a move from an excessive 
dependency on rigid technique and theory to an excessive emphasis on 
idiosyncratic technique and philosophy. According to D.C. Baldwin (1987}, 
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these were often more artificial and manipulative than the traditional 
approaches. 
More recent attempts to bring order out of this chaos can be attributed to 
different sources and findings. Systems theory (in general) and a second-order 
cybernetic perspective (in particular) started offering more systematic ways of 
accounting for many of the facets recognized to be important in the therapeutic 
process (Keeney, 1983). The differences in outcome between clients treated 
with different approaches and techniques have been found to be rather minimal ' 
(Strupp, 1963, 1973) - throwing doubt on the usefulness of inventing more and 
more alternative techniques as a way of finding the answer as to what is 
healing. What the therapist and the client perceive to be critical or insightful 
moments in therapy, often differ dramatically (Standal & Corsini, 1959). This 
contributes to increasing numbers of therapists from all persuasions 
acknowledging that it is the unique nature of the therapeutic relationship and 
the personhood of the therapist which plays a critical role in the process of 
therapy (Baldwin, D.C., 1987; Rogers, 1951, 1961a, 1961b; Truax & Carkhuff, 
1967; Truax et al., 1966). This awareness is seen by Baldwin, D.C. (1987) as 
coming close to what Buber referred to as the I-Thou relationship. Since many 
writers on the use of self in therapy (such as Baldwin, D.C. (1987) and Satir 
(1987)] draw on existential philosophy, as well as Buber's vvork early in this 
century, the basic tenets of these and a few other important influential theories 
and/or debates deserve special mention here . 
. The Influence of Existential Philosophy 
It is amongst other things through the attention that existential philosophers 
such as Kierkegaard (1959) drew to the vvorld of subjective experience that the 
concept of the human being as both subject and object - as a self - emerged. 
Conceptualizations of self excited the attention of thinkers in different 
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disciplines, for example philosophers such as Heidegger (1962), sociologists 
such as Mead (1934), psychologists (clinicians) such as Rogers (1951), and 
theologians such as Tillich (1952, 1961). 
In his seminal work, Kierkegaard (1959) objected to Hegel's efforts at uniting 
the ambiguities of life through positing a higher synthesis. He (Kierkegaard) 
insisted that life's polarities (such as good and evil) could not be solved or 
mediated, but that the person has to make a choice between them. In order to 
do this, the person has to tum from the world of thought to the realm of life as it 
is actually lived, believing that the examination of human experience in all its 
complexity is the only way to approach the question 'What is the meaning of 
life?" Thus the safety of the authority of theory and abstract concepts have to be 
abandoned, \Nhich leaves the person faced with the full realization of the 
importance of the examination of o'Ml subjective experience (and thus of self). 
Similarly, Husserl (1965) introduced the phenomenological method in 
philosophy, calling upon the person to examine her o'Ml experience. He saw 
the person's subjective consciousness or the consensual subjective (social) 
consciousness to be the deepest creative force of all that is (Storig, 1979). 
Heidegger (1962) (one of Husserl's pupils \Nho declined the existentialist label) 
believed that 'Ne can learn something about the fundamental nature of the 
person through an analysis of her anxieties, in particular her fear of death. 
According to him, the person, in facing the idea of her O'Ml death as the 
absolute boundary, also encounters the importance and urgency of \.\'hat he 
termed the Dasein, that is, to be in the world. He accepted life as fundamentally 
contingent, stating that the only way to live authentically is to accept our O'Ml 
finitude and to develop a capacity to care (Sorge) (Baldwin, D.C., 1987; Storig, 
1979). 
In general, the existential philosophers maintained that the only true absolute is 
that there are no true absolutes. This poses a fundamental question: "How does 
a person \Nho needs meaning find meaning in a universe that has none?" 
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For centuries this question has been answered by simply positing a God-
centered universe, but the influence of existentialist ideas on philosophers, 
theologians and psychologists has led to an increasing emphasis on the role of 
the person's ovvn experience in her meaning making. One view is that each 
individual, in joining in the cosmic union, is provided with a personal sense of 
meaning (as exemplified in the work of De Chardin, 1955). Camus (1942), in 
The Myth of Sisyphus, starts this philosophical treatise with the question: 'Nhat 
is the point in continuing to live? He considers how each person needs to 
contemplate her ovvn living in trying to understand \Nhy she does not commit 
suicide. Even the radical existentialist Sartre (1950; 1956) maintains that the 
development of a sense of self-worth enables one to tolerate the irony created 
by the tension betvveen human aspiration for meaning and feeling that the world 
is indifferent to you. 
Different psychological theorists clearly acknowledge their existential roots. 
Frankl (1963, 1985), drawing on these ideas as well as his personal 
experience, coined the word logotherapy ("logos" = meaning) to indicate his 
central concern with the problem of meaning. He posited that \Nhat the person 
desires is not a tensionless state (as suggested by Freud's homeostatic 
principle), but rather a struggle for a goal that is worthy of her. He did not see 
the therapist as a teacher. It is not up to the therapist to get the client to see the 
world as she herself does. Rather, she should enable the client to see the 
world, as he put it, as it is (Frankl, 1963, 1966, 1985). 
Laing ( 1965, 1969) postulated a real and a false self. He believed that the 
failure to successfully identify each and to distinguish betvveen them is 
characteristic of patients with schizophrenia. He was deeply concerned With the 
act of confirmation or disconfirmation from both self and others in gaining a 
sense of self. He saw a sense of identity as requiring the existence of another 
by \Nhom one is knovvn, and a conjunction of this other person's recognition of 
one's self with self-recognition. 
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This is also the task of therapy: to make contact with the true self of the patient 
through understanding the existential world of the false self. The role of the 
therapist is to, from her own true self, affirm both the client's being and 
becoming, as well as the validity of her own unique experience. 
Rogers (1951, 1961a, 1961b), in an effort to underscore his perception of the 
person seeking help as basically self-directing, started using the word "client" \ 
rather than "patient". His client-centered therapy, born from existential grounds, 
stresses the ability of and goal for the person of self-actualization and focuses 
on the inner phenomenological world of the client. Therapy is seen as one 
specialized example of constructive interpersonal relationships. The key 
elements of therapy are seen as the immediacy of the therapist's presence and 
her attitudes, rather than as skills and techniques. Rogers, in his well-known 
specifications of the basic ingredients critical to the success of therapy, focused 
pointedly on the way the therapist is available as a human being in relating to 
the client. These ingredients or conditions are: the therapist's authenticity, 
genuineness and congruence, her complete acceptance and unconditional 
positive regard for the client, and her sensitive and empathic understanding. 
In brief then, the contribution of existentialist ideas to the field of psychotherapy 
can be seen to be the positing of the therapist as a fully available person in a 
meaningful encounter with another. Most of the ideas referred to here contain in 
some way or another the notion that people find meaning in their O'M1 living and 
in themselves through encountering their own struggles (and through that 
themselves) within connection/disconnection, or, to put it differently, through 
their participation in community. As Tillich ( 1961) puts it: · 
a person becomes a person in the encounter with 
other persons, and in no other way... This 
interdependence of man and man in the process of 
becoming human is a judgement against a 
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psychotherapeutic method in 'A'hich the patient is a 
mere object for the analyst as subject. (p.15) 
The Influence of Buber's Ideas 
Buber (1955, 1965) was concerned with the person's three vital relationships, 
that is, those between God and person, person and person, and person and 
nature. He held that the person's relationship with the Great Thou, or God, 
enabled her to participate in I-Thou relationships with other human beings. It is 
specifically his conceptualization of the I-Thou relationship that often informs 
the vvriting on the use of self in therapy. For Buber, the I-Thou establishes the 
'MJrld of relation into which both parties enter in the fullness of their being, with 
a sense of and appreciation for the subject and object in both. It is a relationship 
characterized by mutuality, presentness, immediateness and intensity 
(Friedman, 1965). 
This relationship is contrasted with the I-It relationship in which others are 
regarded as mere tools or conveniences. A positivistic scientific method that 
rests on the machine metaphor as person, is the most highly perfected 
development of the I-It relationship and way of knowing. It is a process through 
which preconceived ends can be met, but through which the person's 
wholeness or uniqueness can never emerge or be kno'M1 of. 
. The I-Thou relationship, hov.tever, is not a means to an end. It is not fixed in 
time and space. It is immediate and enduring, ·always there in potentiality, 
waiting to be released. This relationship is also seen by Buber ( 1970) to be 
responsibility - a reciprocal process of giving yourself by saying You to. the 
other. Self-realization, then, is the by-product and not the goal of this process: 
The person becomes an I through a You. 
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Buber (1970) holds the highest expression of the I-Thou relationship to be the 
confirmation of the other. Mutual confirmation becomes the key element in the 
definition of the self. The person is seen to be so in need of definition and 
confirmation of her self that she will be willing to be falsely confirmed (instead of 
in her true, present, authentic self) than not confirmed at all. Buber calls this an 
act of seeming rather than being. True confirmation, hovvever, is mutual, and 
involves making the other fully present in her fullness and uniqueness. 
Friedman (1965) refers to a conversation be1'Neen Buber and Rogers in 1957 in 
'Nhich he (Buber) shovved that although many of his ideas usefully inform the 
realm of psychotherapy, they also go beyond some comparable concepts from 
that world. His conceptualization of confirmation, for example, goes beyond 
Rogers' idea of unconditional positive regard (or even Heidegger's notion of 
Sorge). He also pointed out that genuine dialogue can not be arranged in 
advance, and is granted rather than created. For him the essential quality of 
therapy is authentic presence, in other words being totally present, in tune with 
the other, without boundary. 
He affirmed that the deciding quality in therapy is the therapist and not the 
technique. Friedman (1965) quotes him as saying: 
There are two kinds of therapists: One 'Nho knows 
more or less consciously the kind of interpretation 
of dreams he will get; and the other ... v.tlo does not 
know. I am entirely on the side of the latter, v.tlo 
does not want something precise. He is ready to 
receive 'Nhat he will receive. He cannot know 'Nhat 
method he will use beforehand. He is, so to speak, 
in the hands of his patient. (p.37) 
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The Influence of Acknowledging the Observer as Participant 
Postmodern traditions that shifted the observer's/ researcher's/kno\Ner's position 
away from one of being a demagogue or the only expert (as described in 
Chapter 1 ), contributed a great deal to the acknowledgement of the importance 
of the self of the therapist. 
Firstly, different views, such as the second-order cybernetic perspective 
(Keeney, 1983), as \Nell as other less structural accounts (Gergen, 1991; 
Sampson, E.E., 1989), gave clear theoretical renderings of how the act of 
observation shifts what is being observed. Thus, the observer (therapist) always 
influences what is being observed and the meaning(s) that are being construed. 
Most specifically, the observer's (therapist's) O'Ml qualities are of paramount 
importance in this process. Following this, the therapist can only be seen as 
unavoidably part of the treatment situation, both as change agent and as 
herself. She cannot choose to be in or out, only to be aware of her self or not. 
Secondly, the assumed hierarchical nature (in modernist thinking) of the 
relationship between observer-observed, intervenor-intervenee, therapist-
patient, shifted. Different views of their (changing) roles are often 
conceptualized along continuums of authority and submission, as \Nell as 
activity and passivity (Baldwin, D.C., 1987; Foucault, 1973, 1982; Hollender & 
Szasz, 1956). The major development has been in the increasingly active and 
participatory role afforded to both parties. Compare, for example, Rogers' 
. (1951, 1961 a, 1961 b) contribution of referring to self-responsible "clients" rather 
than helpless "patients" and seeing the therapist's role as one of assisting 
rather than pushing growth. 
·Thus, new models of treatment could emerge within which the therapist could 
begin to form a partnership with the client. Within this context the therapist's use 
of self can become the main tool for change. It helps her to build trust and 
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rapport so that more risks can be taken. The therapist as participant also 
interacts personally and humanly, and becomes a self interacting with another 
self. In this the client participates in a real and life-giving context (Andolfi, 
Angelo & De Nichilo, 1989; Satir, 1987). 
The Influence of a Concern about Power Issues in the Therapeutic Relationship 
Views on the importance of taking into account the self of the therapist \Nhen 
considering the usefulness of the therapeutic process also stemmed from a 
concern about the use of power in therapy. Many voices have warned about the 
potential danger inherent in a context such as therapy \Nhich can be seen to 
afford one party far-reaching powers of impacting very intimately on the other 
(Flaskas & Humphreys, 1993; Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1982; Goldner, 1993; 
Langs, 1985; Satir, 1987; Szasz, 1961 ). When the authoritarian doctor-patient 
relationship is experienced as one of dominance and submission, it can 
become tempting for the therapist to live out her O'M1 needs for control. In this 
way the therapist can, for example, replicate negative childhood experiences of 
the client. The misuse of power can appear to be benevolent, such as "I know 
'Nhat is best for your own good" or "Since I am the one 'Nho is helping you, you 
should be grateful" (Satir, 1987). This, of course, is a classic abusive pattern. 
When it appears in the therapeutic relationship, it can mirror other problematic 
experiences for the client and be severely destructive. (For more detail on the 
debate on the problem of power in treatment, refer back to the discussion in 
. Chapter 1 of Foucault's work.) 
It is easy for the therapist to negate power issues or certain influences her 
personal functioning may be having in therapy. It is tempting, for example, to 
blame the client for feeling stuck in therapy. Power issues can also easily be 
disguised as rescuing, taking sides, rejection and so forth, always putting the 
responsibility for these problematic processes on the shoulders of the client. A 
'' ' 
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therapist who has not sufficiently faced the difficulties of her own past, as for 
example experienced in her own family, can have something activated in 
herself by the client(s) while continuing to be unaware of this. She can thus 
make the client into someone from her OWl1 past, while denying this pattern or 
distortion of needs. In order to deal with the danger of misusing povver, it is 
seen as important that the therapist always find ways of finding a reasonable 
measure of awareness of her 0W11 functioning as a person in therapy. 
Pointing out the danger that can be done by a therapist who is not aware of how 
she uses herself, Satir ( 1987) focuses on specific aspects of the therapist's 
functioning, such as how she uses power, how she deals with her vulnerability 
and how congruently she acts. She continues to explicate the processes 
through which power can be used and abused. In general she conceives of the 
use of power as a function of the therapist's self. It is related to her self-\VOrth, 
which governs the way in which she handles her ego needs. According to Satir, 
power issues in therapy are not purely contingent on the specific formal 
approach (although she does note Dreikurs (1960), who confirms that some 
therapeutic models more openly conceive of the patient in a submissive role). 
Therapists themselves should thus acknowledge that they are just as 
vulnerable as clients are. 
The importance of the therapist becoming aware of self, is not reduced by Satir 
(1987) to efforts at controlling her OWl1 reactions and needs. She notes that 
power has t'M> faces: the first encompasses controlling the other, the second, 
empowering the other. 
The implication of this is that if power is contingent on the therapist's use of self, 
then she has to find a way of being personally present in the therapy situation in 
such a way that her O'M"l self and experience can become part of building a 
(mutually) empowering and healing context. Thus the importance for the 
therapist is to also openly acknowledge and pursue her OWl1 needs and ability 
to grow within the therapy context (similar to the.client's process). [Satir (1987) 
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also sees this as one way of avoiding bum-out]. For people to be able to grow 
and be healed they need a context of trust, openness and emotional honesty, 
within which they can make themselves vulnerable. It is the therapist's 
responsibility to start creating this context. This she can do by modelling a 
willingness to enter into such a context herself, by daring to be congruent. This, 
more than anything else, requires a sensitivity not just to the other, but to her 
O\M'l state. Thus her awareness of, and way of using her O\M'l experiences and 
feelings, become the most important key to building a healing place. 
This requires a moment in which the therapist and client both become 
vulnerable, and not a context within which the client becomes an opportunity for 
the therapist to confirm her O\M'l expertise. By focusing primarily on a technique 
or theoretical construct, the therapist can be unaware of what she is 
transmitting. This can easily put the client in a one-do\M'l position from which 
she develops even more defenses, this time against the therapist. The therapist 
can then conceptualize this reaction as resistance in such a way that she once 
again does not have to examine her o\M'l contribution of personal unavailability 
to this vicious circle (Satir, 1987). 
In the therapist using herself in such a way that honesty and trust is built, a 
deeper level of communication with the other and self becomes possible. The 
therapist herself thus also enters into an intimate experience where not only the 
other, but also the self is encountered in a useful way. This can be compared to 
what Buber (1970) called the I-Thou relationship, as discussed previously. 
All of the influences discussed above can be seen as contextual, philosophical 
and epistemological antecedents to the emergence of the concept of the 
importance of the use of self in therapy. This valuing of subjective experience 
(amongst all participants) has found increasjngly detailed expressions in 
different domains of the therapy process. One example is the way in which this 
focus is accounted for during the training of therapists. This process will be 
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discussed in more detail as example of how abstract ideas about the use of self 
are operationalized in the realm of therapy. 
CHAPTERS 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THERAPISrs 
SELFHOOD: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND THERAPY 
A valuing of subjective experience and of the personhood of the therapist has 
implications not only for the therapy context, but also for training as such. 
Acknowledging the Importance of the Use of Self During Training 
The importance of the self is stressed by some trainers already during the 
formal initial training of the psychotherapist (Andolfi, Angelo, Menghi & Nicolo-
Corigliano, 1983; Duhl, 1983, 1987; McDaniel & Landau-Stanton, 1991; 
Snyders, 1986). This focus implies an acknowledgement of the personhood of 
both the trainer and trainee as the major instruments of change (during training 
as it v.ould be during therapy). It is suggested that trainers, through their use of 
self, find a way of using the strengths and personal idiosyncrasies of the 
trainees to push them towards creativity in the training context (Andolfi & 
Menghi, 1980, 1982). This is seen as the beginning of a never-ending process 
· of growing into more of an improvisational artist (Keeney, 1990). 
A more detailed view of this process will be given in this section. As mentioned 
before, within the field of psychotherapy a plethora of models of human 
behaviour, intervention and change exist. Likewise, an abundance of training 
interventions and strategies have been developed. The aim here is not to give a 
full overview of these, but rather to render an account of the principles typically 
90 
involved, as 'hell as some examples of how these are translated into practice. 
Similarly, the full theory underpinning therapy and training (especially the 
versions that openly acknowledge the importance of the therapist's self) is not 
in focus here. A deliberate preference is given to discussions of the ways in 
vvhich self is thought about and accounted for in the training of 
psychotherapists. For the sake of coherence, a brief discussion of 
epistemological assumptions in different versions of systems thinking, 
especially as it underpins training, will be given. The choice of this paradigm 
(apart from being in keeping with the author's epistemology of choice) rests on 
the fact that it is within this field of thinking that, firstly, an explicit move to the 
inclusion of the observer was made, and secondly, ideas of how to account for 
self during training, often emanate. 
Paradigmatic Stances Within Systems Thinking and Implications for Training -
Encountering Interconnection 
According to Duhl (1983), how 'he think is always a combination of vvtiat is 
around us in all our contexts and what can be imagined. The way in which the 
self of the therapist is addressed in this study, is heavily influenced by many 
historical emanations. These especially emerged during growing efforts (mostly 
since the middle of this century) at finding a language to accommodate a 
recognition of context, as wall as the interrelatedness between everything. The 
following brief rendering of some important parts of this journey also serves to 
illustrate how the content that was being studied was mirrored in the process of 
the inquiry. This pattern, which recognizes the observer's/researcher's role in 
what emerges, is also central to the epistemology that was being generated 
here - one that 'MJUld eventually similarly recognize the therapist's personal 
impact on her professional functioning. 
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A Condensed Historical View 
The gradual realization that life takes place in context, once acknowledged, had 
startling effects in the mental health arena, amongst other fields. During the 
1950's researching and working with schizophrenic patients beca'!le the cutting 
edge for much of the new paradigmatic development that was in store. For 
example, Bovven (1965) and his colleagues noted that those patients who had 
progressed under psychoanalytic therapy (the prominent treatment of the day), 
regressed again once they had met with their families. Other researchers and 
clinicians [such as Jackson, Whitaker and Wynne (see, for example, Jackson, 
1959)] also met with such contextually shifting behaviour. They started asking 
questions about the switches in behaviour and meanings of language when 
contexts shifted. Work wjth the families of schizophrenics started being done 
actively and in depth during this time (compare, for example, the work done 
during the 1950's by Bovven, Satir, Wynne and Whitaker [see, for example, 
Wynne, Ryckoff, Day & Hirsch, 1958)]. (The exception here is Ackerman who 
had been seeing non-hospitalized neurotic families since the mid-1930's while 
working at the Jewish Family Service in New York.) 
Recognition of the effects of context also spread beyond the world of 
schizophrenia. Bovven (1978) started noting that ordinary people (somewhat 
similar to his schizophrenic patients) tend to revert to less individuated and less 
autonomous behaviours when with their families of origin for any period of time 
(see also Anonymous, 1972). Wynne (Wynne et al., 1958) started included a 
noting of his O'M'l reactions in his studies. For example, he spoke of the feeling 
of going crazy himself while working with schizophrenic families (Duhl, 1983). 
These early explorers found themselves in strange territory. The questions that 
vvere emerging could not be dealt with through any of the then conceptual 
artefacts offered by the positivistic worlds of psychology and psychiatry. They 
had to tum to other disciplines. Within some other fields, researchers vvere 
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struggling with similar issues, such as Ackoff (1959), a leading figure in the 
development of operations research, and the mathematician Wiener ( 1948, 
1954), 'Nho was working in information cybernetics. An important and most 
influential example of the collaboration across the boundaries of disciplines was 
offered by the team that came together at the Palo Alto Hospital in California 
between 1954 and 1956. The communication patterns of schizophrenic families 
were being studied by a group consisting of Jackson (a psychiatrist and the 
only clinician in the group}, Bateson (an anthropologist}, Haley (from the field of 
mass communication) and Weakland (a chemical engineer and anthropologist). 
Through this interdisciplinary collaboration these researchers were living out 
the principle that they were encountering: that the interrelations between 
different systems as well as the parts of a system cannot be denied. 
Another example of such an interdisciplinary group was the collection of people 
brought together by Grinker to participate in four conferences, beginning in 
1951, with the purpose of developing leads toward the unification of behaviour 
theory (Gray & Rizzo, 1969). They consisted of, amongst others, Ruesch, 
Spiegel and Frank - figures representing many disciplines, all within 'Nhich the 
chief concern was to understand human behaviour. The report of these 
symposia were published in 1956 under the title Toward a Unified Theory of 
Human Behavior (Grinker, 1956). These collections of people illustrated vividly, 
through their successful collaboration, the integrative potential of general 
systems theory. Furthermore, they became examples of how the act of inquiry 
can change the inquirer, implying, once again, that the researcher (therapist) is 
part of and affected by her professional endeavours, and vice versa, in ways 
'Nhich she cannot foresee. 
Auerswald (1969) points this out in drawing a distinction between 
interdisciplinary and ecological approaches. He maintains mainly that, in the 
former, each contributor can maintain the vantage point from within her own 
(original) discipline - thus pre-empting, as well as fragmenting, the answers to 
emerge. 1n the ecological or systems approach (within 'Nhich the 
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abovementioned groups fit), however, the vantage point of the data collector is 
changed. 
Auerswald (1969) proceeds to comment on how the systems thinker thus does 
not w:>rk in a context of safety. Her fuller participation and openness could land 
her in a crisis of uncertainty and not knowing, but through this, she can attain 
new and empowering (to all) levels of thinking. This is in contrast with the 
clinical scientists who are the products of the specialized fragmentation of the 
modernist w:>rld of science. They can get caught up in the highly specialized 
sequence prescribed by their own content-based training and intradisciplinary . 
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experience, upon which they seem to depend for the very definition of their \i\ 
personal identity. Acknowledgement of the notion of relative and context-bound 
truth w:>uld challenge them to rearrange not only their cognitive styles and 
professional ways of living, but also their total lifestyles if they were to maintain 
any sense of integrity. It w:>uld mean a turbulent period of disintegration and 
reintegration, of being willing and able to tolerate the fragmentation of identity 
boundaries. 
Instead, the safety of seeming truths enables you not to have to face yourself, 
your own not-knowing and thereby to risk transition. It enables you to maintain 
the sense of being in the right, of self-esteem, of values and of status in the 
vertical hierarchies of society. -~onstructing a w:>rld that is sufficiently 
fragmented to enable you to deny your full participation in what emerges and 
can e"'!erge, is, according to Auerswald ( 1969), abdicating responsibility. A 
system that does this epistemologically and/or practically, is the one, he says, 
really deserving of the prefix schizo-. 
This description is not applicable to the Palo Alto group. Through their full and 
open collaboration, venturing into unknown territories, they did groundbreaking 
w:>rk on communication in systems, tracking it through logical types and self-
regulating feedback loops of cybernetic theory (Bateson, Jackson, Haley & 
Weakland, 1956) and adding the concept of homeostasis from the w:>rld of 
r 
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medicine (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). Their vvork is an example of 
much of the investigations done that contributed to a major epistemological 
shift, away from the metaphor of the machine studied in isolation, to a 
consideration of how all parts flow into the generation and perpetuation of 
patterns in systems. Additionally, their vvork is typical of much of the 
development done in various places, in that it started with efforts at explaining 
systems that contained at least one societally wayward character, and through 
these investigative findings {typically from extreme families) started developing 
guidelines, parameters and rules for the functioning (for example, the clear 
communication) of any system in interaction. 
In this way Bateson and his colleagues (Bateson et al., 1956) managed to 
synthesize the ideas found in new science (as developed by physicists such as 
Planck and Einstein) with Wiener's (1948, 1954) vvork on information 
cybernetics, as well as Von Bertalanffy's ( 1969) contributions on general 
systems theory into an evolutionary paradigm. It contributed to the development 
of a new epistemology, a new set of rules that govern thinking - rules that 
challenged the predominant modernist thought system of the Western vvorld. 
The main themes in the shifts of thinking embodied in such postmodern 
approaches to the 'M:>rld were discussed in Section 1. The following scheme of 
Auerswald's (1985) presenting the main differences (in and) between the old 
Western epistemology and (what is generally termed) the new epistemology, 
can serve here as a brief reminder of these shifts. 
New Physics and Batesonian 
Evolution 
1. 
2. 
A monistic universe is 
assumed. 
The concept of 
fourdimensional timespace 
Newtonian Physics and Darwinian 
Evolution 
1. 
2. 
A dualistic universe is 
assumed. 
Time and space are treated 
separately by both. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
is used by both. 
Linear clocktime is viewed 
as a heuristically useful 
concept which does not, 
however, establish 
causative relationships 
between events. 
"Mind" or abstract ideas are 
included as. part of the field 
of study by both. 
Both focus primarily on 
patterned events in four-
dimensional context. 
Certainty is discarded by 
both, truth is viewed as 
heuristic. 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Linear clocktime is viewed 
as real time in which one 
event is causative in 
relation to the next event. 
The field of study is 
perceived as mechanistic 
and separate from the 
studying of mind by both. 
Both focus primarily on 
atomistic examination of 
entities in space and 
progression of events in 
linear clock-time. 
Certainty is accepted by 
both, truth is viewed as 
absolute. 
During the years to follow the contributions referred to above, the 
acknowledgement of context and interrelatedness were operationalized into 
therapeutic ideas and models in many places, specifically in the USA and 
Europe. In the USA new developments emerged - for example, from the Mental 
Research Institute (with Jackson and his colleagues), the Boston Family 
Institute (with Duhl, Kantor and others) and so forth (Duhl, 1983). Some of the 
most important work in Europe emanated from Italy (compare, for example, the 
work of Selvini-Palazzoli and her colleagues) Vvtlere the closing of mental 
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hospitals and the consequent accommodation of mental patients within families 
and society, urgently necessitated a focus by the mental health practitioners on 
families. This once again illustrated the effect of context - here the role played 
by society and national mental health policy in the development of the fields of 
psychology and psychiatry. 
The abundance of theoretical maps that ·emerged, expounding on human 
systems and fitting generally under systems thinking, can be seen as part of the 
move away from Newtonian and positivistic understandings of the \MJrld. Apart 
from the shared basic epistemology, they did, however also demonstrate a 
significant number of differences. Three different paradigmatic stances, each 
contributing to different models, will briefly be discussed here. The differing 
propositions on the definition of the interpersonal context of therapy training 
inherent in each of these paradigms will also be mentioned. 
A number of views developed as to how the elements of a system relate (Sluzki, 
1983). One is that the operation of a system can still be described as quite 
mechanistic in nature. In the family therapy field this view became known as 
"first-order cybernetics" (Hoffman, 1981; Keeney, 1983). 
First-Order Cybernetics - Viewing Systems From the Outside 
The cybernetic model suggests that the elements of a system are related 
. through processes of recursive feedback activity. Recursiveness, through 
negative and positive feedback, explains how systems maintain and change 
their organization. Thus cybernetics capture the interrelation of stability and 
change and describe the mechanics of these through the use of concepts such 
as morphogenesis, morphostasis and homeostasis (Bateson, 1972; Jackson, 
1968; Keeney, 1983; Keeney & Ross, 1985; Maruyama, 1963). The \MJrk of 
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Jackson ( 1968) and his colleagues represents important developments in this 
field. 
This view of human activity has a distinct technological and mechanistic 
character (Hoffman, 1981 ). It is also selective in its focus. The observer is not 
included as part of the complex interrelated systems through Wiich information 
is seen to be processed in systems. 
Models resting on these paradigmatic assumptions typically focus on 
understanding the nature of the system in focus (usually families). Compare, for 
example, the structural approach to families propagated by Minuchin (1974) or 
the Milan model of family therapy developed by Selvini-Palazzoli and her 
colleagues (Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin & Prata, 1978). 
Training seen from this paradigmatic stance \\()Uld most typically consist of 
becoming au fait with complex ways of conceptualizing systems. The self of the 
trainee, like the therapist herself, \\()Uld not explicitly be seen as part of the 
integrative system. The functioning of human systems \\()Uld be studied from 
the outside. 
Proponents emphasizing the training of impersonal, technical skills include 
Haley (1976) and the earlier \\()rk of Minuchin (1974, 1978, 1980). They 
declared that the trainer or supervisor should focus on the actual therapy 
behaviours displayed by the practitioner and help her acquire the necessary 
therapeutic skills. The practitioner or trainee's life or personal experiences is not 
the object of either change or discussion in training. Haley (1976) especially 
advocated that training should be confined to helping the trainee evaluate the 
metaphor and function of the family's symptom, and then devise an intervention 
strategy. He asserted that the therapist's problems and personal life were not 
appropriate for the teaching context. The external focus in this training context 
was so strong that Haley reported that his clinical students were drafting a bill of 
rights generally precluding any trainer from inquiring into the personal life of a 
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therapy student, no matter how benevolently (Aponte & Winter, 1987; Haley, 
1976; Minuchin, 1984; Minuchin & Fishman, 1981 ). 
There were, of course, exceptions to this principle of training from the outside, 
like the training done from early on by Satir. Although her early contributions 
can be fitted under the first-order cybernetic paradigm, her training 
acknowledged another side. She, Bowen and Ackerman were some of the first 
people to start formal training programs in family dynamics during the 1950's. 
However, of these three generative approaches, hers was the only to include 
the trainee's personal issues in some way. She focused explicitly on trainees' 
researching of their , own 'families for · a three-generational factual and 
chronological history, as the matrix of family influences by which the trainees 
were themselves shaped. Later on Bowen had trainees explore their own family 
histories as well (Duhl, 1983). 
These were antecedental to later paradigmatic moves to formally include the 
observer as part of the observed system. This became known as second order-
cybemetics in the field of family therapy (Hoffman, 1993; Keeney, 1983). 
Second-Order Cybernetics and Self-Referentiality 
Whereas first-order cybernetics can be seen as the cybernetics of observed 
systems, second-order cybernetics, in including the observer in the focus, can 
be seen as the cybernetics of observing systems (Maruyama, 1963; Von 
Foerster, 1981 ). An emphasis on the observer's role in constructing what is : 
being observed, contributed to the development of approaches that came to be 
termed constructivist (Efran & Lukens, 1985; Keeney & Ross. 1985). 
Thus the observer/therapist steps out of her outside position into a reflexive or 
self-referential stance (Keeney, 1983). She has to acknowledge that who she is 
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in a context and \Nhat else emerges from that context, mutually determine each 
other. 
This emphasis connects with Maturana and Varela's ( 1987) idea of structural 
self-determinism. This theory emphasizes both the self-creating nature of living 
systems and the central role that language plays in shaping human activity. 
Human systems are seen to be organized in such a way that they maintain 
themselves through constant self-referral processes. This implies that their 
functioning is dependent on their own structure and organisation, and not on 
external perturbation. Thus the system, in determining its own responses, is 
informationally closed and autonomous. 
TYA:> important conclusions follow from this view (Maturana & Varela, 1987). 
Firstly, \Nhat the observer perceives is determined by her own organization 
rather than the qualities of the observed. Secondly, instructive interaction as a 
concept is viewed as questionable. Living systems cannot be changed in an 
instructive way. 
This also implies that systems cannot change to fit the environment. Rather, the 
challenge for structure-determined systems is to find a mutually satisfying fit -
termed a structural coupling -with other systems and.the environment (termed 
the medium) (Maturana & Varela, 1987). 
Structural coupling in interpersonal contexts is facilitated and attained through 
the use of language. Mutually satisfying interactions generate a consensual 
domain, v.tlich creates the illusion of a single reality, v.tlilst we actually function 
amidst a multiverse of realities (Maturana, 1988; Maturana & Varela, 1987). 
The implications for training of a second-order cybernetic perspective very 
clearly implies an overt inclusjon of the role of the trainee/therapist in 
constructing v.tlat is being understood, as well as v.tlat happens. This 
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participation is not only on a controlled and intellectual level, but also touches 
on the full personhood of the trainee/therapist. 
Satir and Bowen, as mentioned in the previous section, vvere some of the 
earliest proponents of stressing internal, personal skills. They saw the basic 
task of the training program to lie in assisting trainees to become more 
personally integrated, thereby becoming more able to intervene in the lives of 
clients with a greater range of choice, insight and creativity. By being able to 
recognize their own selective psychological blindness better, trainees will have 
increased access to their O\Ml wisdom in therapy (Bovven, 1972; Satir, '1987; 
Satir & Baldwin, 1983). Bovven (1972) (although repeatedly emphasizing the .. 
need for, and development of, theory) is unequivocal in his focus on the 
development of the person of the therapist/trainee. Aponte and Winter (1987) 
quote him as saying "I am not training people to utilize techniques or telling 
them how to say hello" (p.88). 
Minuchin (1980, 1984), in more recent statements, also reveals a dissatisfaction 
with his earlier training approaches, acknowledging the limitations of a narrow 
focus on techniques. Gurman and Kniskern (1981), in a comprehensive review 
of family therapy outcomes, asserted that therapist relationship skills have 
increasingly revealed a relationship to treatment outcome. 
Allowing for the central importance of the self of the trainee does not, however, 
imply a complete rejection of an external focus. Aponte and Winter ( 1987) 
propose a person-practice training model that stresses both external, technical 
and internal, collaborative skills. Their training utilizes the various contexts of a 
trainee/therapist's life, including her clinical, collegial and family relationships. 
This emerges from an ecological frame'M:>rk with the trainee/therapist's clinical 
practice as the central context or setting for training the person of the therapist. 
Andolfi and his colleagues (1983) suggested that trainers use the personal 
strengths and idiosyncrasies of trainees in pushing them towards creativity in 
the training context. Whitaker ( 1991) stresses the importance of training 
therapists to be present in the therapy circumstance in a personal way - not 
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vicariously, but so that it would be conducive to the construction of a 
transformation context. Duhl (1983) stresses the importance of the 
trainee/therapists becoming grounded in their own lives in such a way that they 
can learn to think about systems and change "from the inside out" (the title of 
her seminal work on training). All of these approaches imply the possibilities for 
growth and evolution inherent in accessing the social and personal processes 
of self, rather than trying to find the (externally) general way in training and 
therapy. 
Second-order cybernetics, likewise, is critical of the principle of human systems 
working to maintain equilibrium, stating that this was not so much a generic 
quality of systems, than something attributed to it by observers (Dell, 1982; Dell 
& Goolishian, 1981 ). Instead of using the concept of equilibrium in some way to 
describe systems, conceptualizations can centre around systems' evolution. 
Evolutionary Systems - The Transformational Role of Crisis 
Using nature as referent (Hoffman, 1981 ), a perspective developed that saw the 
development of patterns in systems not so much as a byproduct of their striving 
for return to a presumed steady state (equilibrium), than as the result of 
instability. Living systems are seen as permanent instabilities in constant - - ----
evolution. 
Much of the acknowiedgement within the field of therapy of systems as being 
evolutionary (Dell & Goolishian, 1981; Elkaim, 1981, 1985; Hoffman, 1981) is 
based on the work of the physicist Prigogine (Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984). Prigogine and Stengers (1984) note that modern science's 
fascination with the discovery of eternal laws at the core of nature's 
transformations exorcises the idea of time and becoming. They comment on 
· how people, however, in seeking general all-embracing schemes that could be 
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expressed in terms of eternal laws, have instead found time, events and 
evolving particles. They searched for symmetry and instead found symmetry 
breaking processes on all levels, from elementary particles up to biology and 
ecology. Thus Prigogine and his colleagues started formulating complex 
understandings of how all systems are constantly becoming, finding order 
through chaos in a non-equilibrium ordering process, without the effort of an 
external force. 
In short, Prigogine (Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) explained the 
phenomenon of systems evolving via discontinuous, self-transc.endent leaps by 
introducing the concept of dissipative structures. These structures draw energy 
from outside the system to enhance growth, but attain the conditions necessary 
for discontinuous change into new formations from the fluctuations within the 
system. Dissipative structures occur only when the system is a'l/l/ay from 
equilibrium and when a discontinuous supply of energy or matter is present. 
When a critical value of the system's parameters is reached, a discontinuous 
shift or "bifurcation" (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p.160) occurs. At the point of 
bifurcation, however, transformation becomes inevitable but unpredictable (for 
example, in which direction the system will change, as well as which of the 
system's O'M1 fluctuations will affect the transformation). It is stated, though, that 
the further the system is a'l/l/ay from equilibrium, the greater the number of 
possible states there are into which the system can settle following a critical 
perturbation (Elkaim, 1981; Lazio, 1972, 1986; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; 
Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
Furthermore, the establishment of a dissipative structure is accompanied by the 
appearance of a new function related to this structure. This brings about a 
higher level of interaction between the system and the structure. Prigogine 
described this pattern as evolutionary feedback. He also maintained that with 
increased dissipation, the class of fluctuations leading to instability is extended. 
Thus increased entropy production is brought about, which in tum leads to 
more instabilities appearing. In essence then, living systems can be seen to 
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evolve towards the maximal complexity attainable given the energy available 
from the environment. This implies greater variability, flexibility and a higher 
order of process - eventually becoming metastable and able to shift easily from 
one dynamic order to another (Dell & Goolishian, 1981; Lazio, 1972; Prigogine, 
1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984 ). 
This evolutionary perspective has some important implications for the training of 
psychotherapists. To start off with it recognizes the possibility for trainees of 
evolving as therapists. However, it also acknowledges that the impetus for 
change does not necessarily emanate primarily from the trainer's external input. 
Constructivist and constructionist approaches to intuition foster intuitive 
understanding of academic disciplines by treating them as conceptual territories 
that can be imaginatively entered. The art of instruction lies in the evocative --'---- :0\ 
presentation of ideas that point beyond themselves (Stuewe-Portnoff & Stuewe-
Portnoff, 1995). 
Furthermore, the importance for the trainee of crises in her own living as points 
of bifurcation, is strongly implied. The importance of the trainee's personal 
experiences as transformational in her growth as a therapist is thereby / 
undeniably acknowledged. The challenge for training then becomes one of co-
creating a context for evolution as a therapist through personal transformations. 
This does not imply a push for the trainee to become increasingly familiar with 
the how-to's of the job, but rather for the trainee to become increasingly able to 
access, evolve and move within the multiplicity of her selves within different 
forms of interaction, by learning to live (that is, to find a metastable position} 
within her own and the 'Mlrld's uncertainti~s. 
This necessitates an understanding of the seemingly external and internal 
'Mlrld, as well as of scientific and ethical values, not as mutually exclusive or 
orthogonal, but as part of the same constructions we make of time and space. 
This implies an ethical responsibility in the way we join with the constant 
transformations that make up living. 
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Realizing the potentially enormous number of bifurcations involved in complex 
systems such as people and societies, leads, according to Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984), both to hope and despair. The hope lies in the potential of 
even small fluctuations to grow and change overall structures. The despair is 
embodied in the way the security of stable permanent rules in the universe 
seems to be gone forever. To the trainee and therapist, this means not being 
able to live and 'M:>rk with a sense of blind and secure confidence. Rather, what 
is needed is a feeling of qualified hope. Prigogine and Stengers (1984, p.313) 
illustrate this kind of position with the kind of hope attributed to the God of 
Genesis by the Talmudic vvriter Neher: 
Twenty-six attempts preceded the present genesis, 
all of which were destined to fail. The 'M:>rld of man 
has arisen out of the chaotic heart of the preceding 
debris; he too is exposed to the risk of failure, and 
the return to nothing. "Let's hope it 'M:>rks" (Ha/way 
Sheyaamocf) exclaimed God as he created the 
World, and this hope, which has accompanied all 
the subsequent history of the 'M:>rld and mankind, 
has emphasized right from the outset that this 
history is branded with the mark of radical 
uncertainty. 
The paradigmatic stances as outlined above provide one reality map of the 
evolving contexts of psychotherapy training as far as a focus on the self of the 
trainee/therapist is concerned. Not denying the multitude of realities around this 
content as around any other, an effort can be made at spelling out some central 
themes that emerge from this kind of focus on self in training. 
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Training as a Catalyst for the Personal Development of the Trainee - Some 
General Themes 
Training as Treatment - Training as Impetus for Personal Development 
Engaging in therapeutic 'NOrk with clients is a social context which jostles a 
therapist's personal issues in ways that few other encounters do. Similarly, 
engaging in a training process that focuses on the use of self with clients leaves 
little of the trainee's internal life and patterns of relating untouched. Thus, 
training for the person of the therapist creates a circumstance within which the 
trainee/therapist can obtain an intervention for herself in the context of her 
training and 'NOrk (Liddle & Saba, 1983). 
Training can explicitly address the trainee's personal issues and struggles (as 
dilemmas brought to the foreground by the activity of providing treatment) and 
thereby become a potent stimulus to personal growth, fostering a variety of 
possibilities for change in the therapist herself. 
Using oneself as a therapist means first to know one's self, to know the 
meanings one harbours, and where and when they come from. Thus an 
important aim of training is to heighten the trainee's awareness of her o'M1 
thinking and believing at each stage of her life in order to rekindle that which 
has been dormant. The more trainees/therapists know about themselves and 
the others with Vlklom they learn, the more they can move and learn with that 
which is generic in all people. Use of self requires that the trainee/therapist 
continually updates her life, while examining herself as an actor in the systems 
she is in (Anonymous, 1972; Duhl, 1983, 1987; Liddle & Saba, 1983; Satir, 
1972, 1987). 
106 
Aponte and Winter (1987) point out that training (and therapy) is often a useful 
context for personal transformation as the trainee/therapist is not so locked in 
the same person-specific struggles as is typical of her interactions with her own 
family. They point out certain components of the training and therapeutic 
process that can be catalytic in the trainee's transformational process. One of 
these is that training/therapeutic circumstances can enhance the 
trainee/therapist's motivation and courage to face difficult struggles, as the 
forceful drive towards both professional achievement and a sense of fulfilment 
in her own living are served. 
Duhl ( 1987) points out that using oneself as a trainee/therapist means being 
involved in an ongoing research project. This entails being curious about one's 
own reactions and intentions in varying contexts, and to locate the source of 
reactivity in one's learned-to-learn patterns. These patterns, developed in 
earlier contexts, give clues to the current context as '11011 as the context of 
clients. 
As much as training can provide treatment, an important challenge for the 
trainee is to learn how to construct all subsequent therapies into a similar 
training context that is also self-beneficial. 
Mutuality and Metamorphosis - Training the Person of the Therapist so that the 
Therapy Can Work for Her as Well 
Therapy can be seen as a personal relationship operating within the 
parameters of a professional structure. Clients and therapists join together to 
create a new actively evolving entity, each participant bringing her distinctive 
life experiences, world views and personal issues to the process. The 
therapeutic circumstance creates yet another set of life experiences, impacting, 
·due to the interrelatedness of all participants, on everyone in a non-reversible 
107 
way. The therapist's needs are typically subordinated to the client's. However, 
the treatment relationship, in affecting everyone, should also be beneficial to all 
participants. 
From this perspective, therapists should and can actively utilize all that the 
therapist is as a person. Learning how to employ the therapeutic circumstance 
in such a comprehensive manner is training the person of the therapist. 
The trainee/therapist must be aware of 'Nhat she brings into the relationship and 
learn to manage herself and her personal dynamics firstly for the welfare of her 
clients. Moreover, she needs to be aware of how the therapy is affecting her 
personally. Leaming to make the therapy she conducts with other systems vvork 
for herself as well is also part of the training of the person of the therapist. 
The positive outcome of treatment (for all participants) is dependent on the 
trainee/therapist's successful harnessing of herself and also her own needs for 
healing within the social negotiation of the therapy. (The importance of the 
therapist's own vulnerabilities will be discussed in more depth later in this 
chapter.) 
Aponte and Winter ( 1987) confirm the extent to 'Nhich the therapeutic situation 
can act as a catalyst for the trainee/therapist's own growth through vicarious 
change. By guiding a client in certain ways through a process of change, the 
trainee/therapist can also be addressing a complex, difficult problem for herself. 
The same understandings, directions and suggestions that she is giving to the 
client, she might unwittingly be giving to herself. 
This personal shifting of the trainee/therapist can evolve through many different 
nuances of the therapeutic process. Partaking in this process, even in the. role 
of the professional(-to-be), means entering a domain different from the typical 
dances of daily interaction. It becomes a domain within 'Nhich risking and 
revealing is dared, 'Nhere people find the courage to travel to unknown 
I •, 
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territories. The therapist becomes personally part of this space. Paradoxically, 
being in the seemingly protective role of the therapist can also serve to lower 
the self-protective shields of the therapist since she is not the overt target of 
change. Thus, in guiding the client through unknown places where certainties 
about self are left behind, can also bring a new awareness to the 
trainee/therapist of pain and issues of her own living which until that point had 
remained buried. 
Thus, due to these catalytic forces, the conduct of therapy can create unique 
opportunities for transformational shifts for both the client(s) and the therapist. 
Guiding a trainee to be able to conduct therapy in this way is one of the most 
important tasks of training. 
Training for Improvisation 
As already mentioned repeatedly, many proponents point out the importance of 
trainers and trainees using themselves and not their techniques as the major 
instruments of change (Andolfi & Menghi, 1980, 1982; Duhl, 1983; Keeney, 
1990; Snyders, 1986). 
This implies that the implementation of a single training package that all 
trainees are exposed to, is inappropriate. A training context has to evolve within 
'htlich increasing attention can be paid (during training as well as evaluation) to 
individual differences and resources amongst trainees and the development of 
such personal skills (Perlesz, Stolk & Firestone, 1990). 
Furthermore, given the unpredictable nature of human interaction and 
communication, trainees need to learn to move away from impersonating others 
or following rigid ideas of how to conduct themselves in therapy. Such positions 
would only block their full participation in the therapeutic circumstance. Instead, 
109 
they have to develop their own improvisational style, fully informed by both their 
own limitations and resources, in order to step into the full aesthetics of 
themselves-in-context. The continual development of the trainee/therapist's 
capacity to respond creatively in life situations, as well as in therapy, and to be 
in touch with her existential core in relation to her life in context at each period 
in time, becomes important. Through this she learns to play with options for 
herself to be able to access a wide range of stances and roles from w'hich to 
choose. Then she has many ways to invent metaphor, humour and ways of 
making the familiar strange and the strange familiar (Duhl, 1983, 1987; Gordon 
& Poze, 1973; Keeney, 1990). 
Similarly, the training context needs to create situations in w'hich the trainee is 
invited to improvise. Such situations 'vVOuld make it impossible for the trainee to 
rely on previously (externally) attained lines, scripts, ways or habits, facilitating 
the necessity for the trainee to rely on her own resourcefulness in context 
(Keeney, 1990). 
This kind of training demands most essentially of the trainer to be resourceful .,._ 
and improvisatory herself. She needs to diversify her own use of self in the I I 
training by, for example, relinquishing the role of expert and instructor. This 
could take the form of finding different ways of putting the trainees in charge of 
their 0\\11 training, of getting beyond recipe and prescription by seeing the 
specific training situation as another chance for her 0\\11 ongoing training, and 
moving beyond constant evaluation to an appreciation of creativity. 
Attachment Theory as Metaphor for the Training Process 
General metamodels for the training of psychotherapists typically propose ways 
in v.klich trainees and their environment (including trainers) should and can 
change over the course of the training process. Such developmental models do 
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not necessarily imply a reintroduction of a dependence on linearly causal time. 
Rather, these models can embody a diachronic aspect of the training system. A 
struggle with certain themes as part of the evolutionary process of training can 
be identified. These themes can contribute to the amplification of certain 
fluctuations that can again result in a complexity of bifurcations - embodying 
transformation through training. 
Such models typically focus on themes or facets such as dependency-
autonomy, separation-belonging, differentiation-imitation, and so forth (Andolfi 
& Menghi, 1980; Snyders, 1986; Stoltenberg, 1981; Worthington, 1987). These 
different languagings all contain some effort at addressing the way a person is 
herself with others. Stoltenberg ( 1981 ), for example, in his counsellor 
complexity model, proposed training to be a process consisting of four 
identifiable stages. At each of these stages he identifies trainee patterns as: 
Stage 1: dependency on the supervisor, imitating the trainer and subscribing to 
techniques; Stage 2: struggling between dependency and autonomy and 
fluctuating motivation; Stage 3: showing conditional dependency with increased 
empathy; Stage 4: adequate self- and other awareness. For each of these 
stages he prescribes optimal environments, Vtttich in essence entails the 
trainer's varying use of availability (for dependency, for the sake of, for example, 
support) and unavailability {for example, through the use of ambivalence, to 
push for the trainee's autonomy). The trainer aims for a more shared, mutual 
relationship, entailing the trainee's differentiation from a dependency 
relationship. Similarly Snyders {1986) noted that the trainer has to facilitate the 
unfolding of a learning context in such a way that the increased differentiation of 
all participants is encouraged. More specifically, the trainer has to promote the 
progressive emancipation of the trainee in order for her to eventually 
successfully separate from the training system. 
These views illustrate important facets of the process of coming to be with your 
self/selves in a way that could also be healing for others. These facets, as 
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illustrated above, often deal with issues of connecting and disconnecting with 
others. 
Training typically happens within a series of interrelated contexts, involving 
mainly the trainer(s), the individual trainees, the training group, punctuated 
client systems and the related systems which each trainer and trainee implicitly 
contribute to the complexity of context. Within these contexts circumstances 
that are appropriate for the encountering of issues of connection-disconnection 
are co-created. Through provocation (messages transmitted by the training 
group) and counter-provocation (formulations of training strategies in response 
to these messages) the trainer and trainees are able to influence the unfolding 
of a learning context (Andolfi & Menghi, 1980). 
This form of provocation and counter-provocation is used to regulate the 
dynamic equilibrium between belonging and separation to favour the 
progressive individuation of each trainee therapist. For example, while 
guaranteeing full support and respect, the trainer can challenge, amplify or 
criticize the trainee's idiosyncratic behavioural patterns, functions and feelings 
(Andolfi & Menghi, 1980, 1982; Andolfi et al., 1983). 
Different facets of such a process of building a useful learning context for 
therapy trainees can be vie'Ned as follows: 
Training as necessitating connection 
For the trainee to encounter herself usefully, she needs to belong to 
some system(s) within v.klich her issues of relating will not only play out, 
but can be addressed. 
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Typical initial provocations from trainees entail an implicit request for the 
safety and stability provided by the cohesion of, for example, a nurturant 
training group. This desire (analogous to that of the client entering 
therapy) entails an impossible task for the trainer: to help the trainee 
differentiate herself as a major instrument of change, while 
simultaneously providing and preserving previously attained patterns of 
safe and nurturing connection. If this kind of connection had to become 
. possible fully and unequivocally, the trainee 'MJuld partake in a process 
that really masks anonymity and thus pre-empts any new and fuller 
experience of self (Andolfi & Menghi, 1980). 
The experience of the need for, and the building of, community is, 
however, not superfluous, but very important during training. Firstly, it 
creates a circumstance within which the trainee (and trainer) can 
become increasingly aware of the rules of interaction that she has 
typically constructed in the effort to escape the pain of impending 
change by reconsolidating previously attained equilibriums. It provides 
the opportunity for trainees to investigate how they hook others into their 
schemes and also get hooked into others' schemes. Secondly, a realm 
of connection or the sense of community also provide the opportunity for . 
-·····"\ disconnection, thereby allowing for more awareness of the relationally ) 
constructed self and providing the chance for more senses of self to 
emerge. As explicated in Chapter 1, developing a sense of self 
necessarily implies interaction and co-creation with specific discursive 
communities. A change in these interactive patterns also brings 
movement in the patterns of interpretation of self. 
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Training as necessitating disconnection 
The trainer has to find ways of creatively introducing difference into the 
training process in order to facilitate the evolution of autonomy and in 
that, greater differentiation of self for the trainees. As mentioned in 
Section 1, an experience of difference can bring a person (i.e. the 
trainee) to a clearer sense · of her typical experience of the world, 
relationship and self. That is, a relational or contextual sense of the parts 
can emerge more clearly (Bateson, 1972). 
The potential for such shifts is embodied in an acknowledgement of the 
training system as a relational system in constant transformation. This 
also means that the introduction of difference does not happen at a 
given point in time, explicitly or unequivocally. Processes of joining and 
separation are constantly at 'NOrk in training systems. These experiences 
are also both desired and feared by the participants. It is, for example, in 
the trainee's conflictive autonomy and dependency needs (Stoltenberg, 
1981) that the template develops for a usefully uncomfortable move in 
her web of relatedness. 
In her struggle to separate from the trainer, training context, well-'NOm 
ideas and old patterns of relating, the trainee increasingly differentiates 
and new senses of her self can be negotiated. Through this process she 
can increasingly come to trust herself, be able to reach inside herself, 
and come to tune into herself en route to other people. A simultaneous 
(if everchanging) sense of self and other can emerge and she can come 
to know that to be human is to unfold and conserve in varying degrees at 
different times (Duhl, 1987; Le Roux, 1987). Thus both her abilities to 
engage and separate in different ways in different contexts evolve 
through experiences of separation (v.klich conversely imply experiences 
of connection). 
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The importance of crisis in building and accessing the multiplicity of self 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the experience of crisis is closely linked to 
the experience of separation. The sense of crisis that can emerge for a 
trainee from the multitude of separation experiences in the learning 
process, or from gaining an awareness of old identities (of self and 
relationships) is an important impetus in separation from old selves and 
the building and accessing of new nuances of self in context. 
Similarly, what is experienced by the trainee (and possibly the trainer) as 
a hindrance to her functioning as a therapist, can transform into an 
important resource of self. This necessitates, however, a stepping into 
the experience of crisis. The effort to escape from or to solve the crisis 
only results in the co-construction of a therapeutic or training impasse. 
Andolfi demonstrates this principle in the handicap intervention \NOrk he 
does as part of training. The trainee is encouraged to face her existential 
dilemmas in order to help elicit the necessary resources to break the 
rigid, relational rules that impede differentiation. The purpose is to 
increase the trainee's response-ability - to help her access more sides of 
herself in building creative healing contexts. Thus, in facing the dragon 
of her O'Ml crises, she can move from handicap to handy capable 
(Haber, 1990). 
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Implications for Therapy of Acknowledging the Therapist's Personhood 
Implications for the Way the Treatment Context is Conceptualized 
The Dilemma of the Personal Approach - The Need for a Disciplined Use of 
Self 
The same proponents of freeing therapists to be themselves, also engage in 
alerting them to the dangers of the undisciplined use of self (Satir & Baldwin, 
1987). Collier (1987), for example, warns against the peril of egoism, adding 
that the therapist's over-centrality or dominance will guarantee failure in the 
goal of facilitating the client's process and experience. 
In essence, it is stated repeatedly that the idea of training is not to allow a more 
comfortable context for the therapist in that she can now drift regardlessly with 
Yttlat happens to come up in her at the time. Rather, the issue in training and 
therapy is to find the bridge between the therapist's personal life and issues, 
and her actual conduct of treatment. Discipline and discomfort is implied in the 
therapist's constant (explicit and implicit) striving to enhance her ability to utilize 
her own life experiences, personal assets and struggles on behalf of her 
professional performance (Aponte & Winter, 1987; Satir, 1987). 
The aim of this is clear and specific. She aims at generating effective 
therapeutic outcomes (Yttlere effectiveness is conceptualized in terms of the co-
creation of transformational contexts) and supplementing her own efforts at 
enhancing her own living. Thus a call for the disciplined use of self in therapy 
does not imply linear constraints, but rather prescribes a commitment to 
participation in a process Yttlich is always in search of the confluence of 
profession and person, community and self, crisis and transformation. 
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Moving from Prescribing Therapist Qualities to Facilitating the Co-creation of 
Healing Contexts 
Earlier acknowledgements of the therapist as a person primarily endeavoured 
to conceptualize what the ideal qualities of an effective therapist are. These 
typically referred to characteristics that would also be evident outside of the 
actual context of therapy - thus implying assumptions about stable and cross-
contextually predictable personality traits. 
A typical example of this approach is the way in which Rogers' (1951) 
description of the three central aspects of effective therapist functioning (in 
brief: warmth, empathy and unconditional regard) have come to be 
conceptualized as characteristics and been prescribed (as basic requirements 
for a therapist) in a great deal of contexts in the 'M>rld of therapy. 
Another person who has over time spent a great deal of effort at ascertaining 
what constitutes the effective therapist, has been Gurman ( Gurman, 1987; 
Gurman & Kniskem, 1981; Gurman, Kniskem & Pinsoff, 1986; Gurman & 
Razin, 1977). He summarized and ordered many variables identified and 
prescribed in different parts of the literature. However, he also concluded the 
inconclusiveness of the research done on this issue. (In fairness to Gurman 
(1987) it has to be mentioned that he steadfastly confirms the importance of 
continuing to scrutinize this issue, and ascribes past research failings to 
methodological problems.) 
Some of the major examples of therapist characteristics that have been 
identified in the past, can be summarized in the following categories (Gurman, 
1987): 
Personality characteristics: These include honesty, perceptiveness, 
open-mindedness, caring, empathy, attitudes and values about intimate 
relationships, pathology, and so forth. 
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Mental health: These include formulations such as psychological 
integrity, being at ease with oneself, level of differentiation, and so forth. 
Gender: These descriptions do not typically describe the desirability of 
one gender above another in the world of therapy, but rather 
acknowledge the different impact of different genders. Collier ( 1987), for 
example, describes the different voice of women therapists, in that they 
work more with and through themes of attachment, Wiereas men 
therapists more typically work with and through separation. 
Experience level: Most typically a higher level of experience is 
associated with better therapeutic outcomes. An interesting variation on 
this theme is the suggestion that experience as an individual 
psychotherapist can be harmful (if not preclude) effectiveness as a 
family therapist (Haley, 1976). 
Demographical variables: Variables such as race, social class and 
ethnicity are considered inasfar as they can contribute to conflicting 
values or damaging stereotypes held by therapists about their clients. 
Apart from seemingly "outside" qualities, such as those described above, the 
effective therapist can also be described as displaying some of the following in-
process qualities: 
Therapist styles: These include the ability to model meaning clarification 
and positive perception of clients; level of activity (in that the more active 
therapist is seen to have fewer early dropouts); expressions of the 
therapist's involvement rather than expressions of mere understanding; 
structuring skills such as directiveness, clarity, self-confidence, and so 
forth. 
Therapeutic relationship skills: These most typically reflect the familiar 
triad of warmth, empathy and acceptance, or at least, some minimal level 
of empathic responsiveness. 
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As much as there are a myriad of such ideal therapeutic variables that have 
been identified until now, and as much as these apparent recipes have been 
criticized for including "a litany of virtues more suited perhaps to the most 
honored biblical figures than to any of their descendents" (Parloff, Waskow & 
Wolfe, 1978, p.235), a scrutiny of these lists does reveal one very specific 
theme. All of the descriptions convey some nuance of a process of engaging 
with another in a full and real way. This recognition could enable one to move 
beyond the seductions of mechanistic prescriptions. Rather, what can be 
prescribed is a process of healing that entails a fuller and more truthful 
encounter between two people, than what traditional authoritarian approaches -., 
/ 
allo'vVed. Whatever the qualities and experiences that the therapist can access 
\ 
to help her engage in this way with a specific client at a specific time, those are - ---- ->;; 
the appropriate therapist qualities in that context. Thus the process of becoming 
a committed partner in the co-creation of a transformational healing context 
comes into focus, rather than the search for specific qualities. 
Even Rogers, who is credited with the famous trilogy of prescribed therapist 
qualities (Rogers, 1961 ), describes this shift in himself over time. In a recent 
interviewwith Baldwin (Baldwin, M., 1987b) he says: 
In the past, I could be understood at a purely 
cognitive level. Ho'vVever, as I became clearer as to 
what I was doing, academicians had to allow room for 
experiential learning, which is quite threatening, 
because, then, the instructor might have to become a 
learner, which is not popular in such circles. (p.51) 
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Spreading Expertise: Moving from Private Practice to Partnership Process 
In the traditional authoritarian doctor-patient relationship in therapy, the 
emphasis is on the therapist's special ability to apply acquired knowledge and 
theory. This imbues her with the right to decide (privately) 'Nhat is best for the 
patient. 
In contrast, in an approach to treatment that acknowledges the therapist's 
possible positive use of self, she (the therapist) can also begin to form a 
partnership with the patient. Both can work together utilizing their respective 
actions, reactions and interactions. Thus the treatment context becomes a life-
giving and life-learning context between client and therapist, 'Nho can respond 
humanly and personally. In this partnership therapists become responsible for 
the initiation and continuation of the therapy process. They are not in charge of 
the clients within that process. 
A partnership can allow for the empoVYerment of both therapist (also in her 
personhood) and client through the therapy process. This shift in approach is 
most basically predicted upon the belief that human beings have the capacity 
for their CM11 growth and healing (Rogers, 1961; Satir, 1987; Yalom, 1980; 
1989). 
Therapy as a Personally Co-created Process - Building Local Communities of 
Significance and Transformation 
Allowing for the place of personal reactions and interactions from both the client 
and therapist, pre-empts the possibility of a predictable process in therapy. It 
also implies that the therapist cannot be the same person with the same 
(predictable) patterns across the boundaries of different therapy interactions. 
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Indeed, the therapist's self is not a bounded, singular and, above all, inner 
entity. Rather, it is an amalgam of endless fragments from many meaningful 
interactions with the world and others. 
Thus, what will emerge for both the therapist and client in terms of self and 
meaning, is constructed within the specific social setting. The emergence of 
personal, local narratives and meanings are negotiated. The process beMeen 
therapist and client entails the construction of a local community of significance 
(McNamee, 1992). This allows for a context within which both can become 
increasingly committed to and moved by what happens. Thus, the process is 
recursive. The therapist is positioned within the system and not as an expert 
acting upon it. Then the therapist facilitates change through the participation in, 
and active involvement and engagement with, the perceptions and experience 
of the client(s) (Real, 1990). Not only does personal involvement allow for a 
transformational therapeutic context, participation in this community of \ 
significance also allows for new experiences of a relational self to emerge. Thus 
the process of therapy becomes a (conscious or unconscious) process of self-
exploration for both the therapist and client, of getting acquainted with one's 
O'M1 feelings and coming to accept them as part of self. 
Moving from a Focus on the Outcome to a Focus on the Journey 
In the traditional authoritarian (modernist) medical model, emphasis is first on 
eradicating the symptom, with the hope that health will follow (Albee, 1982; 
Dunham, 1984; Mann, 1979). In a partnership process, however, what is"; 
acknowledged as transformational is the process of negotiating self and \ 
community in the relating between the therapist and the client. This allows for 
certain interpretations, explanations, experiences and lines of action to emerge, 
and for others to be constrained (Gergen, 1990). 
121 
Thus, therapy is most effective \Nhen the therapist's goals are limited to the 
process of therapy and not the outcome (Baldwin, M. 1987a; Collier, 1987)" 
Similarly, the most important choice for clients is not \Nhich technique (and thus( 
technician) will help them best, but \Nhich therapist will offer the widest and most; 
flexible response as an individual to the clients as individuals. 
The issue then for therapists is not \Nhether a stance is adopted that is active or 
passive, inquiring or assertive, but rather \Nhether a truly healing domain can be 
created, a fifth province in McCarthy's (McCarthy & Byrne, 1988) terms. This is 
a place \Nhere polarities and tensions are not to be obviated and solved, but 
rather encountered in a close and personal interaction, in order for the potential 
for transformation that lies within the tension of seeming impossibility, to 
emerge. 
Redefining the Goal of Therapy: Expanding and Multiplying Existing Narratives 
and Discourses 
Moving the focus away from the outcome to the journey of therapy necessitates 
a re-formulation of the goals of therapy. Traditionally the expectation has been 
that therapy in its problem orientation is there as part of an endeavour to allow 
people to live problem-free. What renders the goal of eradicating problems 
irrelevant is an understanding that posits the experience of problems as 
moments within Vvtlich movements beyond the habitual patterns that keep 
people stuck, can emerge. 
The constructionist stance proposes that psychotherapy is a linguistic context 
and process within Vvtlich both therapist and client become participants with no 
clear vision of the ultimate destiny. Both of them and their senses of themselves 
have also been formed by their participation over time in other linguistic 
· contexts. In other VJOrds, their ideas about themselves, their relationships and 
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their lives have been formed through language in relation to others (Gergen, 
1989; Harre, 1989; Shorter, 1989). It is the narratives that people have formed 
in this way, its limitations, as well as the limitations of the particular discursive 
habits or language games at play in people's local communities of significance, 
that (in this perspective) constitute the problem. 
Thus the aim of therapy becomes one of co-creating a context within which the 
,patterns of previous habitual languaging can be broken out of, in order for 
everyone's narrative discourses to expand or multiply. 
Clients frequently enter therapy with fixed and constrictive narratives that 
provide an articulation of their stance toward the 'M>rld. They tell their first 
(which is also their usual) stories as though they were monologues: single-
voiced, absolute and closed. These (mostly negative) monologues purport to 
hold singular truths which has been and will be enduring over time. 
Denied in this stance is what Bakhtin ( 1981) calls dialog ism or, in other 'MJrds, 
the interanimating process whereby self and other are authored in 
conversation. An allowance of this process in therapy is also what is called for 
in order for the emotionally insistent monologues that are presented initially to 
be allowed to e><pand and multiply. 
Thus the therapist helps to create a dialoguing process through which more -) 
voices of the person can be heard in order to facilitate a move towards multiple 
description. 
This is not a unilateral process being perpetrated by the therapist on the client. 
The therapist, as much as she may be cognitively aware of the possibility of 
multiple reality, also, in her personhood as well as professional being, enters 
the therapy situation with at least some singular stories about herself. Similarly, 
she also needs to go through a process of expanding and multiplying 
narratives, about her self as well as the client. 
~. 
I\ 
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Moving beyond singular and constrictive narratives often become most possible - ·· ··· · 
when crisis is encountered. This is precisely because a sense of crisis disrupts 
a person's sense of a coherent and meaningful context, separating them from 
old meanings, narratives and identities. (This notion of the role of crisis is 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.) 
Penn and Frankfurt (1994) discuss this notion of the goal of therapy by focusing 
specifically on the idea that language has the inherent potential to generate a 
reply. They propose that the reply to others is shaped by our initial reply to 
ourselves in inner conversation. In other words, we (therapists as well as 
clients) try to perpetuate historically formed narratives by imposing them as 
monologue on interaction. However, when interaction can move back and forth 
from inner conversation to conversation with others (or dialogue), the stuff of 
new narratives can emerge. Thus, a participant text is written (whether verbally 
or by hand) that is composed of many voices. These voices, often newly 
discovered or invented, can allow everyone's narrative discourses to expand 
and multiply. 
Similarly, Sluzki ( 1992) notes that an encounter can be defined as therapeutic 
when, in its course, a transformation has taken place in the set of dominant 
stories of the client(s) so as to include new experiences, meanings, and 
(inter)actions, with the effect of a loosening of the grip of the set of stories on 
what has been termed symptomatic-problematic behaviours. 
The Nature of the Therapist's Healing Use of Self - Some Main Themes 
A concise but comprehensive definition of the concept "use of self' is currently 
missing from the field of psychotherapy. Part of the reason for this inadequacy 
is that the therapist's use of self is a multifaceted phenomenon. More 
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coherently, it can be said that the goal for the therapist is to use her self in such 1 
a way that the client is engaged in an active t>Na-way relationship within which I 
the usual interactive roles, in terms of when which stances are taken, and what 
stays hidden and how, can be transgressed by both. Real ( 1990) says in this 
regard that the goal of useful therapeutic conversation is most often more useful 
therapeutic conversation. Furthermore, he maintains that for therapeutic 
conversation to be useful, it must first be conversation, as opposed to 
monologue, and it must secondly be therapeutic, that is, it must lead to a 
relaxation of therapeutic stances - it must be healing. Some of the main facets 
or themes in this complex process of the healing use of self can be 
distinguished as follows. 
The Therapist's Multiplicity - Revisiting the Notion of Authenticity 
The therapist is no longer seen to possess a predictable set of integrated, 
hierarchically arranged personal characteristics which will always help clients to 
move in useful directions. Rather, her self that emerges is a multiple, 
fragmented and socially negotiated version. 
Rogers notes that in using himself, he includes his intuition and some essence 
of himself, 'W'latever that is" (Baldwin, M., 1987 a, p.46). According to Collier 
(1987), the roles that the therapist can play, vary greatly, such as consultant, 
catalyst, resource-provider, reactor, observer, problem-solver, sharing human, 
sometimes even just a shoulder to cry on. She notes that from minute to minute, 
through awareness and accompanying discomfort, she receives cues to (also 
spontaneously) change roles. Whitaker (1976) refers to the therapist's freedom 
to advance or retreat from any position. Satir (1972) sees the therapist as using 
herself in multiple roles, from empathic listener to an artful dodgem-car-
operator. Duhl ( 1983, 1987) discusses how the therapist becomes a weaver, 
linking images, behaviours, thoughts, and experiences with context, and 
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connecting all in a textured tapestry of life. Also in terms of professional role, 
she can become historian, dramatist or anthropologist. Keith ( 1987) 
conceptualizes the personal self of the therapist as in fact being a community of 
selves, and refers to his own selves as being at different times a giant in a 
miniature vvorld, a lover, a vvoman, a barefisted warrior, sometimes helpless and 
fleeing, sometimes confused and partially dressed, . sometimes crazy and 
creative - "a furtive schizophrenic, both chronic and acute, fragmented and out 
of focus" (p.63). 
Real (1990) uses the term multiple engagement to refer to the way in wtlich 
therapists can use themselves in a healing way in the therapeutic conversation. 
In this he proposes a role for the therapist that entails multiplicity, avoids · 
unilateral therapeutic po'Ner and simultaneously focuses neither only on any 
particular set of techniques, nor upon a vague prescription of attitude. Here the 
therapist is seen as positioned in, rather than as acting on, the system. 
Real (1990) describes multiple engagement as consisting of five therapeutic 
stances. These are seen as a set of specific therapeutic activities, therapeutic 
positions or uses of self, wtlich taken together may serve to guide the therapist 
in her participant-facilitator role. These stances are also seen as illustrations 
rather as prescriptions for the therapist. Real also acknowledges that these are 
only some possible examples of a myriad of stances that the therapist might 
take to further therapeutic dialogue. 
The five stances she proposes are: the eliciting, probing, contextualizing, 
. matching and amplifying stances. In the eliciting stance the therapist takes on a 
one-down posture, asking about different theories and ideas about the problem 
and situation. She resists the temptation to rule on the correct version of reality. 
Instead she communicates implicitly and explicitly equal respect for competing 
constructs, modelling a both-and position. This stance serves to help move 
beyond the repetitive monologuing that typically tends to get a system stuck 
wtlen the rules of censorship on the stories about this reality get too narrow and 
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predictable. Using the probing stance the therapist offers alternative 
descriptions of her own. In this she again does not offer the "true" version, but 
rather models ways in which each person can move themselves in order to 
invite more interesting and useful conversation. 
The contextualizing stance equals the circular questioning of the Milan team 
(Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin & Prata, 1980). Here the therapist 
references a particular move, behaviour or idea in a system out into the 
interactive field, connecting it to the meta-domain of overall pattern. In the 
matching stance the therapist simply mirrors back that which has been shown to 
her, in order to facilitate a process of liberating that particular position. Using 
the amplifying stance, the therapist chooses a particular idea, affect, theme or 
behavioural sequence that is available as a resource within the system and, 
,through her attention to it, evokes more of it. (White's (1988b) attention to 
unique outcomes is an example of an amplification stance.) These stances are 
another example of a conceptualization of the multiplicity involved in the 
therapist's place in therapy v.tien she places her full personhood in active 
participation with others from within the therapeutic circumstance (Real, 1990). 
The therapisfs acknowledgement and use of her own multiplicity can also 
contribute to the co-creation of a context within v.tlich there is not only space for 
the client's multiplicity, but also for a perspective that communicates that there 
are many ways to deal with things. Thus clients can also move between 
different voices or narratives of themselves, for example their male or female 
voices (Collier, 1987), in finding ways appropriate to different experiences, 
demands and needs. The freedom to be inconsistent can become another 
doorway to transformational creativity for the therapist and client and save both 
from the trap of becoming a fixed theoretical construct. Often, therapy can also 
become a context within v.tlich different voices can emerge together for the first 
time. This can bring into being a new symphony v.tlich can teach the therapist 
and client that there is a world very different in nature from the specific 
bifurcated worlds they have so far created. 
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Young (1989) notes that the account of a multiple, fragmented self brings with it 
the implication of an inconsistent and even incoherent experience of self. This 
also has important implications for the notion of authenticity - an experience 
much valued in the therapist's functioning. In essence, it is postulated that for 
therapy to be effective, the therapist has to be there as an authentic other in a 
relationship with the client in order to create conditions for change (Lovlie, 
1982). 
Authenticity, however, is often associated with a sameness and predictability of 
self that transcends the boundaries of time and space. (This notion is 
underpinned by a modernist assumption about the existence of a unitary and 
genuine self out there, that is with ontological primacy - see Chapter 1 ). 
An acknowledgment of the therapist's multiplicity, however, brings about an 
understanding of authenticity that emphasizes the importance of being human 
and personal within a given moment. Thus the goal for the therapist is to be 
within herself, within the way she is in that moment, and likewise with the other 
person in that moment. Thus authenticity implies being present as a person 
now, and not in the way she 'M:>uld, for example, rather like either the client or 
herself to be (Baldwin, M., 1987a; Lovlie, 1982; Satir, 1987; Yalom, 1989). It 
implies a steady awareness of herself within this moment, and a commitment to 
endeavour to stand the discomfort that this may bring (Collier, 1987; Duhl, 
1983; Miller & Baldwin, 1987). 
This experience of discomfort by the therapist can help her understand and 
deal with specific nuances of the experience of authenticity during a process of 
transformation. The explicit and conscious experience of personal authenticity 
is most often informed by a sense of staying in the same pattern (an implicit 
goal for living w11ich is the typical legacy of a modernist education) and can, 
therefore, not be taken as an indication of attaining the abovementioned notion 
of authenticity. Indeed, transformation can often bring a conscious sense of 
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inauthenticity. This is part of the discomfort that needs not to be solved in the 
therapy process - by either the therapist or client. 
The Ethical Self - Integrity and Maturity in the Therapist 
The concepts of "integrity" and "maturity" often emerge when the issue of the 
therapist's ethical use of self is discussed (Baldwin, M., 1987a; Bugental, 1965; 
Guy, 1987; Keith, 1987; Rogers, 1961; Satir, 1987; Yalom, 1980; 1989). 
These concepts seem to be most essentially used to reflect a position of (as 
much as possible) awareness of self without assuming an all-knowing stance. 
Many writers refer to the importance for the therapist of knowing her self in 
different moments - to have a sense of her reactions as well as what they 
connect to (Baldwin, M., 1987a; Satir, 1987; Yalom, 1980). Thus maturity does 
not only refer to experience of living, but it is what one has done with that 
experience of living 'Atlich is seen to make a difference in therapy. 
The idea of knowing the self is in itself a problematic notion. The self cannot be 
known in an assured, left-brained, pass-the-examination-level way of knowing. 
Rather, what is needed is for the therapist to be familiar with her self ''to the 
point of being both pleased and pained with its familiar unpredictability" (Keith, 
1987, p.63). 
The idea of integrity refers to a position from 'Atlich the therapist does not permit 
herself to think that she knovvs the other sufficiently (or vice versa). This also 
prevents the disrespect inherent in understanding too quickly. Thus the way in 
which the concept of integrity is used implies a refusal to be all-knowing and a 
comfort with the notion that all human problems do not have answers (Bugental, 
1965, 1967; Keith, 1987; Shadley, 1987). 
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Moving from Being a Missionary to Being a Pilgrim 
Being a therapist implies also being subject to the seductions of a missionary 
zeal to take away all clients's hurt, of a hunger to change the world .. This 
position of being the one to change things for others can be likened to the 
position of a missionary. Notwithstanding the nobleness of this endeavour, it 
also implies a disrespect for those Wio will be touched, in that the truth, the 
answer, as well as the way to attain these, is something the missionary-
therapist alone is assumed to be privy to. Her job then is to convert those she 
works with to the more useful living she knows of. 
As for any missionary, this position, if stuck to unflinchingly, guarantees failure 
in the way that it pre-empts a transformational journey for all parties in the 
encounter. (Perhaps one of the most famous failed missionaries is Stanley, 
Wio, in all his years in Africa, is said to have converted one person. Ironically, 
he is most famous for one rather chance encounter with Livingstone. Perhaps 
more importantly, his own later rendition of the personal meaning he found in 
his African pilgrimages acknowledges the importance of his mistakes. The most 
famous of these might be his declaration, in the height of his fame after the 
Livingstone-meeting, that the Zambezi River can be traversed from the ocean 
right up to the Victoria Falls. It was only years later, Wien he personally tried to 
do this, that he encountered the unnegotiable Ruacana Rapids, and realized 
that a journey easily prescribed for others, might be full of impossibilities Wien -
tried yourself.) 
It is through encountering the ghosts of failure in herself and in the missionary 
endeavour that the therapist can attain a more useful position - one in Wiich 
she finds herself on a journey, in an ongoing quest for meaning. Then her self is 
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not anaesthetized by a born-again enthusiasm (Keith, 1987), but like the client, 
struggles with the pain of growing until death comes. 
The knowing of this struggle from the inside out (Duhl, 1983) enables her to 
encounter the client in a more real and human way, more respectful of the 
journeys they are both on, and of the ways in which their past and current 
encounterings of both arrogance and humility can lead to a communion of 
silence on their moment of joining pilgrimages. 
This idea of the therapist as a failed missionary and a pilgrim can be likened to 
the character of the barman in the novel The Fall by Camus (1957). The 
barman is visited by survivors from the front of existence, seeking a home in 
solace and advice. Due to the fact that he was previously a judge who fell from 
the grace of the judicial system, he has not only witnessed, but also 
experienced much human misery, suffering and indiscretion. His encounter with 
his visitors is thus from the inside of his own experiences, struggles and failings. 
His only conclusion to existence on the front, close to the reality of life and its 
misery, is that there are no absolutes and certainties. Therefore, no person has 
the right to make value judgements, no person is perfect and 'Ne all falter at 
some stage or another and must, therefore, accept our and others' 
indiscretions. Failing, forbearance and grace are, therefore, fundamental in 
encountering in community, and hence surviving, the burden of life. 
Jeter ( 1995) describes pilgrimage as an ancient tradition that offers each 
person the potential to become a social artist with the ability to become 
participant in transformation. According to him, 
[d]uring pilgrimage, the entire 'M:>rld opens up; 
healing is possible, even v.klen cure is not. The 
opportunity is presented to start life anew. 
Everyone has 'M:>unds and pains v.klich cannot be 
hidden. In the context of a pilgrimage, illnesses 
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may or may not be cured; however, healing, the 
feeling of wholeness is most possible ... Friends and 
kin entrust themselves to each other. Shifts in 
approaches to solving life problems occur because 
of the intense expression of care, concern and 
love. Isolation weakens people; tender 
communication reassures people, evoking the will 
to live consciously, mindfully. Healing is recognized 
as the personal attributes a person brings to the 
process itself, the inner resources gathered 
together and utilized. (pp.17 4-175) 
Punctuations of Important Experiences for the Therapist 
An acknowledgement that the dynamics of the therapy process are also imbued 
with the personhood of the therapist, suggests that the patterns and dynamics 
of the therapist's seemingly outside living will also feed the therapy situation. 
This idea is reflected in many renditions from therapists of how profound 
therapy experiences often correspond - in timing as \Nell as content - with 
periods of profound emotional shift or turmoil for themselves (Andolfi et al., 
1989; Duhl, 1987; Keith, 1987; Whitaker, 1991) . Thus seemingly outside 
troubles may diminish technical proficiency, but enhance the way in which the 
therapist is present as a person. This can bring a useful commitment and 
intensity in the co-creation of experience and meaning during the therapy 
encounter. 
This realization leads to a search to determine interface issues within the 
therapist's professional and personal lives. All such searches offer renditions of 
personal transitions and/or tragedies as the most likely circumstances to be 
· associated with the emergence of a sense of calling as a therapist, profound 
132 
and useful therapy experiences or transformation as a therapist (Guy, 1987; 
Shadley, 1987). The content of these can be explored in more detail. 
Many vvriters explore this issue, offering a myriad of different semantics in 
punctuating seminal experiences in the therapist's life. However, a coherent 
thread seems to run through all of these in that they all refer in some way or 
another to movements in the therapist's web of connectedness. These most 
typically include specific life and death events, new patterns of connection-
disconnection or developmental life transitions within the therapist's immediate 
relationships and significant meaningmaking communities. 
Shadley (1987), for example, finds a pattern of therapists primarily punctuating 
the events of having children and the death of a parent, or also other events 
such as divorce, disengagement from the family of origin, children leaving home 
and the experience of their own developmental life cycle. Balsam and Balsam 
(1984) spend a vvhole chapter (the only explicit and detailed reflection on the 
personal life of the therapist contained in their Vv'Ork) on the attachment status of 
the therapist. Guy (1987), in his book, The personal life of the psychotherapist, 
give a detailed discussion of significant events in the life of the psychotherapist. 
He chooses to list these according to developmental stages, and then proceeds 
to discuss different experiences all pertaining to moves in the therapist's 
patterns of connectedness/disconnectedness. These include marriage, 
pregnancy, parenthood and relocation (early adulthood); divorce, the departure 
of children and death of a loved one (middle adulthood); aging and retirement, 
terminal illness and sudden death of the therapist (late adulthood). 
Themes of connection/disconnection in family-of-origin discussions 
The therapist's encountering of issues regarding her family of origin 
(Braverman, 1981; Framo, 1991; Goldklank, 1986; McDaniel & Landau-
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Stanton, 1991) has become an important dimension in considering the 
therapist's differentiation and use of self. Again, the myriad of aspects 
focused on through this lens all reflect some nuance of the therapist's 
experience of patterns of connection/disconnection within the domain of 
her family of origin. Indeed, many renditions see not only the therapist's 
early experiences as seminal in her work, but also describe how 
profound experiences of connection/disconnection in therapy can again 
serve to reconstruct the therapist's transgenerational meaning making. 
Whitaker (1991), for example, demonstrates this in· his stressing of the 
importance of the therapist's experience of being and not being with 
others. He understands not only relationships in general, but also the 
choice of psychotherapy as profession, as 'Well as the therapist's growth, 
in transgenerational terms as reaction to the experience of childhood 
and parenthood. Guy ( 1987) similarly discusses factors related to the 
therapist's family of origin as leading to psychotherapy as career choice. 
In particular, he points towards an early sense of isolation, through, for 
example, childhood experiences of parental death, illness, distant or 
unavailable parents, and so forth. (Connected to this pattern, the 
therapist also typically seems to have been assigned an early role in the 
family of either explicit therapist and caretaker, or of identified patient 
and thus lightning-detractor.) 
Whitaker ( 1991 ) specifically views the effort to become a 
psychotherapist as an effort to retaliate against vvhat was vie'W0d as a 
poor childhood with bad parenting. In order to avoid the panic of 
retaliation the therapist starts to try to cure her mother or father (or other 
relative) - in the guise of clients - of their bad parenting qualities. The 
therapist can panic again about the danger of the possible failure of this 
effort and then start to carry out the same treatment process with people 
in her personal life vvho become transference objects. Professionalising 
then, according to Whitaker, implies moving away from the amateur 
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status of doing therapy simply as an imitation of the ongoing problem of 
trying to cure the therapist's own parents, to utilizing this personal 
process as part of an evolving professional role-set (Neill & Kniskem, 
1982; Whitaker, 1991 ). 
Other family-connected important influences on the therapist that are 
often pointed out are personal losses. Carter (1991), for example, in 
discussing death in the therapist's own family, describes her intensely 
personal experiences in the early seventies. She sees this not only as a 
description of her own permanent reconnection to her family of origin, 
but also as directly reflective of the approach she still uses in her clinical 
practice Wien faced with the death or threatened death of a family 
member. 
Themes of connection/disconnection in conceptualizations of the 
therapist's work 
The theme of connection/disconnectron does not only emerge in 
discussions of important experiences in the therapist's personal life, but 
also in conceptualizations of her work and ongoing training. 
Lovlie (1982), for example, offers a detailed study of the relational self of 
the psychotherapist. Stressing the essentially dialectical nature of 
therapy itself, as well as of the experience of all parties therein, she 
considers how the client and therapist mutually create the 
predispositions to live certain themes together. She focuses specifically 
on themes such as closeness/ distance, openness/closure and 
sameness/difference. 
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Andolfi also bases his work on a consideration of the dialectical 
processes emanating from the experience of separation/belonging for 
both the therapist and the client (Andolfi et al., 1989). This he sees as 
the central dimension in the therapeutic relationship. This focus ties in 
with his experience of himself as a therapist whose 
personal/professional handicap lies in connecting too strongly and 
finding it very hard to separate (Andolfi, 1990). 
·These are also the dimensions he uses most strongly in the training of 
(also experienced) therapists in the use of self. This process is parallel 
to the one at play in therapy. Andolfi and others' 'Mlrk can be seen as 
coherent with views of therapy/training as a process through different 
orders of learning from more dependence towards more separation and 
also individuation [for example, as expounded by Stoltenberg (1981) as 
discussed earlier in this chapter]. The therapist/trainer regulates the 
dynamic equilibrium bet\veen belonging and separation to be optimal for 
the progressive individuation of each therapist/trainee/client. Instead of 
protecting the therapist/trainee/client from the escalating tension and 
intensity Wiich may result from continued movements within her vvebs of 
relatedness (such as the continuing individuation in a training group), the 
therapist/trainer utilizes the systemic tension to facilitate increasing 
openness and differentiation. In this, it is important for the 
therapist/trainer to be provocative Wiile guaranteeing full support and 
respect to the client/trainee (Andolfi et al., 1983; Andolfi & Menghi, 1982; 
Haber, 1990; Watkins, 1990). These ideas about therapy and training 
clearly illustrate how the tension arising from movements in the patterns 
of connecting and disconnecting in the therapy or training context is 
used as a template in order for trainees to move towards a clearer sense 
(and ease in use) of self. 
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Themes of connection/disconnection in discussions of other factors 
impacting on the therapist 
' 
Movement in the patterns of connecting and disconnecting also emerges 
as a central theme in discussions of the impact of many other factors. In 
discussing the role of gender, for example, the differing roles of male 
and female therapists are conceptualized in terms of this theme. 
Masculinity is seen as defined through separation, and femininity 
through attachment. The male gender identity is seen to be threatened 
by intimacy, and the female gender identity by separation, and so forth 
(Collier, 1987; Gilligan, 1982). 
Similarly, humour is seen to play an important role in therapy in the way 
that it can bring both distancing and sudden moments of intimacy in peer 
relationships (Keith, 1987). 
As can be seen from the above, the theme of the significance of movements in 
the therapist's web of relatedness is pervasive, and shows an important 
connection with the therapist's use of self. These movements .ccm bring a 
therapist to a clearer or altered sense of her self and can take place when her 
own pain is encountered. Thus the therapist's own crises and vulnerabilities are 
very important in the process of developing her therapeutic use of self. 
The Therapist's ooo Vulnerabilities: Doing and Needing Healing as 
Counterparts 
Traditionally the therapist's personal difficulties, stucknesses and vulnerabilities 
were regarded as even more noxious in the therapy situation than just the 
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notion of her personhood. This stance implies that the therapist should above 
all else be a healthy (read: problem-free) person. 
In contrast, though, an acknowledgement of self as resource does not only 
imply bearing with the therapist's emotional frailties, but in effect positions it as 
essential for healing to take place. This understanding that it is only through 
experiencing pain herself that the therapist's (or any person's) deepest abilities 
to heal can be mobilized, is captured in the legend of the wounded healer. 
According to this legend, Chiron, the healer centaur, suffers from an incurable 
wound originally caused by the poisoned arrows of Hercules. Thus Chiron is a 
healer who needs healing himself. It is also to him that Asclepius (born of the 
union of the god Apollo and the mortal woman Coronis) is given to raise. Under 
Chiron's tutelage, Asclepius becomes the Greek god of healing (Graves, 1955; 
1959). 
Miller and Baldwin ( 1987) point out that the image of the wounded healer is 
found again in the medieval myth of Parsifal. In the account of Chretien de 
Troye, the Fisher King, despite possessing the Holy Grail which has the power 
to grant all things to all persons, suffers interminably from an incurable wound. 
Thus the Fisher King is unable to avail himself for his OVvfl wound of the curing 
powers he has access to, but instead has to wait for the Holy Grail to be freed 
by Parsifal. 
This understanding of healing happening through the woundedness of all 
involved, is in keeping with the cosmology underlying most ancient and non-
Westem healing systems. In traditional African healing, for example, the calling 
of a healer (her thwasa) is actually announced through her developing a severe 
illness (inkanthazo). The only cure for the symptoms (which can take many 
forms) is to submit herself to undergo formal initiation. A refusal to do this can 
result in madness, deformity and even death (Hammond-Tooke, 1989). 
(Similarly, it can be considered that the psychotherapist's entering of her 
particular world of healing, can be seen as the start of the ongoing treatment for 
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herself. This is in keeping with Jung's (1946) statement that the healer should at 
least know that she did not choose her career by chance.) 
Thus the age-old shaman figure is a wounded healer in the fullest sense 
(Meyerhoff, 1976; Radin, ·1957). She is a boundary figure, simultaneously 
healer and priest, in contact with the world of the living and of the dead, and 
stands personally at the junction between heaven and hell, between suffering 
and healing. She takes on the pain and wounds of people who need her 
abilities. In this way she gains an understanding of healing far beyond rational 
thought and simultaneously is able to join in a process of transcending the pain 
through the power that becomes accessible through personally experiencing 
the junction of hurting and healing. 
The w:>unded-healer paradigm has been revived in modem Western 
approaches to healing by figures such as Jung (1951), Guggenbuhl-Craig 
( 1971) and Groesbeck ( 1975). Jung ( 1951) maintains, for example, that it is 
only the wounded doctor that can heal. This idea is expanded on by the notion 
that not only does every patient have a hidden inner healer, but every healer 
has a hidden inner patient (Groesbeck, 1975; Guggenbuhl-Craig, 1971). Thus 
real healing can only occur when each gets in touch with their hidden sides. 
Others such as M. Baldwin (1987a) agree that it is only as the therapist vie'NS 
herself as vulnerable, flawed and imperfect that she can see herself as helping 
another person. He says that "some people who call themselves therapists are 
not healers, because they are too busy defending themselves" (p.50). 
Similarly, Kreinheder (1980) contends that 
[i]f you are going to be a healer, then you have to 
get into a relationship. There is a person before 
you, and you and that other person are there to 
relate. That means touching each other, touching 
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the places in each other that are close and tender 
where the sensitivity is, where the 'NOunds are, and 
where the turmoil is. That's intimacy. When you get 
this close, there is love. And when love comes, the 
healing comes. The therapist is an expert in the art 
of achieving intimacy. When you touch each other 
intimately and with good will, then there is healing. 
{p.17) 
Thus for healing to take place, the therapist has to touch her client and the 
client has to touch her (Lifschitz, 1991; Snyders - personal communication, 
1990). The therapisUhealer, in being with the 'NOundedness of the client, can 
gain a greater awareness of her O'M'l 'NOundedness and in that a growing ability 
to be with her o'M'l vulnerability (Lifschitz, 1988). This dissipates more of her 
professional armour and is crucial in creating a context within which, using 
Buber's ( 1955, 1970) terms, an I-Thou encounter can take place. Here both 
people take on the role of both subject and object and are able to recognize the 
totality of other in this common experience, and in that to confirm each other's 
deepest humanity. 
In this process the client's O'M'l innate ability to heal can also be recognized and 
mobilized through the mutual flow of energy that is generated in such a healing 
encounter. [Miller and Baldwin ( 1987) also postulate that this energy created by 
the recognition and integration of a therapist's O'M'l v.uundedness can be the 
sustaining force that prevents professional burnout. Thus, I-It interactions 
(Buber, 1970), Wiich result from a reliance on techniques and professional 
distance, are most likely to result in a sense of personal emptiness in the 
therapist.] 
This accessing of both 'NOunded person and healer in one's s~f entails a 
growth towards discovering hidden parts, becoming more of oneself and finding 
a greater sense of balance and understanding Wiich reflects the original roots 
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of the word healing. Heal derives from the Anglo Saxon word hal, which means 
whole. Thus, to heal is to make whole, or more specifically, to facilitate an 
ongoing process within which more parts and polarities can be recognized, 
accessed and used (Miller & Baldwin, 1987). 
There is a sense of transformation that can accompany the infinite-seeming 
moments of accessing and finding the healing poW'er in hidden woundedness or 
pain. This transformation can entail a sense of transcendence over the 
mundaneness, boredom, predictability and finitude of possibilities in our daily 
lives, as W'ell as in the typical behavioural and emotional routines therapists can 
fall into while doing their work. Thus, encountering pain and woundedness -
especially if it finds expression in a context of communion with others - can 
constitute a W'ellspring of creative energy and insight. This implies that the 
creativity of the therapist (as wounded healer) is always renewed if she is open 
in a non-habitual way to her own vulnerability. According to Miller and Baldwin 
(1987), this is what NoUW'en (1972) might have been referring to when he said 
that the creative man (sic) is always close to the abyss of sickness. 
In Summary: Community and Crisis: Accessing, Using and Transfonning 
the Therapists Sense Of Self 
An exploration of the notion that the therapist's personhood is her most 
important resource in the therapy situation, reveals that it is also not by chance 
. or through sheer rational choice that therapists come to their profession. 
The therapist (like any person) has, over time, in her specific discursive 
communities, joined into interactions and languagings that have left her with 
specific stories about her self. These have evolved as she has repeatedly been 
posited as an ! in interaction with an-other. Thus it is in the movements in her 
W"ebs of connectedness that she gains a sense (or senses) of identity. 
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Some of her stories about herself typically either include or hide narratives of 
pain or woundedness from her past. These are described by many as 
instrumental in her joining with a domain where human pain is confessed and 
transformation around it is endeavoured. 
Thus she offers to clients the possibility of entering into a new community of 
belonging in the therapy situation, one in which different discursive patterns 
from the ones they typically encounter in their daily lives, could lead to the 
transformation, expansion or multiplying of their own constrictive narratives 
which have become like monologues. 
For the therapy to become a truly transformational domain, it has to allow for 
the possibility of real encounter - real community ..; within which both participants 
are present in a daring and human way. Once again, the therapist has to offer 
the client the chance of encountering her (the client's) sense of! in new ways in 
interaction with a very present you. Thus the therapist has to bring her own 
personhood into the encounter in order to build an I-Thou meeting (in Buberian 
terms). If she is only present as instructor, expert or technician, the client's 
monologues can persist, as transformational dialogue requires an 
interanimating process v.tlich requires of both the ! and the you to be present in 
a fuller sense. As representations of the other are contained and located within 
our selves, there can be no! without a you and no you without an !. Thus for the 
therapist to allow for more stories about the client to emerge, she also has to be 
present as person in interaction, with access to as many voices of her own as 
she can. 
Thus her use of self involves her ability to be present in as full and human a 
way as possible, to simultaneously employ her own (constantly developing) 
ability to move as freely as possible between different stories of her own and to 
actively build and co-author more stories in participation with the client. 
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However, as with all human tendency, the therapist also tends - in a yearning 
for safeness and predictability - to get stuck, time and time again, within set and 
constricting stories about her self and the world. Thus she also needs to join in 
the process of moving and being moved beyond known meanings and stories. 
Being too sure about herself and seeing the process of therapy as too 
predictable, can make her lose an openness to the new journey of the specific 
therapy situation 'A'hich is necessary for co-creating a participative 
transformational experience. 
Getting in touch with her own vulnerability is one of the most important ways in 
'A'hich a therapist can escape the monologues of her own linguistic and 
behavioural habits. Becoming, for example, touched, moved, frightened, shaken 
or excited in the therapy enables her to again enter the journey of transforming 
old meanings in a way 'A'hich builds a context within 'A'hich all participants can 
be present in an increasingly full and risking way. Then it becomes possible to 
find new replies to each other and to self and, in that, to join in a discursive 
community within 'A'hich new and more stories are actively built from the inside. 
The therapist's sense of vulnerability can emerge 'A'hen something in the 
therapy situation suddenly brings her in touch with old familiar, current or 
hidden pain in her self. She can also encounter new disruptive experiences or 
crises 'A'hich, even if they seemingly fall wholly within the domain of her 
personal life, will require of her to come to altered senses of her self and her 
world ooich will diffuse into her work as a therapist. Such. disruptions can (not 
denying the pain involved in such a process) actually serve, in a renewed way, 
to prevent her from falling into too set and familiar narratives about her self and 
the world, 'A'hich in tum will cause her to enter the therapy situation in a too 
distant and protected manner. 
Although any experience that brings a sense of pain, disruption and 
vulnerability could fall within the ambit of the process described here, there 
. does seem to be a pervasive theme to the kinds of experiences of crisis that are 
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most instrumental in bringing therapists to their profession, as 'N0ll as in usefully 
moving their positioning of themselves therein. This theme constitutes moves of 
different sorts within therapists' 'N0bs of connectedness. It is experiences of 
connection-disconnection that serves as a template for the building of stories of 
identity (for all people) and it is these experiences that push therapists towards 
the helping professions. It is also themes of connection-disconnection that 
permeate conceptualizations of the therapist's \NOrk (Lyddon, 1995; Pistole & 
Watkins, 1995). Similarly, it is movements in patterns of connection-
disconnection that most often constitute crises for the therapist and lead to the 
transformation of not only her sense(s) of self, but also of the ways in which she 
can access and use these (new) stories. 
Such movements often entail the encountering of experiences of loss, whether 
the new encountering of an old instance of loss, or the occurrence of new 
losses. The pervasiveness of the content example of the experience of loss 
around therapists' \NOrk and use of self, calls for an exploration of the way in 
which loss impacts on people's experiences of themselves and their \NOrld. This, 
with specific focus on the way in which an experience of loss can bring about 
transformation in a person's narratives, will be discussed in Section 3. 
SECTION Ill 
TOWARDS TRANSFORMING SELF: THE JOURNEY THROUGH LOSS 
In this section, it will be argued that the experience of loss is much more than one 
content example of crisis. In the role it can play in the intense, intimate interactive 
fabric of human existence, as well as in the tapestry of socially spun meanings, it is 
one experience that has the potential to profoundly transform human existence. 
As shown in the previous t:Y.o chapters, the experience of connection-
disconnection can be seen to serve as a template through 'vVhich all human 
experience of self, other, and the 'M:>rld gain specific meanings. It is in relatedness 
that theories develop and it is of some nuance of relatedness that these theories 
try to make sense in a more or less obvious way. It is also the struggle of being 
your self in the presence of others that can be seen to lie most profoundly and 
centrally at the core of all therapeutic experience. This includes the content of 
struggles that bring both therapist and client to therapy, and the dance of healing 
being played out between them - one that contains the rhythm of many dances, 
past and Mure. 
It is in connection and disconnection that webs of significance are spun -
intellectually, experientially and spiritually. Thus in patterns of relating explicit or 
implicit models, ideas and other communal languages are built , that form the 
ideological nets that catch, sensor, organize and provide meaning to 'vVhatever is 
out there. 
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A movement in the webs of relatedness and significance could then have 
transformative effects on the ways in which meanings around self, other and the 
world are negotiated. Such a movement could be provided by an experience of 
loss, as an event and signifier that falls outside of the usual pattern of connection-
disconnection through which seemingly stable webs of significance are built up to 
that point. 
Thus the experience of loss can be seen as pivotal to all human activity, with the 
potential to transform all meanings, rather than as just one specific content 
example of a human experience of crisis. This argument, which will be discussed in 
much more detail during the chapter, is, however, much broader than the way in 
which loss, mourning, and the experience of death has traditionally been 
approached, especially in the field of psychology. 
CHAPTERS 
TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF LOSS 
· Traditionally loss has been seen in psychological literature as a (mostly single or 
once-off) event during which the loss of something is clearly demonstrable. Most 
often, discussions on the experience of loss have focused on death (and 
concomitantly dying and mourning) as prototypical of the loss experience (Carroll, 
1985; De Vries & Carmi, 1979; Jackson, 1957; Kubler-Ross, 1969, 1975; 1981; 
Lifton, 1979; Smith, 1985; Staudacher, 1987). 
The extreme painfulness of the loss or death experience is very central in these 
discussions. Freud (1917), in describing how part of the essential 'MJrk of mourning 
is the testing of reality, commented that 'l/lkly this process should be so 
extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms of mental economics. 
Bowlby (1980) reiterated that the loss of a loved person is one of the most 
intensely painful experiences any human being can suffer. One definition of grief 
refers to the state of mental and physical pain 'l/lklich is experienced 'l/lklen the loss 
of a significant object, person, or part of the self is realized (Stephenson, 1985). 
The painful inevitability of loss, and the fact that loss is seen to equal death in the 
traditional literature, does seem to have a strong influence on the trends of these 
discussions. It seems that the history of thanatology reflects the t'NO broad themes 
of death denial and fear of death. This leads most basically to a trend that dictates 
that since the experience of loss/death cannot be avoided (Feifel ( 1969; 1990) 
terms death an absent presence, even before its actual arrival), the most one can 
personally and professionally strive for is to recover from the experience, that is, 
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once again reflecting the desire to avoid or get away from loss. 
This trend finds different expressions in different traditional theoretical 
perspectives, as explored below. 
Traditional models of loss and grief 
The Disease Model 
In this perspective the experience of loss and grief is seen either as a disease or 
analogous to a disease, a definite syndrome with psychological or somatic 
symptomatology (Engel, 1961; Lindemann, 1944). Engel (1961), for example, 
argues that grief is a sickness and should be treated as such. He compares grief to 
a physical \YOund and sees grief \YOrk as the process Wiich slowly heals the wound 
in the psyche. 
Thus the disease model stands in direct contrast to a growth perspective. This 
model is pathology orientated and views health as reparative rather than as a 
natural proclivity towards growth. The basic underlying assumption here is that the 
most that can be hoped for is the healing of a \YOund, or, recovered ease after dis-
ease. 
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Biological Explanations 
Biological perspectives serve to explain an aspect of the human response system 
(most typically the respiratory, autonomic and endocrine systems, as \Vall as 
cardiovascular and immune functions) during the reaction to loss, and limits itself to 
this area of understanding the experience (Little'AtOod, 1992; Oster\Veis, Solomon & 
Green, 1984). As in the disease model, biological explanations see recovery or 
health as adaptation. No attention is paid, for example, to the influence of people's 
interpretations of their experience. 
The Psychoanalytic Tradition 
Psychoanalytic literature has contributed vastly to the way grief has been 
understood (Freud, 1917; Jacobson, 1943, 1946, 1965; Klein, 1935, 1940). The 
emphasis here has been on the intrapsychic processes operating during mourning. 
Freud (1917), for example, saw mourning as libidinal de-cathexis from the lost 
object and identification as a substitute for a libidinal tie. Klein ( 1940) later 
explained mourning in terms of reactivation of paranoid anxieties in an inability to 
maintain the depressive position. 
Bowlby ( 1980) noted that in the psychoanalytic tradition the study of grief has 
· usually been approached through a focus on depressive illness in adults, and that 
the bulk of the clinical literature here is concerned mainly with pathological 
variants. 
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Attachment Theory 
Recently attachment theory (Bowlby, 196'1, 1969, 1973, 1980; Parkes, 1972) has 
combined an evolutionary perspective and a psychodynamic perspective. Human 
beings are seen to make strong affectional bonds, 'Nhich serve security and safety 
needs. Consequently unwilling separation and loss give rise to emotional distress. 
In the course of evolution responses develop around the fact that losses are 
retrievable and the instinctual response to separation is aggression. Bowlby (1980) 
differs from Freud's (1917) conceptualization of the functions of mourning - 'Nhich 
is to detach the survivor's memories and hopes from the dead - by positing instead 
that there is a persistence of relationship bei'Neen the bereaved and the dead 
person. 
Similar to both biological and psychoanalytic perspectives, attachment theory limits 
itself to a consideration of healthy and pathological mourning, and does not 
concern itself with, for example, growth aspects of the grief experience. 
Cognitive-Behavioural and Stress Perspectives 
Very little has been 'Mitten on grief per se within a cognitive-behavioural framework 
or within stress models. Loss is essentially conceived of as a stimulus condition 
· that is cognitively evaluated and produces a stress response. The main 
assumption here is that emotions and behaviour are a function of how 
environmental demands are construed. The aim then is not to attempt to change a 
troublesome situation or eliminate all painful feelings concerning it. Success is 
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rather defined in terms of improving the individual's competency to manage 
important aspects of the environment. Effective management depends on 
possessing the necessary cognitive and behavioural skills to confront a given 
stressor, and on being able to mobilize these skills v.Aienever necessary (Beck, 
1979; Haaga & Davidson, 1986; Monat & Lazarus, 1991; Roskies, 1991 ). 
Thus, in the face of loss, the individual will be helped to increase coping skills 
through cognitive and behavioural techniques such as cognitive restructuring, 
problem-solving skills and stress-inoculation techniques. Since the aim is to help 
the person manage the stress of the loss, the goal from this perspective, once 
again, is adaptation. 
Even though the above examples of traditional approaches to loss differ markedly 
in their description of dynamics,· they share some basic premises, v.Aiich can be 
seen to summarize the traditional approach to the experience of loss. 
Basic Assumptions of Traditional Approaches to Loss 
The main assumptions underpinning traditional approaches to the issue of loss can 
be summarized under the following headings. 
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Loss is a Discrete Event, the Quality of Which is Determined Mainly by What is 
Being Lost and How it is Lost 
The traditional clinical literature on loss mainly consists of content-focused 
examples of losing (through death) either a specific other person, or of dying 
yourself (through terminal illness). The quality of the experience is seen to be 
mainly determined by who is lost. In this vein special focus is placed upon, for 
example, the death of a parent (Berlinsky & Biller, 1982; Hilgard, Newman & Fisk, 
1960; Jacobson, 1965; Koller & Castanos, 1970; Smith, 1985; Staudacher, 1987), 
the death of a spouse (Conroy, 1977; Di Giulio, 1989; Maddison & Viola, 1968; 
Parkes & Brown, 1972; Smith, 1985; Staudacher, 1987), the death of a child 
(Carroll, 1985; Craig, 1977; Jolly, 1976; Kirkley-Best & Kelner, 1982; Smith, 1985; 
Staudacher, 1987) or the death of a sibling (Adams, 1981; Cain, Fast & Erickson, 
1964). 
The other factor assumed to have a major impact on the quality of the loss 
experience is the way in which the person has died or is to die. Similar content-
based discussions, research and w-itings can be found regarding this theme. The 
most frequently discussed causes of death are illness (Sherizen & Paul, 1977), 
especially heart problems, cancer or other malignant disease (Assael, Wallach & 
Rosin, 1979; Carroll, 1985; Rosin, Wallach & Assael, 1979; Smith, 1985), suicide 
(Cain, 1972; Cain & Fast, 1966; Hajal, 1977; Parramore, 1979; Staudacher, 1987; 
Wijsenbeek, 1979), euthanasia (Kohl, 1979; Levinson, 1979; Young, 1979), 
· human-made or natural disasters (Klein, 1979; Lifton, 1967; Robinson, 1979), the 
death of young or unborn children through miscarriages, still births, abortions or 
sudden infant death syndrome (Smith, 1985; Worden, 1982) or the death of the 
elderly of natural causes (Smith, 1985). Content examples of loss that do not 
152 
necessarily include physical death and that do get attention in the literature are 
mainly divorce (Wallerstein & Kelly, 1975, 1976), relocation, physical dysfunction 
and change of life circumstances such as retirement or retrenchment. Although 
these are all seen to have their O'Nl'l characteristics, it is assumed that such losses 
can also be experienced as a form of death. 
Loss and Mourning is a Problem to Manage or Solve 
The traditional clinical literature tends to focus narrowly on the problematic and 
even pathological effects of loss on a bereaved individual (Bro'Nl'l, 1966; Cain & 
Fast, 1966; Cain et al., 1964) and the unquestioned assumption that people need 
to be helped, to, as constructively as possible, get over this experience. Even 
though authors of such texts often (if briefly) acknowledge that loss can be a 
''turning point. .. a psycho-social transition", they proceed to show that the bereaved 
are people in trouble with "an increased risk to physical and mental health" and 
thus need to be helped over this period (Worden, 1982, p.ix). Similarly 
Staudacher's (1987) very start to her book reads: 
What does the grieving person need to know, have, 
and be able to do in order to successfully work through 
the pain that accompanies the death of a loved one? 
Exactly Wiich perspectives, insights, strategies, 
resources, and courses of action will ease the 
survivor's burden?" (Preface, no page number). 
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Thus the goals of studying, discussing and dealing with the experience of loss 
remain a narrow range of options of either solving/getting rid of the experience in 
the healthiest way possible (Fleming & Altschul, 1963; Oltjenbruns, 1991; Ramsay, 
1977; Worden, 1982) or promoting a more open accepting attitude in society 
towards death, in order once again to serve the first goal (Carroll, 1985; Kubler-
Ross, 1981; Silverman, 1977; Viorst, 1986). 
These goals apply similarly to 'IA'lat is termed normal or uncomplicated grief, as 
vvell as pathological or complicated grief. Complicated grief reactions are said to be 
of three main types. There is delayed grief, absent or distorted (also called 
unreleased, repressed, or disguised) grief, and chronic grief (Leick & Davidsen-
Nielsen, 1987; Little'M:>od, 1992; Worden, 1982; Zisook, 1987). 
Recognition of complicated grief has simultaneously pointed to the need for 
intervention or management (Lindemann, 1944; Raphael, 1975). Worden (1982) 
made a distinction betvveen grief counselling, of 'IA'lich the aim is to facilitate 
uncomplicated grief, and grief therapy, of 'IA'lich the aim is to resolve pathological 
grief. In both of these instances, hoVJever, the emphasis of the professional 
intervention prioritizes recovery as the main and most appropriate goal. 
The Effects of Loss Form a Fairly Predictable Process 
· The experience of loss and mourning has often been conceptualized as a process 
'IA'lich takes place over time. This has emanated in a variety of models 'IA'lich 
delineate the stages or phases of the loss response (Bowlby, 1961; Kubler-Ross, 
1981; Lebow, 1976; Ramsay, 1977). Although these stages are generally not seen 
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to be invariable and it is acknowledged that people can progress at different rates 
over time, these models have introduced a strong sense of predictability of the loss 
process, and represent a formalization of emotional and other reactions involved in 
mourning. 
Kubler-Ross (1969), for example, delineates five much-quoted stages of dying: 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. Later theorists such as 
Parkes ( 1972) and 'Bowlby ( 1980) proposed a phase-oriented approach which is 
more encompassing and has a different emphasis to Kubler-Ross's model. They 
separately conceptualized t'NO models, both entailing four phases and showing a 
great deal of similarity. The phases of the t'NO models are: 
Parkes (1972) Bowlby (1980) 
1. Numbness 1. Numbness 
2. Pining 2. Yearning/searching 
3. Depression 3. Disorganization and despair 
4. Recovery 4. Reorganization 
Zisook (1987) observed that despite variations from individual to individual, most 
models of the loss or mourning process include at least three similar, partially 
overlapping but distinct stages: 1) an initial period of shock, disbelief and denial; 2) 
an intermediate period of acute somatic and emotional discomfort and social 
withdrawal; and 3) a culminating period of resolution. 
Thus such predictions of process begin with shock and end with resolution. 
Change is acknowledged, for example, in the way all of the above stage or phase-
models recognize the painful nature of the internal changes that occur in moving 
155 
through the grief process to resolution. These changes are necessary for the 
adaptation of the individual to changed external circumstances. Resolution is thus 
viewed as successful adaptation to change which is primarily external (rather than 
a more profound transformation of self-in-context). In this way even writers who 
have seemingly moved to a developmental perspective still expound reductionistic 
view of loss and death as the last stage of growth (Kubler-Ross, 1975), with more 
or less clearly distinguishable phases one has to move through in order to attain 
closure. 
Such research into the course of loss and mourning also remains implicitly 
pathology-focused (in that the last stages repeatedly reflect the successful escape 
from the dangerous difficulty of the earlier stages). More explicitly, Parkes (1972) 
argues that part of the difficulty of fitting loss and mourning experiences into 
existing descriptive disease categories derives precisely from he fact that such 
experience is a process and not a state. It is not a set of symptoms that starts after 
a loss and fades away. Rather loss and mourning involve a succession of clinical 
pictures which blend into and replace one another. Parkes ( 1972) likens mourning 
to a physical injury, in which healthy healing can occur or complications can set in. 
Loss is an Individual Experience 
A general trend in traditional approaches to the experience of loss is that the focus 
· is mostly individually orientated. Although the importance of others as, for example, 
support systems during recovery is emphasized (Staudacher, 1987), the struggle is 
seen as one that the person is grappling with essentially by herself. The bigger 
c6ntext of her living is essentially ignored. 
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This individual emphasis is ironic in that the whole issue of loss implies not only a 
domain of relatedness, but also the fact that it is within this domain that profound 
experiences play themselves out. 
In contrast to these traditonal premises, certain paradigms have offered conceptual 
apparatus that could initiate a move away from the reductionism of the views on 
loss mentioned above. 
CHAPTER7 
PARADIGMS THAT OFFER ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS 
OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LOSS 
T'NO notable examples of paradigms offering a less reductionistic view of loss, 
are the existential and the systemic perspectives. 
The Existential Perspective 
Smith ( 1976) suggests that a fuller understanding of loss and mourning might 
be achieved by considering the individual's experience of bereavement in his or 
her existential and social context, an omission made by the majority of 
traditional models explaining loss and mourning. Existential therapists are not 
concerned with isolated psychological reactions in themselves, but rather with 
the psychological being of the living person Vvtlo is doing the experiencing 
herself (May & Yalom, 1984). 
Existential thinking contributes an important option for expanding the traditional 
reductionistic lens on loss and mourning, by positing this experience as an 
. ontological phenomenon that is most intricately and undeniably connected to 
the experience of life. Since Heidegger's (1962) Being and Time, many 
existentialists have recognized that the fact of existence has to be faced in the 
certainty of death. Indeed, it is precisely the notion of not existing, non-being, 
that gives life meaning. Similarly, Koestler (in Dinnage, 1990, p.1) has noted 
that without the 'NOrd death in our vocabulary, there 'NOuld be no civilization -
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"the cathedrals collapse, the pyramids vanish into the sand, the great organs 
become silent". 
Existentialism is concerned with the tragic nature of life. It has been described 
as a philosophy of crisis, which dares to express the distresses and crises of 
living openly (Heinemann, 1958). Thus the existentialists can be seen to be 
devoted to discovering the basic human condition, and what constitutes it, and 
to be the shock troops of the humanistic movement (Bugental, 1965, 1967; 
May, 1969). Indeed, existentialism is characterized by a striking preoccupation 
with death (Feifel, 1969). 
Towse (1986) describes bereavement as an experience of the possibility of 
non-being. May and Yalom (1984) postulate that existential conflicts arise 
betNeen the individual and the givens of existence, such as death. Death, they 
say, plays a major role in the individual's internal experience. To cope with the 
terror of obliteration, the individual erects defenses against death avvareness. 
Thus loss provokes existential anxiety. May and Yalom (1984) claim that the 
death of someone close to us confronts us with our OW'l death. Towse (1986) 
suggests that loss may thrust a person into existential despair, evoking a fear of 
standing alone and the potential loss of the self. Rowe ( 1988) argues that it is 
the ability to confront existential crises that results in the successful self. 
It is loss too (for example, through death), that presents us with another ultimate 
concern of existence: the meaning or meaninglessness of life. Yalom (1980; 
1989), for example, outlines four givens of existence: the inevitability of death 
for each of us and for those we love; our ultimate aloneness; the freedom to 
make our lives as we will; and the absence of any obvious meaning or sense to 
life. As Leick and Davidsen-Nielsen (1987) note, working through loss is so 
demanding because the mourner has to confront all four conflicts at once. Thus 
loss may be the first glimpse into the abyss of nothingness, into the possibility 
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of non-being, and may thrust an individual into existential despair (Towse, 
1986). 
The humanist perspective (Bugental, 1967; Buhler, 1959; Frankl, 1966) is often 
combined with existential theory to explore how people can deal with loss (or 
death) in life. Shaffer ( 1978) points to two central emphases within humanistic 
theory: the person's essential wholeness and her unfulfilled potential. 
Humanistic psychology is not only concerned with describing the existing way of 
the human experience, but also to ask: how might life be extended, enriched, or 
made more meaningful? As such, humanistic psychology is involved with 
helping people to grow and evolve towards greater realization of their potential. 
The humanistic position views a tragedy (the existentialist focus) such as loss 
as a challenge to personal growth. Goldstein ( 1939) writes about finding an 
affirmative answer to the shocks of existence, which must be borne for the 
actualization of one's own nature. Buhler (1967) claims that fulfilment in life 
seems to result primarily from a constructive and thoughtful way of living -
constructive to the degree that even major tragedies as well as great 
misfortunes are overcome and used beneficially. Sutich and Vich (1969) refer to 
converting a problem situation into an opportunity for further emotional growth. 
The value of the contribution of the existentialists and humanists in moving 
beyond a reductionistic pathology-focused view of the experience of loss is 
indisputable. They bring an understanding that in facing the issue of loss and 
death, one is facing the complete issue of one's living, the problem of one's own 
survival, how to sustain it and Wiether it is legitimate. 
A criticism that can be brought against these views is that they still focus on the 
individual and her eventual seemingly almost unilateral ability to make meaning 
(or not) in her living and through that to transform it. An effort at producing a 
more holistic description of the dynamics between people and elements in 
living, is found in different emanations from systemic thinking. 
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A Systemic (and Emerging Constructionistic) Perspective on Loss 
A major 'IN8.Y in 'Nhich systemic thinking moved a'IN8.y from the reductionism of 
the traditional vie\NS of loss 'IN8.S simply by going beyond the focus on the 
individual. In general, it started to examine the impact of loss on the entire 
family system and to consider both normative and dysfunctional processes in 
relation to a system's life- cycle passage and cultural context (Berkowitz, 1977; 
Donley, 1993; Evans, 1965; Gelcer, 1983; Paul & Grosser, 1965; Pincus, 197 4; 
Stubblefield, 1977). 
Pincus (1974), for example, writes about the experience of death within a 
context of an understanding of the relationships and interactions in the family. 
Bowen (1976, 1991) describes the disruptive impact of death or threatened loss 
on a family's functional equilibrium. In this he focuses on the emotional 
shockwave that reverberates through an entire family system after the loss of a 
family member. Paul and Grosser. ( 1965) describe the effects of unresolved 
mourning on relationships and especially on marriages. Both Bowen ( 1976, 
1991) and Paul (Paul, 1976, 1980; Paul & Paul, 1982, 1989), in different 
therapeutic approaches, emphasize the importance of coming to terms with loss 
and changing relationship patterns associated with it. 
Also, a multigenerational developmental perspective on the impact of loss 
started emerging. This posits that, rather than regarding events surrounding a 
death or loss as pathological causes of disorder, they can be seen as normative 
transitions in the system's life cycle. Such transitions carry the potential for 
growth and development, as well as for immediate distress or long-term 
dysfunction (Jordan, Kraus & Ware, 1993; Walsh & McGoldrick, 1991 ). 
Thus loss is not simply seen as a discrete event (another basic difference from 
the traditional approach), but rather as an experience involving a transactional 
process over time, with the approach of loss and in its aftermath. Individual 
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distress following loss is not only seen to be due to grief, but also due to 
changes in the realignment of the system's emotional field. Loss modifies the 
system's structure, and generally precipitates the need for the reorganization of 
the entire system. Perhaps more importantly, the meaning of a particular loss 
and individual responses to it are modified by the system's web of beliefs, 'vVhich 
in tum is and has been modified by all loss experiences (Kuhn, 1981; Reiss & 
Oliveri, 1980; Walsh & McGoldrick, 1991 ). 
According to Walsh and McGoldrick (1991 ), this perspective implies that in 
order to help families with loss, therapists must reappraise family history, 
replacing deterministic assumptions of causality with an evolutionary 
perspective. They note that the temporal context, like the social one, provides a 
matrix of meanings in 'vVhich all meanings are embedded. Thus a family cannot 
change its past, but changes in the present and future occur in relation to that 
past. In essence then, systemic change involves a transformation of that 
relationship with the past (Hoffman, 1981, 1991 ). 
Following from this, systemic thinking can be seen to imply that for a family to 
adapt to loss, it needs to be in harmony or balance with its past, not in a 
struggle to recapture it, escape from it or forget it. In order to do this family 
members have to reconstruct their history and place their losses in a more 
functional perspective. Here adaptation is not understood as resolution, but 
rather as finding a way to move on with life. The multiple meanings of any loss 
are seen to be transformed throughout the life cycle, as they are experienced 
and integrated with other life experiences, including other losses (Walsh & 
McGoldrick, 1991 ). 
In this process, the family is seen to face crucial tasks. (These tasks do not 
impose - as in the traditional approaches - expectations of fixed stages, 
sequences or schedules on the complexity of the loss experience.) One 
conceptualization of such tasks are (Carter & McGoldrick, 1989; Walsh & 
McGoldrick, 1991 ): 
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1. Shared acknowledgement of the reality of loss and shared experience 
of loss. This involves sharing attempts to put the loss into some 
meaningful perspective that fits coherently with the family's life 
experience and belief system. 
2. Reorganization of the system and reinvestment in other relationships 
and life pursuits. This involves in essence the realignment of 
relationships because of the disruption to established patterns of 
interaction. 
Also, more authors have started to account for the importance of the wider 
context of the loss experience. Rituals, for example, interpreted through cultural 
and ethnic traditions, have become seen as a means of healing in the system 
(Hammond-Tooke, 1989; Imber-Black, 1988; Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ). 
In essence the systemic perspective's contextual widening of the lens 
contributed strongly to a move away from regarding the experience of loss as 
the (protracted) reaction of an individual to a seemingly discrete event. Rather, 
it can be regarded as a process that may be triggered by an event, but v.flich 
speaks most closely of, expresses as well as affects, the patterns of 
connection-disconnection in the broader (also historical) ecology. 
The most central ideas inherent in this perspective can be summarized as 
follows. 
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Loss is Not an Optional Experience · 
Loss is often described as being at the heart of human experience. It is seen to 
force us to confront our ultimate priorities,· reminding us more po'Nerfully than 
anything else how much relationships matter. 
This is in contrast with the denial of death and loss that is such a prominent 
feature of Western society and is probably part of the modernist myth of the 
continual advancement of the human being's ability to gain control over 
everything, including all forces of nature (Becker, 1973; Walmsley, 1986). 
Imber-Black (1991) notes in this vein that Western culture has increasingly 
allo'Ned the funeral industry to shape mourning rituals so that they express 
more about capitalism and the denial of death than about authentic healing. In 
this process relationships that need to undergo the changes demanded by a 
death rigidify, and symptoms emerge which are metaphorical expressions of 
incomplete mourning and unhealed loss. 
The reluctance to address loss as both an inevitable and an important part of 
existence reinforces what Rosaldo (1984, 1989) terms the invisible community 
of the bereaved. The greater irony is that essentially everyone - while 
entertaining notions of their own immortality in order to escape the terror of their 
own mortality - forms a part of this unspoken community. 
Loss is Not a Discrete Experience, It Forms an Integral Part of the Complete 
Cycle of Life 
The experience of loss, in the way that it can catalyze shifts in the life course, 
affirm or move values and bring a consciousness of human connectedness, is 
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an experience of ending and beginning that forms a most integral part of the 
human life cycle. Lifton (1975) puts this as follows: 
There is no love without loss. And there is no 
moving beyond loss without some experience of 
mourning. To be unable to mourn is to be unable to 
enter into the great human life cycle of death and 
rebirth - to be unable, that is, to live again. (p.vii) 
A life cycle perspective on loss, joining a developmental framework with a family 
systems orientation, views loss as a transactional process involving the lost with 
those who remain in a shared life cycle that acknowledges both the finality of 
loss and the continuity of life. This implies that a purely interactional approach 
for understanding as well as intervening in a system's experience of loss can 
never be adequate. (An example of such an interactional stance is Haley 
(1976), who maintains that he does not believe in ghosts and, therefore focuses 
his therapy exclusively on the interactions of the living.) Rather, one needs 
firstly to acknowledge that loss is not optional and secondly to be committed to 
the importance of human connectedness and the continuity of relationships 
within the system (Becker, 1973; Lifton, 1979; McGoldrick, 1991; McGoldrick & 
Walsh, 1991; Rolland, 1990; Walmsley, 1986). 
The loss experience can bring many here-and-now shifts in the system, such as 
the reassignment of roles and tasks, the forming of new attachments and the 
shifting of old allegiances. None of these can, however, be understood 
. adequately without a perspective on the transgenerational encounters with 
threatened or actual loss and the timing of life-threatening events within the 
individual's and system's life cycles (Rolland, 1991 ). 
Similarly, dysfunctional dealing with loss can be conceptualized as happening 
when continuity stops. Examples of this may be when time (in the system's 
experience) has stopped, Wien relationships rigidify or Wien mourning 
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becomes a family secret. [W.H. Auden expresses the sense of all things 
stopping with a loss - a sense that most of us get to know at some point - most 
movingly (Beeton, Kossick & Pereira, 1984): 
Stop all the clocks, cut off the telephone 
Prevent the dog from barking with a juicy bone, 
Silence the pianos and with muffled drum 
Bring out the coffin, let the mourners come. 
Let aeroplanes circle moaning overhead 
Scribble on the sky the message He is Dead, 
Put crepe bows round the white necks of the public doves, 
Let the traffic policemen 'Near black cotton gloves. 
He was my North, my South, my East and West, 
My working 'vVeek and my Sunday rest, 
My noon, my midnight, my talk, my song; 
I thought that love would last for ever. I was wong. 
The stars are not wanted now: put out every one; 
Pack up the moon and dismantle the sun; 
Pour away the ocean and pack up the wood. 
For nothing now can ever come to any good.] 
Systems can become locked in time through dreams of the past, in the 
emotions of the present, or in the dread of the future. They can close entirely, 
with an inability to attach to anyone. When systems are unable to accept a loss, 
they tend to develop fixed ways of relating to handle their Mure fears of loss. 
For example, myths, secrets and expectations that develop around a critical 
loss may be incorporated into the rules of the system and be passed down from 
generation to generation (Bo'Nen, 1991; Coleman, 1991; McGoldrick, 1991 ). 
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Thus many of the set patterns routinely observed in systems may reflect the 
inability to deal with loss, which has finally become the inability to connect with 
anyone else out of fear of further loss. In contrast, reconciliation or dealing with 
a loss is defined as both an internal and external process, a compromise 
carried out by the members of a system in times of crises to alter their personal 
myths about the types of relationships they require and the 'Way they and others 
must act to meet their needs. A system's life cycle provides numerous 
occasions in which individuals must alter their most basic assumptions about 
themselves and the key persons in their lives. This implies altering the limited 
range of extremely personal myths they have built up around their systems of 
belonging. If this is not possible, a fragmentation of these systems of belonging 
may result which will impact in various 'Ways on future generations (Gutstein, 
1991; McGoldrick, 1991). 
If loss is seen as such an integral part of the life cycle, it can also more 
specifically be seen as having everything to do with life's transitions. It not only 
is a byproduct of these periods, but becomes a catalyst for transition in itself. 
Transitional periods al'Ways involve beginnings as well as endings. Commonly, 
preoccupations about death, about life's limits, an anticipation of separation and 
loss or a resurgence of prior feelings of loss surface at such times. Also, at 
these times and in the face of the loss experience the tasks of the next life 
stage may need to be altered, delayed or given up, alliances may need to be 
shifted, and, more profoundly, the place of self in the system may need to be 
renegotiated. From this emerges the notion that the experience of loss plays 
within the dialectic of connection and disconnection. 
167 
Loss is Necessarily an Ambiguous Experience 
To speak of loss is to enter a realm of paradox, since VtJe are dealing with a 
process within which connecting or belonging and disconnecting or separation 
are interdependent counterparts (Andolfi et al., 1989; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 
1980; White, 1988a). For example, joining with one person (like a partner) may 
mean separating from another (like a parent). Loss can also make new 
connection or re-connection possible, and vice versa. Andolfi and his 
colleagues (1989) point out that these shifts, which seem paradoxical at any 
one point, become comprehensible over time. The meaning of the loss 
experience can, therefore not be examined by viewing it as a discrete event. 
Rather, it is by understanding it as an unexpected punctuation in the more 
predictable meaning(s) which evolve through the rhythm of counterpart 
experience over time, that the experience of loss offers a useful entrance into 
the person's socially constructed narratives of herself as a person between 
others. 
Thus, experiences regarding loss bring many complexities into play. Dealing 
with loss means dealing with changes that go far beyond the event which 
represents the loss. It can bring about the profound restructuring of fundamental 
relationships. Apart from the specific relationship/ connection that is lost, one's 
sense of other close relationships, connections-disconnections with one's family 
of origin and with a larger community within which meanings emerge, come into 
the picture. 
The Experience of Loss Takes Form Within a Social Web of Meanings 
Given the diversity of system forms, values and life courses in any given 
society, the systemic thinkers warn not to confuse common patterns with 
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normative standards (Walsh, 1982) or to imply that alternate life pathways or 
timetables are pathological inasfar as they differ. The uniqueness of each life 
course in its context needs to be appreciated in every assessment of the 
multigenerational system life cycle and in our understandings of the meaning of 
loss. Historically constructed meanings within the ecology - for example, the 
understandings built around the system's legacy of losses, as well as the 
communally sanctioned tendencies in dealing with loss - will all influence the 
experience of the person most profoundly (Hertz, 1989; McGoldrick et al., 1991 ; 
McGoldrick & Walsh, 1983, 1991 ; Rosaldo, 1989). 
This notion ties in closely with a social constructionist perspective, which, as a 
specific emanation of systemic thinking (as discussed in Section I) has already 
strongly infiltrated the above discussion of systemic thinking about loss. A 
further discussion of social constructionistic approaches to loss, with specific 
reference to explicit socially constructed behaviours and meanings around loss, 
will follow. 
The Social Constructionist Contribution to the Understanding of Loss 
According to social constructionist thinking (Gergen, 1971, 1985a, 1985b, 1993; 
Hoffman, 1993), separation and loss as such may be an inescapable part of 
living, but the form and course this experience takes cannot be regarded as a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, rather as a social and historical construction. 
Thus a sense of loss is neither an innate emotional event, nor a cognitive 
process, but rather an experience that takes form and meaning within social 
exchange (which in itself is highly circumscribed by historical, cultural and 
social context). 
Through this perspective a recentering in the study of experiences of loss is 
achieved. These premises brings a move away from a concern with seemingly 
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predictable and bounded feelings and behaviours in the loss process. Rather, 
the concern is with the 'Nabs of socially constructed meanings that give form to 
a sense of loss, as 'Nell as the active co-operative enterprise of people in 
relationships in which these systems of meanings arise. 
The search then is to find a way of accessing these meanings and the patterns 
of relating that maintain them. One route to take is to focus on the (socially 
constructed) rituals that groups and societies tend to follow when faced with the 
experience of loss. Such rituals, composed of metaphors, symbols and actions, 
speak symbolically of the meanings constructed around loss and ongoing life, 
and point to the directions that are follo'Ned in making sense of the loss while 
also enabling the continuity of living (Imber-Black, 1991; Imber-Black, Roberts & 
Whiting, 1988). 
Rituals can take many forms, be they implicit or explicit. They can lie in the 
embarrassed silences or muted understandings on the one hand, or in the 
extreme pornography of violence on the other hand that modem Western 
society, for example, can bring forth. They can lie in the highly circumscribed 
and extended periods of mourning with particular rituals to mark the passage of 
time, 'Atlich can be found in Hindu culture. Whatever form rituals take, an 
examination of not only the differences, but specifically the similarities betvJeen 
different rituals, can be most useful in revealing some of the main socially 
constructed meanings around loss and ongoing life. 
. Rituals: Celebrations and Maskings of Loss and Death 
Imber-Black (1991) notes that a cross-cultural examination of mourning rituals 
reveals certain similarities, such as the fact that they are all space-bounded and 
time-bounded, providing a sense of psychological safety for the participants. 
For example, people come together to grieve in a time-limited manner that is 
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mutually supportive and allows for the initial expression of pain and loss in a 
context designed to promote interpersonal connectedness. 
There are, ho\Never, also many seeming contradictions and complexities in 
what can be regarded as the universals of death rituals. They can be 
simultaneously an arena for acknowledging finality, but also be filled with 
expressions of sexuality (such as in the Berawan funeral rituals). American 
death rites reveal the irony that in a country where togetherness is a national 
fetish, often no phase of the most severe crisis of the family's existence takes 
place at home (Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ). 
Furthermore, whereas rituals may seem predictable per se, this is often not the 
case. Rites may \Nell succeed in calling forth the experiences and interactions 
deemed appropriate to the moment, but nothing is guaranteed. 
Given the multifaceted nature of the meanings that emerge around loss and 
death through socially constructed rituals, as \Nell as the indeterminacy of these 
rites, it is necessary to try and discern some of the major nuances embedded in 
these implicit understandings. 
(This presentation of categories does not pretend to represent the complexity of 
anthropological studies on this topic, nor take full account of the major points of 
debate in this field, such as the relation between ritual and emotion, the political 
significance of ritual and the universal in symbolism (Bloch & Parry, 1982; 
Metcalf & Huntington, 1991; Needham, 1987; Rosaldo, 1984). Suffice it to say 
here that for the purpose of this discussion and in keeping with the 
epistemology of choice in this text, the relationship between ritual on the one 
hand and emotion, habitual behaviours, and cognitive action and content on the 
other hand is not seen to be causally determinative in either direction, but rather 
cybernetic.) 
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Loss Rituals as an Arena for the Acknowledging of Finality 
Modes of ritual practice that simply acknowledge the fact of a loss or death can 
fairly easily be detected in all groups. These mostly consist of some form of 
presenting the realness of the loss to those that remain, for example through 
the habit of viewing a body and a coffin, wllether on a deathbed, in a funeral 
home, on a pyre, or in an open and specially assigned vehicle leading a 
mourning procession. The creation of a space within wllich the painful presence 
of the loss can be acknowledged is most often demarcated through rituals 
wllich create a time out of time. Signifiers of this kind of space can include the 
\Yearing of certain clothes and colours, and sometimes through the way in 
wllich emotion is sho\Yed and shared. The latter can vary from the open wailing 
found in some groups to the sad quietness often surrounding Western 
experiences of loss. The latter is often criticized by commentators such as 
Schiff ( 1977) wllo says, for example, that Jackie Kennedy's stoic demeanour at 
her husband's funeral set mourning back a hundred years. What is probably 
ignored by this implicit prescription of mourning behaviour is that in each case, 
regardless of the specifics of the unspoken rules for behaving, wllat happens is 
clearly distinguishable from that group's daily rituals and habits. This disjuncture 
between mourning rituals and wllat goes as contemporary life, serves to create 
an important space for the acknowledgement of the loss. 
Such rituals that portray the realness of finality do not only occur immediately 
subsequent to the incident of loss. Many cultural and religious groups have 
. rituals that occur subsequent to a death in prescribed time sequences, enabling 
the living to remember and honour the dead and deal with the loss over time. 
Such rituals as the Catholic anniversary mass or the Jewish ritual of the reciting 
of the Kaddish on the anniversaries of the death reflect the reality of mourning 
that occurs over time (Imber-Black, 1991 ). 
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The importance of this nuance of ritual may easily be disguised by its 
blatantness, but is revealed by the stuckness that can result from an absence of 
acknowledging a loss. Imber-Black (1991), Ramsay (1977), and many others 
discuss in differing detail the nuances of such unfinished mourning and 
unhealed loss. Imber-Black (1991), for example, notes how families can actually 
subtly design rituals or try to keep traditional celebrations or life-cycle rites of 
passage seemingly unchanged to support a pretence that no loss has occurred. 
In other families a moratorium is placed on certain rituals, in order not to show, 
but to hide the loss. 
Such instances, wtlere an acknowledgement of the loss is censored, and 
valiant but unsuccessful attempts to avoid pain are made, also result in the 
avoidance of any genuine sense of connection and support. For example, the 
seemingly commonsensical moratorium that can be placed on any rituals that 
may remind those that stay behind of wnat was lost, also has another very 
damaging outcome. Often, such people discover that contexts of life, of other 
people's stories of loss and of celebration exist all around them, exacerbating 
their sense of pain with isolation, and cutting them off from the emotional 
support that, according to Imber-Black (1991), lives within the fabric of familiar 
rituals. 
This importance of sensing yourself as part of community during a time of loss, 
is also revealed by the nuances of many rituals. 
Ritual-Bound Creation of a Sense of Connectedness in Living Through 
Disconnection 
Rituals of death and loss often invoke a supposedly communal (if not universal) 
emotional and behavioural process to account for a host of small rites of 
kinship. Additionally, such rituals often require shared meals, visits, gatherings 
173 
and so forth, all serving to promote interpersonal connectedness (Imber-Black, 
1991; Metcalf & Huntington, 1991; Van Gennep, 1960). 
This nuance takes different forms in different rituals. Sometimes it can be seen 
to lie in a part of the ritual that simply acknowledges life or in the way that the 
detail of the existing social collectivity is acknowledged. The former is apparent 
in rituals such as the Berawan death rites where expressions of vitality and 
sexuality are auspicious (Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ) or in Irish wakes which 
typically centre on getting drunk, telling stories and jokes, and playing pranks 
on the corpse (McGoldrick et al., 1991 ). The latter can be seen in many rituals 
(from many different groups) wherein the expressions of mourning are precisely 
assigned according to kinship roles. For all the violent or subtle displays of 
emotion, preexisting social arrangements and the meanings attached to them 
govern these behaviours. 
In Hindu death rites a close friend or relative usually bathes the body with soap 
and curd to symbolize life. The large network of extended family relationships 
plays a major active and prescribed role in cushioning the grief surrounding a 
death. Sacrifice for family glorification in one of the important tasks of 
completion for a death. Similarly, in traditional African and African-American 
ways, greater emphasis is placed on attending a funeral than perhaps any other 
family gathering. In Jewish death rituals a specially trained group of community 
members (the hevra kadisha) takes the responsibility for preparing the body for 
the burial. Additionally, during the family's seven-day mourning period (shiva) 
all food is cooked by friends and all arrangements are handled by others 
(McGoldrick et al., 1991 ). 
In essence, the fact that death and loss rituals are mostly embedded in 
extended family and community participation offers firstly a safe space to be in 
crisis and secondly, the opportunity of acknowledging the connection of not only 
the deceased but also the bereaved to present and future life, and in that, to 
· acknowledge continuity. 
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Under this and the previous subheadings the ritual representation of death/loss 
and of life/continuity is respectively discussed. The fact that these nuances are 
encountered simultaneously and not separately, is another nuance of the 
meanings around loss that needs to be explored. 
The Ritual Representation of the Ambiguity of Loss 
Many aspects of death rituals simultaneously act as reminder of death and 
continuing life, of pain and of healing, of power and of helplessness, of good 
and of evil. 
This is, for example, often portrayed in colour symbolism. Turner (1967) 
suggests that there exists an almost universal colour triad of red, white and 
black associated with mourning. In many societies, white relates to such things 
as purity and fertility, red to both good and evil aspects of power and life, and 
black to decomposition and evil. Black is the more well-known funeral hue. 
White, however, is often added, for example, in Christian funerals to symbolize 
the joy of eternal life. Red is an important funeral colour in Madagascar. An 
important feature in funeral rituals in Madagascar is a large number of 
expensive, brightly coloured striped shrouds. These come in many colours, but 
are always called the "red cloths". Red here is seen to represent life and vitality 
in opposition to death. 
The ambiguity of loss is also often represented in rituals around the cutting (or 
not) of bodily hair. Leach ( 1958) notes that practices involving the special 
cutting of hair have a 'NOrldwide distribution, but are particularly prominent in 
funeral ceremonies. The form can differ dramatically: frequently survivors are 
enjoined to shave their heads as a sign of mourning, but elsewhere the custom 
is reversed, mourners forego the usual custom of shaving and trimming hair 
L 
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and hence this symbolizes a hirsute dishevelment during the time of mourning. 
(Again, 'Nhat is important to note is that the content this ritual takes, constitutes 
within that particular context a disjuncture betv.Jeen daily life and the space 
opening around loss.) 
Similarly, drumming often accompanies funeral rituals (Turner, 1968). Metcalf 
and Huntington ( 1991) note that the drumbeat has an obvious affinity with the 
heartbeat and rhythm of life. Or, equally, it can resound with the hollow finality 
of death. 
Thus there are multiple symbolizations around the same facets of death rituals. 
In essence, they seem to symbolize the simultaneous encountering of liminality 
and continuity. Other facets of such rituals do, however, seem to symbolize the 
meaning that continuity does not necessarily imply the continuation of exactly 
'Nhat went before. 
The Ritual Representation of Loss as Transition 
Death is often regarded as transition, and funeral rituals are seen as carrying 
this symbolism. One example, once again, is the prevalence of drumming at 
such times. Needham (1987) states that there is a connection betv.Jeen 
percussion and transition. Metcalf and Huntington (1991) note that percussive 
noise seems to punctuate and divide or mark time, the way that a line or wall 
would demarcate space. Hence they see drumming as a natural symbol for 
marking a temporal change in status, especially one as irreversible as death. 
Often the transition of the dead person into another realm is 'Nhat seems to be 
most noticeable as a transformatory nuance in death rituals. Jung (1964) points 
out that ancient initiation rites, such as those celebrated in the Eleusinian 
mysteries, were also used as a preparation for death, as if death also requires 
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an initiatory rite of passage of the same kind. While in this text we are more 
concerned in loss with understandings of what happens to the living (rather 
than the dead), these rituals do reveal important meanings for the living. 
Essentially, death is seen as carrying some nuance of a promise of immortality, 
of a transcended everlasting life, and in that as strongly supporting of a notion 
of continuity. 
Similarly, other death rituals are often seen to consist of phases of separation, 
transition and incorporation. The Bara people of Madagascar, for example, 
perform a series of three ceremonies in the process of providing final 
disposition for each person. There are: (1) the burial (into an individual coffin), 
which takes place in the first few days after death; (2) the gathering, which is a 
great feast celebrated after the harvest following the death; and (3) the 
exhumation and reburial (in a communal coffin) after the corpse has completely 
dried and the flesh rotted away. Metcalf and Huntington ( 1991 ), who describe 
this in great detail, note that each of the ceremonies concentrates on liminality 
of a different sort. The burial is largely concerned with the transition of the 
corpse. The gathering is distinguished from the other ceremonies by the 
concern showed toward the reordering of social relationships that have been 
altered by the loss of a kinsman. This is manifest in the witchcraft fears and 
accusations that concern the settling of old scores. The affair closes with the 
granting of new names to the deceased and to some of the living. The reburial 
focuses on the transition of the remains from the individual coffin to the final 
resting place in the communal coffin containing the bones of agnatic kin 
(Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ). 
Thus the death ritual becomes a rite of passage concerned with arranging the 
ambiguities that loss reveals and creates in the organisation of the relationships 
within the social order, as well as between the v.orlds of the ancestors and the 
living. What is important in this rite-of-passage kind of ritual is that although the 
ambiguous and transitory nature of loss and dying is acknowledged, it is 
essentially life that is seen as transitory, and death as tragically unambiguous. 
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Thus all of life is ultimately a transition, and only a meaning system that 
includes (re)birth allows an understanding of the ultimate nature and meaning 
of loss and death. 
The central importance of this kind of transition is vividly expressed in one of 
the Bara legends about the origin of death (Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ). God is 
said to have given the first man and woman a choice bet.Neen two kinds of 
death. They could die like the moon, being reborn over and over. Or they could 
die like the tree, wtiich puts forth new seeds and, although dying itself, lives on 
through its progeny. It was a difficult decision, but the first man and 'NOman 
chose to have children even at the cost of their own lives. And which of us, asks 
the storyteller, .would not make the same choice today? 
Thus, through rituals, it becomes more apparent that loss means transition. This 
does not only refer to what is lost or has died, but even more importantly to 
those and that which stay behind. Briefly it can be stated that loss and death is 
seen to bring continuity through transition, ooich implies the evolution rather 
than simple conservation of ooat 1Nent before. Different facets of this kind of 
continuity through transition can be explored in more detail. 
Ritual Representation of Rebirth Through Death - Transformation of the Social 
Order 
When loss occurs, the simultaneous encountering of things that end and things 
that carry on can only lead to an altered sense of what is, a sense of things 
falling apart, shifting or taking on completely different meanings. 
These transformations occur not only because the physical playing field and its 
elements have changed, but also secondly because the possibility of ending 
and loss creeps into everything that is also alive and, therefore, alters and 
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complexities its apparent meanings, and thirdly because the communities of 
translators, the webs of meaningmakers that all of existence filters through, 
have been altered. 
This sense of an entire shift in a social web of meanings is, for example, 
invoked by the folk saying (referred to by McGoldrick and Walsh, 1991) that 
when your parent dies, you have lost your past, but when your child dies, you 
have lost your future. 
Similarly the social order can be transformed in a more active way during the 
rituals surrounding loss. Death rites are often described as becoming arenas 
within which leadership, for example, is asserted, or contradicted, and at each 
occasion, renegotiated. Somali death rites, far from enshrining the values of the 
social order, are actually subversive of them. The second (gathering) phase of 
the Bara funeral ceremonies, referred to above, is focused on the reordering of 
social relationships that have been altered by the loss (Helander, 1988; Metcalf 
& Huntington, 1991 ). Hertz ( 1960) describes how panic can sweep over a group 
with the passing of specific people. His argument, which is limited in that it 
essentially turns upon the social status of the deceased, does point out how a 
loss can leave a large rent in the fabric of society, which plays out in the way 
the corpse is handled in, for example, Borneo death rituals. 
Many groups, as shOVJn in Puerto Rican families as well as in many African 
practices, have a ritual of participating in long vigils before the funeral takes 
place. During this time, people who have become disconnected over time, 
return and have to find a way of reconnecting, with the system having to shift to 
make space for them (McGoldrick et al., 1991 ). 
What rituals such as these implicitly reveal is the sense that, with a loss, the 
vvhole connected community goes through some sense of redefinition. This 
transformation is more intense for those for vvhom the relationship with the one 
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that was lost, takes on more significance. It can in effect, bring a sense of 
having to redefine self in the absence of the lost one. 
Ritual Representation of Rebirth Through Death - Transformation of Self 
Hertz (1960) describes how in Indonesian death rituals, the widow may be 
obliged to rub the products of decomposition of the corpse on her own body. 
One interpretation of this is that kin are seen to be contaminated by the death, 
in that the loss brings about some extinction of their own social person. Each 
severed relationship can leave a person that much reduced: a social and 
psychological amputee. Of all relatives, the widow is seen to be the most 
disfigured. Thus she must, like the dead man, undergo a liminal phase during 
Wiich her identity is readjusted (Hertz, 1960; Metcalf & Huntington, 1991 ). 
SomeWiat similarly, in Jewish custom, mourners are from the time of death until 
the burial exempt from the requirement of observing the ritual law (McGoldrick, 
Almeida, Moore Hines, Garcia-Preto, Rosen & Lee, 1991 ). This can be seen to 
acknowledge how, in the moment of loss, the person is unable to continue as 
before, even to Wioleheartedly participate in honouring God, and to signify how 
the experience of loss alters the person in terms of Wio she is by shifting how 
she is in all significant relationships. 
The above discussion on social meanings surrounding the experience of loss 
as they emerge through (historically) socially constructed meanings, point 
strongly towards the centrality of the experience of loss (for example, through 
death) in the full experiences of living and all the meanings that emerge around 
it. A sense of loss touches on themes of death and finality, of the meaning of life 
and the relativity of values, of the origins and endings of the world as we know 
it, and of resurrection and transformation. As Jung ( 1964) points out, even the 
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altar in Christian churches represents, on the one hand, a tomb and, on the 
other, a place of resurrection. This notion of the experience of loss lying at the 
nexus of many shifts in meaningmaking, and in that most central to the whole 
process of meaning making, can be explored in more detail. 
CHAPTERS 
EXPERIENCES OF LOSS AS CENTRAL TO SOCIAL MEANINGMAKING 
Patterns of Connection-Disconnection as Necessary Template for the 
Construction of Meanings 
As discussed before (see specifically Chapter 1 ), all knowledge, identities and 
experiences are intersubjectively created. This emphasizes a relational domain as 
a sine qua non for the construction of all meanings. Such an emphasis directs all 
attention to the (historical and social) communities of interpreters within which this 
continuous construction takes place. 
Gaining a sense of values, meanings and identities thus implies participation in 
some centralized communities of significance, and non-participation in others. 
Through these patterns of connection-disconnection webs of meanings emerge 
that can give us a sense of safeness, predictability and legitimacy. 
All theories and paradigms - academic and informal - can firstly be traced to the 
particular patterns of connection and disconnection that they emanate from, and 
secondly be seen to try, in some way explicit or implicit, to make sense of these 
. patterns, as well as to maintain them. 
It is a shift in these patterns, most specifically brought about by an experience of 
loss, that affects the patterns of meaningmaking profoundly. 
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Loss as Bringing About a Shift in Webs of Significance 
An experience of loss entails a shift in the webs of relatedness that make up the 
person's centralized communities of interpreters. The more central the person that 
has been separated from, or with whom the active interaction is stopped or 
changed, was in your own negotiations within the community of interpreters, the 
more profound the shift. 
This shift is not simply brought about by the person's absence, but by the impact 
this has on the reorganization of the whole social web and the typical patterns of 
meaning making. This impact is certainly not similar for all. Although these 
interpreting communities imply collectivity, their nature and impact depend for each 
person on their current and historical positions and movements within this web. 
This notion of the nature of the process inherent in the experience of loss also 
implies that it is not sufficient to focus on death as the main example of loss (such 
as in the traditional literature on loss). Whilst the experience of death is certainly 
an extreme and universal one, it is the process (that is, the experience of loss and 
the storms that it stirs up through its effect on our meaningmaking communities) 
that we should try to detect, rather than to make inferences about a certain content 
example of a trigger of this process. The experience of loss and the disruption of 
discursive communities can be brought about by the sense of your own pending 
death (and in that of the people you have hoped to become and t~ be with), of the 
death of another, of the loss of a relationship close to your heart, of the vanishing 
of a projection into your future - the sudden realization that a dream will never be 
realized, certain experiences will never be had, certain relationships will never 
materialize, certain losses will never be turned around - or the vanishing of a 
projection into your past - the discovery that an idealized figure from your childhood 
was most flawed. Thus, although reference in this study is for practical reasons 
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most typically made to the loss of a living relationship with another person, this 
does not exclude other possible triggers for the same process. 
The movement brought about through loss in our 'Nebs of significance entails an 
unexpected separation from others in the usual patterns of our interactive 
discursive communities, and, therefore, from the sustained meanings (derived from 
our sustained patterns of negotiating in these communities) with which \Ne cushion 
ourselves. 
It is then the discontinuity of meanings and connections in the consensual domain 
of the community of belonging which leads to the declaration of the loss as a crisis. 
The predictability and, therefore, safety of the whole ecology of ideas is under 
threat. The person becomes disconnected from what she 'Wanted to be connected 
to. Simultaneously, what seemed marginal or peripheral, or even clearly 
un'Nelcome, now looms larger than ever before. 
Thus, what the experience of loss calls for is moving beyond previously perceived 
boundaries into another domain that now has to be constructed and kno'Ml in such 
a 'Nay that adequate and sustained consensual validation once again seems 
possible. This entails the transformation and redefinition of not only boundaries, 
identities and meanings, but also ofthe 'Nay in which this knowing becomes kno'Ml. 
In other v...urds, the discursive community/communities, as 'Nell as their patterns of 
negotiations, get transformed. 
Thus, a sense of loss is not simply one content example of an experience of crisis, 
but has inherent in it the ability to transform all of a person's knowing and living 
negotiations. As mentioned in Section 1, the v...urd crisis is, in fact, derived from the 
v...urd krinein which literally means to separate. An experience of loss, then, is a 
crisis during which the person gets separated not only from, for example, another 
person, but also from old meanings and identities. 
184 
Different aspects of the experiences emanating from the shifts in the vvebs of 
significance that can be brought about by loss, can be referred to as follows. 
Loss of Other as Loss of Sense of Community 
Maturana (in Capra, 1996) refers to the fact that the crucial role of language in 
human evolution lies not so much in the ability to exchange ideas, but in the ability 
to co-operate. Through this discursive communities are created which serve as 
source of the unfolding and legitimization of humanity and its many emanations. 
This concept is also central in the understandings of the social constructionists. A 
person is thus seen to exist in and by virtue of such an abstract community. Being 
in this web of meanings can bring to the person a sense of living in a predictable 
ecology within which her own story is unfolding. An experience of loss then also 
brings a move in this predictable ecology and with that an experience of losing a 
sense of safety, belonging and community in general. 
Loss of Other as Knowing Anew That Which Went Before 
The experience of loss often brings a reflection on life as it was known before the 
sense of loss shifted the person's patterns of knowing. This ties in with the notion 
. that the nature of something emerges more clearly or differently at points where 
difference is encountered (Bateson, 1972). Similarly, the nature of a relational 
bond is perceived in specific ways by those involved in it. These narratives of the 
relationship which emerge during the process of connectedness necessarily hide 
other (counterpart) narratives about the same relationship and about the people 
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involved in it. Thus patterns of connectedness-disconnectedness, as the template 
for communication, always imply censorship. The telling of one story makes the 
telling of another impossible. 
[It is similarly only on his deathbed, that in Joseph Conrad's (1988) Heart of 
Darkness, Kurtz finally and for the first time comes face to face with the sense of 
emptiness about his owi life - and -Mlich leads him to his wrenching last words: 
''The horror! The horror!" (p.149).] 
Old hidden stories that might be met for the first time at the point of encounter of 
loss, can include the unspoken legacies of loss emanating from the historic fabric 
of the specific communities of interpreters and hidden in more recent negotiations 
of meanings that make the belief in permanence more possible. 
It follows then that getting out of the usual pattern of connection-disconnection -
even temporarily - becomes an indispensable condition for encountering the 
hidden counterparts of -Mlat was apparent, and to bring any growth or shifts in the 
meanings attributed to the world, as vvell as to the people -Mio constitute it for you, 
and to yourself. 
Loss of Other as Trigger for the Mourning of Unmet Needs 
The mourning of a relationship that has been lost often entails a grieving for unmet 
c needs. 
The pain caused by a sense of unmet needs can entail the anticipation of forever 
unfinished processes and thus imply a focus on the Mure. The altered knowing of 
the past that often comes with loss (as discussed under the immediately preceding 
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subheading), can, however, also bring about a sense of the needs that were unmet 
while the relationship was a live and active one. This is a new encounter with what 
seems to be past (but until now unknown) loss. This, combined with the sense that 
the opportunity to redeem the relationship experience into a more whole and 
fulfilling and thus a seemingly more meaningful one is also lost, can be 
devastating. The simultaneous sense of lack of fulfilment and ending can seriously 
challenge the sense of continuity and meaning. 
Loss of Other as Loss of Source of Feedback 
The person who is lost often served as source of emotional nourishment, of social 
feedback, of concern, and in all of those as source of a sign that your own living 
was meaningful. This function did and does not only remain a characteristic of the 
specific individual person, but evolved as a function of the whole interactive space 
that the specific relationship formed a thread of. The inaccessibility of this thread 
alters the surrounding social web. For the person that is experiencing the loss of 
another person, the loss can then extend to the loss of a complete space within 
which her own legitimacy, acceptability, and central to that, her belonging, used to 
be constantly and implicitly confirmed. Without warning she can find herself at the 
borders of language communities, instead of at their centre. She no longer has 
clarity about the meanings of it all and is no longer safe within the seemingly 
predictable and sustainable feedback from a seemingly sustainable discursive 
community. 
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Loss as Source of Social Reorganization 
The loss of a person through her death or inaccessibility due to another reason 
changes the patterns of all the discursive communities that her interactive 
presence forms a part of. 
The necessity to change and re-establish relationships in a system after a loss has 
occurred, has been discussed by many authors (as referred to before). The social 
reorganization that is called for after a loss, does, however, entail much more than 
the establishment of new relationships. 
Since the community/communities of interpreters and patterns have been 
interrupted in the process, new connections and disconnections have to be formed. 
With that goes the establishment of new lines and patterns of negotiating meaning 
and knowledge around the 'M>rld, life, people, and self. 
In this vein White and Epston use innovative interventions in their 'M>rk with loss in 
order to transform and recreate family narratives (Epston, 1991 ). They found that 
often those who have suffered a loss develop deeply self-blaming stories about the 
loss which inexorably starts moving them towards their own personal tragedy. 
These stories which serve to increasingly isolate the person are an indication of 
the destructive kind of fragmentation that can follow the breaking of connective 
patterns in social webs through loss. Their approach (which they term deep play 
associated with creative endeavour) is in sharp contrast with the usual kind of 
. serious talk with which the profound issue of loss is typically approached. This 
latter trend is often just another product of the stuckness created by the disruption 
of the local communities' connecting and meaningmaking abilities and adds to the 
fragmentation and reduction of interactive possibilities in the moment. This very 
well-intended respectfulness can stymie any measures of creativity and in that 
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actually prevent the necessary transformation of social and meaningmaking 
patterns from taking place. 
This social transformative impact of loss is probably its most profound, in that it 
makes the redefinition and evolution of the person's sense of self a necessity, and 
can be discussed in more detail. 
Loss of Other as Loss and Redefinition of Self 
Identity and the Search for Continuity 
It has been argued up till now that the identities granted by people to all things, 
people, as 'Nell as to themselves, are emanations of ecologies of ideas. What is 
also important in trying to understand the impact of a sense of loss within such an 
ecology, is a recognition of how much energy is spent in trying to conserve a 
sense of predictability and continuation of this ecology. 
Capra ( 1996) notes this tendency in referring to some teachings of the Buddha, 
'Nhich he sees as containing some of the most lucid expositions of the human 
condition and its roots in linguistic patterns. 
In the Buddhist view, people out of ignorance (avidya) fragment the world into 
. separate and seemingly independent objects, entities and meanings. People see 
these as above all firm and permanent, instead of recognizing the fluidity and 
transience of all things. This clinging to rigid ideas about fixed forms and 
categories, 'Nhile actually existing in a fluid and impermanent space, is seen as 
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lying at the base of all existential suffering. (Similarly, Varela refers to how the 
belief in an independent and fixed self results in what he terms Cartesian anxiety.) 
This active dream of permanence is not being labelled here as simply problematic. 
Rather, it can be understood as part of the essence of the human experience 
which arises from the tension betvveen wholeness and fragmentation, betvveen 
continuity and discontinuity - all of which play out in patterns of connection and 
disconnection. 
The pursuit of fixed meanings and permanence, the fear of change and the 
suffering resulting from the impact of transient processes, all has to do with the 
fragmentation and seeming unsafeness that discontinuity on some level of 
experience can bring to the person's sense of everything. 
Identity and the Encountering of Discontinuity 
The encountering of discontinuity somewhere in v.klat is pursued as a permanent 
meaningmaking ecology can bring a discontinuity in past meanings and patterns of 
connection. In this sense the sureness and fixedness of all identities are under 
threat in this moment and the ensuing process. 
Regarded from a different angle, it is only through discontinuity in the discursive 
community's patterns that new and - transformed meanings become possible. _ 
Before the disruption, the webs of meaning making show set limits, firstly in their 
seemingly enduring repeating patterns, and secondly through their continual efforts 
at sustaining and legitimizing themselves. 
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Thus transformation of meanings and identities become possible vvhen 
discontinuity (for example, through the experience of loss) is encountered outside 
-of the predictions of discontinuity and disconnection that is already part of the 
discursive communities' meaningmaking habits. 
Loss and the Transformation of Sense of Self 
As discussed before, a sense of self can only be a relational one, and can only be 
attained interactively. In simpler terms, there can only be an I through a You. It 
follows quite clearly then, that vvhen a shift occurs in the person's sense of vvho and 
vvhere her Yous are, her sense of I also has to shift. 
Connection, then, is not about reaching towards something outside. It is about 
recognizing the self in the other. It is a deeply personal endeavour vvherein you can 
only touch the other by letting the other touch you. Similarly then, disconnection is 
not so much about losing another, but about losing the self that is only accessible 
through the other. 
Thus another person, Wien in some relationship with you, becomes a repository 
for your own identity, and you a repository for theirs. Should they disappear or the 
relationship become less easily accessible, a part of yourself gets lost, and the part 
of yourself that has to do with them and their identity, suddenly seems useless. 
Similarly, the vvhole connected community/communities of significance evolves as 
a repository for the person's identity. At the point and through the process of loss, 
this v.tlole web of relatedness and patterns move, and takes with it the person's 
sense of safety in being able to know before - through the web's repeated patterns 
-vvho sh.e is. Thus a vacuum (of identity, history, continuity) is produced by a loss 
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of some of those links that constitute selves-in-context. In having to live through 
this shift in context, the person is in migration, leaving behind familiar markers, 
predictable relationships and the icons of past meanings, vvithout having the clear 
sense of a next destiny. 
Thus the experience of loss becomes a moment vvhere the person finds her self 
removed from a part of her own history, having less to do vvith the people vvith 
vvhom she has constructed it, and removed from her couchedness vvithin the 
patterns of a familiar web of meaningmaking. It is a moment vvhere new and hidden 
narratives of her self in the relational domain of living and dying can emerge, as 
new patterns and webs of meaningmaking have to be built around her. 
It is during this process that a shift and/or evolution in her sense of her own self 
can emerge. (It is through such movements in the person's webs of relatedness 
that individuation can occur. This can be seen to refer to a person having a 
complexity of senses of self that has not only emerged from, and does not only fit 
vvith, one clear discursive context, but from the kinds of transformation elicited by 
discontinuity in meaningmaking systems.) 
This evolution becomes possible firstly through the fact that the crisis moment of 
the loss creates an opportunity for increased openness and flexibility (as much as 
it is a moment of fear and unsafeness) around old behavior patterns, stories and 
identities. Secondly, the resulting social fragmentation and isolation creates a 
moment for a new gathering and forming of kinship systems and through that of 
discursive communities. Through both of these sides of the process the person 
becomes able to draw other boundaries and to hear different voices of her self and 
of those next to her. Thus also those people she knew before, she now knows in a 
new way, a reorganization and changed reconnection that forms part of the 
transformation of her own sense of self. 
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Epston ( 1991) refers in this vein to the process of (what he terms) reconciliation 
that is necessary after the kinship system fragmentation that follows the experience 
of a loss. This reconciliation is defined by him as both an internal and external 
process, carried out by the person in the crisis of the loss and entailing the altering 
of the person's personal myths about herself, about the types of relationships she 
requires and about the way she and others have to behave in order to meet her 
needs. 
Thus the experience of loss precipitates a whole process of transformation of 
identities and meaningmaking patterns. It necessitates an altered and profound 
reconnection to an entire web of life - one that incorporates a sense of transience. 
This nuance of the gaining of altered and relativized senses of self and of meaning, 
. 
of new ways of believing while knowing of impermanence, finds some echo in the 
fact that the 'M:>rd "reconnecting" comes from the same root as the 'M:>rd religion: 
religio in Latin. 
Or as e e cummings puts it (Cummings, 1965, p. 72): 
i thank You God fof most this amazing 
day: for the leaping greenly spirits of trees 
and a blue true dream of sky; and for everything 
which is natural Wiich is infinite which is yes 
(i Wio have died am alive again today, 
and this is the sun's birthday; this is the birth 
day of life and of love and wings: and of the gay 
great happening illimitably earth) 
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how should tasting touching hearing seeing 
breathing any - lifted from the no 
of all nothing - human merely being 
doubt unimaginable You? 
(now the ears of my ears awake and 
now the eyes of my eyes are opened) 
EPILOGUE 
In the previous sections different angles of the social construction of all identity, 
and most notably of our senses of self, have been discussed. Our ideas of \Nho we 
are and can be, and of \Nhat we can and should do and not do, grow from 
ecologies of ideas, from the semi-familiar rhythm of connection and disconnection 
within our usual discursive communities. Thus our sense(s) of I is indelibly linked to 
our senses of \Nho our You's are. In this mutual and historically based granting and 
perpetuation of meaning, we try to attain \Nhat seems to us to be stability and 
continuity. We move in webs of \Nhat seems to us to be set meanings, evolving 
habits that do not threaten what seems to us to be a largely axiomatic world. 
However, it is when we encounter unexpected and often painful moves in these 
webs that transformation of all meanings become possible. Such moves entail 
changes to the pattem(s) of connection and disconnection that we are used to in 
our meaningmaking communities. It is the discontinuity of what went before. In the 
previous sections the encountering of loss was shown to often entail such a move 
and in that a transformational process within which new stories around the world 
and self can now emerge. 
All meaning, theoretical and otherwise, was shown to evolve from the template of 
connection-disconnection. This template is also most notable in the worlds that 
therapists move and work in. It is the moves and meanings between people that 
become the focus of their professional conversations. It is their own patterns of 
connection-disconnection from which they themselves evolve into different forms of 
therapists. Furthermore, the question of the possibilities of transforming one's 
sense of self, and recursively with that, one's options in relating, is at issue for both 
the client and therapist personally. In that sense, as discussed before, the 
therapist's experience(s) of loss is particularly interesting. In this chapter, all of the 
above ideas which have been discussed at length in the previous sections, will be 
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approached in another language. Here, my stories of the narratives of loss of tv.JO 
therapists from two different contexts, are given as illustration of the ideas 
discussed before. These stories are not offered as proof and will not be analyzed 
accordingly. Such an effort at finding proof wculd imply the search for an ultimate -
truth. Rather, these stories are offered as lived reality synchronous to these ideas. 
It is a different language used to enhance the telling of this version of the story of 
the transformational power of loss. To me, these are stories of hope evolving from 
lives interrupted by painful experiences of losing most that seemed familiar before. 
Isabelle's Story 
Isabelle is a 33-year old 'M:>man vvho is married to Alex and has two daughters, 
Robin, 5 and Beatrice, 2. She has been qualified as a psychotherapist for nine 
years. 
She is the only child from her mother's second marriage and there was a bigger 
age gap than usual between herself and both her parents. Her father was +- 50 
years older than her and her mother +- 40. She has two half-siblings from her 
mother's first marriage, both of \\'horn are also a great deal older than herself. 
During the last five years both her parents have died from cancer, first her father 
and eighteen months later her mother. Her mother had already been diagnosed as 
tenninal \\tlen her father died. 
Although I knew her some'Nhat from professional contexts before, our relationship 
really started developing \\tlen she came to see me for a vvhile for psychotherapy a 
few months after her father's death. She returned around the time that her mother 
was dying, and again about two years after her mother's death. 
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Isabelle describes the main threads running through the sense(s) of herself that 
she had evolved for most of her life, as someone vvho was organized and socially 
very able. 
If I look back on how I was before I'd lost both of them I think I was always we/1-
dressed and I always looked good and I always had the right amount of empathy 
and I could always listen ... I think I became a therapist at the age of five. 
I 
Isabelle used to think of herself as having grown up in a materially privileged and 
emotionally "quite normal" environment. She was exceptionally close to her father, 
adoring him as far back as she can remember. She was less close to her mother, 
but remembers feeling proud of her, as she was a beautiful and graceful woman 
that got a great deal of explicit admiration from a lot of people. 
Isabelle specifically remembers always having had extreme difficulties in dealing 
with people leaving, even vvhen they are going away for short periods for 
seemingly unthreatening reasons. She recalls: 
This difficulty with separating spread over into so much of my life, into every aspect 
of my life. I didn't realise how much it did affect. I almost stumbled upon a greater 
awareness of it in the sense that I kept feeling so anxious when Alex [her husband] 
was going away and I thought well it is because my brother and sister went away. I 
didn't even realise the enormity of why I thought that and when someone goes 
Qway I always tried to be so good because I got scared they won't come back. I 
would try to make everything okay, not fight with them, not be disruptive, not 
express emotion and just say I am okay. Because I got afraid if I am not okay they 
really won't come back. I would tum myself around in knots, inside out to make 
everything perfect so they won't be sitting far away thinking ah I don't want to be 
with her. 
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This formed a central thread in Isabelle's patterns of relating. Certain meanings 
around the reasons for this difficulty \Nere also evolved by the people in her 
immediate social \Nebs, most notably her family. The idea that formed was that 
Isabelle couldn't deal with others leaving because her brother and sister, \Nhom 
she was particularly close to, left home \Nhen she was still very small. The quality of 
this constructed meaning - referring to an event long gone and seemingly 
unchangeable, and employing a semantic permeated with permanence - served to 
bring a sense of permanence to her relational pattern. She would not question the 
absoluteness of this interpretation until after the death of both her parents. 
In this vein, in telling her story of the losses in her life, she notes that the difficulty is 
that she "actually almost need to go backward', since the more overt losses she 
dealt with later in her life, enabled her to deal with the more hidden losses she 
experienced earlier in her life, and that it was really this journey that brought 
profound shifts in her sense of self. 
I think the first loss I dealt with was the physical loss of when my father died and 
that was the first time that I ever experienced loss, in a very concrete sense, in that 
I lost him. And he died very suddenly and it was an enormous shock - and it was 
something that I thought about through my lffe. I thought one day he will die, but I 
never realized what loss actually meant. 
And I also had the sense that when he would die, I would die, because I never 
knew how I would ever cope without him. 
And then the second loss was the loss of my mother, which was a year and a half 
later and that was something that was yet another physical loss. So in terms of that 
, those were the two sort of major losses that I've had. 
But looking back on what in fact happened in my lffe, I had been dealing with the 
issue of loss from when I was very, very small, but not knowing that that's actually 
what I was dealing with. That only became more apparent to me after their deaths. 
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Then I started seeing that I'd lost so much throughout my life and never realized 
that all of that had actually been an enormous loss. 
So in a sense my journey was sort of one that was from something that happened 
recently, right back into something that happened in the past. 
The journey of mourning her parents also, entailed her moving in unfamiliar 
relational patterns and brought with it new lenses in her considering and 
constructing of the nature of the 'N0bs of connection and disconnection within 
which she learned about herself and about who she is and can be in the presence 
of others. 
Firstly, she remembers the loss of her father as bringing experiences she had 
never known before. 
I think that through the process of my father dying and me actually facing that 
terrible pain that I didn't even have words and I still to some extent don't have 
words for... I remember feeling like I'd, I knew I could feel this enormous, 
enormous pain and loss. I didn't have a word in the world to describe it, and if I 
think back on most of the losses that I've experienced, that I had experienced up 
until then I always think of that painting "The Silent Scream': of standing there 
screaming and nothing coming out. And I think I felt that way when Anne left me, I 
felt that way my whole life with my parents' with their fighting. I felt that way when 
my brother left even though I screamed, it did nothing. And when my father died 
that was my feeling but then something started coming out, that scream did come 
out and I learnt to find words to piece with that pain. I learnt to just feel it, and it was 
so difficult because it was intolerable for me, and there were so many times when I 
would sit, feeling so desperate and crying, and crying and crying for him, and think 
to myself" I don't want to feel like this, if only I could go back to how I was, if only I 
could not feel sore, if only I could cut off". And I just couldn't do it, there was just 
no point at which I could do it. And I think that in a funny way through him dying, 
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and through me going through that process, he gave me the gift of life because I 
had never had it before. Because through that absolute pain and dealing with - for 
me the most frightening stuff, the most frightening stuff in the sense of, not the stuff 
of home, but the most frightening feelings for me, because they meant I was going 
to die. I felt so desperate that I thought it was going to kill me, and that's what I was 
so afraid of, I thought "I'm going to die, I'm never going to wake up, I'm never going 
to be able to get up tomorrow morning, because I feel like this ". And I would wake 
up the next morning, I'd feel exactly the same and think I'm not going to make it, I'm 
actually not going to be able to do this. And through it I actually learnt what it 
means to live, and through it I actually became what I would regard as a person 
because I think that I learnt to live and how to make contact with people which was 
something I had never done before. 
The immense pain and disruption in her v.orld brought about by the death of her 
father, brings many shifts in her way of relating to others and to her own feelings. 
Later, she sees his death as preparing her to be able to face the emotions and 
issues which \Nere to emerge after her mother's death. In the period after her 
father's death she is also kept in old patterns (of being controlled and taking care of 
others) by the imminence of her mother's death. This is illustrated in who and how 
she was at the time of her mother dying. 
I sat with her while she died and I counselled her through it, I mean if I think about 
it, it was just so ludicrous. I sat with her while she died and she was struggling, and 
I think the worst thing, the thing that for me really just epitomized my mother so 
much was that she couldn't even acknowledge her physical pain of the cancer. I 
. remember the morning that she died she was bleeding internally, she was in the 
most incredible amount of physical pain and she turned to the doctor and she said 
"I'm in a bit of trouble". And that to me .. it is just my mother. That she couldn't say 
in her last moment when she was dying this is fucking sore, this is fucking awful, 
this is something I'm in a bit of trouble. Oh, her doctor would have to phone me 
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after she had been there to find out how she was, because he had asked my 
mother, and she would tell him she is fine. She was always fine. So she sat 
keeping, I think what had made her ill to start with. Keeping everything, all 
contained, all inside never been able to face anything and she couldn't even face 
her own illness, she faced on the surface, she went off to therapy, she went to 
meditation. She was not okay about dying. She was not okay about being sick at 
all. But she would go to the doctor, and he'd say, 
"how are you': this is my mother who could not get up for three days at a time 
because she was so tired, from her liver, who she would wake up every morning, 
she would have diarrhoea for two to three hours that she would get hot flushes and 
hormones flushing through her system, she was menopausing, who could barely 
walk without getting out of breath, completely and utterly out of breath, and she 
would say "I am fine thank you or I'm a bit better''. 
And family would say "how is your mother?': and I couldn't even tell them how 
absolutely bloody awful it was, and how sick she was, because I'd also been taught 
that you don't do that. I still cannot go to the doctor and tell him I'm ill. I mean for 
me to go to the doctor I have to have pneumonia okay and I go and say" I have a 
bit of a sore throaf', because I've been taught thaf s what you do. And that morning 
that she died I think in a way I still played the consumer therapist, in the sense that 
she was lying on the bed and she'd have a lot of morphine and she was dying, I 
mean she was very close to being dead. And I sat with her and it was such a 
horrible, horrible thing to do, it was so awful to sit and watch my own mother die 
and yet I held it all together, it was ludicrous. And she was struggling and she kept 
saying to me "I can't get over, I can't get ~ver" and there I was stroking her 
forehead saying "it's okay, you're going to go soon". 
With the death of both her parents, her meaningmaking communities shift 
drastically. She does not have access to the interactions and dialogues through 
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which her identity within certain patterns of relating was also constructed and 
continually strengthened. 
In the loss of her parents Isabelle's social 'N9bs, the sites of the co-construction of 
the identity of herself, her parents and her history, move dramatically. In it she also 
moves from mourning a dead mother to mourning a living mother. A new story, set 
of meanings, about her childhood emerges. In this she reconsiders what she 
thought she knew before, encounters the loss of unmet needs and meets her 
parents and herself in a different way. This process of transforming 'N9bs of 
meaning, also entail a punctuation of different events. 
My memories of my childhood now are memories where I think I lost being a little 
girl - such a long time ago. I don't remember much about when I was very small . I 
know that my sisters' told me that when my parents' left and went away on holiday, 
I was absolutely devastated, but I know I've never been able to deal with people 
leaving and with people separating from me, at all. 
She tells of many instances where the presence and more notably the absence or 
looming absence of someone or something important, stands out in her memories. 
My first real recollection of somebody going away until recently, was of my sister 
leaving, she is seventeen years older than I am, so I was six when she got married 
and she left home. And I remember feeling devastated. I remember feeling that I 
couldn't believe that she'd gone 
... We stood in the station and watched that train because they were going down to 
Cape Town by the blue train and then they were going off to live in London. And I 
remember everybody crying, and I just stood there and I was numb from shock. I 
couldn't even cry , and I got home and I remember I found my father crying. And 
I'd never seen him cry before in my life, and when I saw him cry I started to panic 
and I thought 'what's happening, he's crying'? And he covered up very quickly. I 
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felt very anxious that he was so upset. I was so used to seeing my mother cry at 
everything - I mean she'd cry when she'd put on a record . So I mean I was quite 
used to her crying. But I wasn't used to him, and it made me terrmed. I used to cry 
for Anne and then I used to miss her. Nobody helped me really deal with how 
desperate I was. She was so much like a mother to me, and she'd provided .so 
much nurturing for me, that my mother never had. And had protected me from so 
much, and had really been there for me always. 
And after she had left, I think it was about a year later or even less, my brother 
Alan had come back to live at home. I felt quite protected by him. And I remember 
my mother telling me, that he was going to live in Australia and I just didn't believe 
it. And often I can hear my mother or even Sam saying -" I'm going soon! ", And 
I'd say - "No you're not - I'm gonna come with you! " I think I just thought I would 
go with, because for me it was the most natural feeling that I would just be with 
him. I have such a clear recollection of the day that he left and I went to the airport, 
and I got to the airport and we were standing, I think outside where people go 
through to get on the plane - to board the plane. And the horror of him going and 
the horror of that loss adually hit me, and I threw myself on the floor of the airport 
and I just cried, and cried and cried and screamed for him (which was something I 
was never allowed to or did never do). 
I would have done anything to have got on that plane with him. I was frantic. And I 
was always told throughout my life, that that was why I couldn't deal with people 
going, because Sam and Anne had left. And NOW I have come to a point where 
I realize that my not being able to deal with people going has got very little to do 
with that. I think it made it worse, it made the way that I deal with loss worse but I 
think that I had lost so much during my childhood anyway, particularly in terms of 
what was going on at home at that time, on a much more subtle but also a much 
bigger scale. 
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When I was 2 or 3 we left Brits which is a very small, little community where the 
only people I ever spoke English to were my parents. I used to run around the 
streets and go to my friends and I was quite happy . I don't have much recollection 
- I think I was happy in terms of friends, I don't know, I wasn't very happy at home. 
And we went to live in America when I was three and I just had the feeling , when I 
look back on it that it was just the most awful year. I know that I didn't fit in at all at 
school , nobody could understand how I spoke. All the kids used to say " She 
talks funny: because they didn't understand my accent at all. And my parents -
well my father was never around because he was back at university at the age of 
59 and having to really prove himself . And my mother was demented in that flat. 
We were in a small little flat and I remember her shouting at me so much. And I 
remember feeling completely unnerved and just feeling VERY vulnerable and 
insecure. I really didn't know where I was, I remember I wouldn't eat. My mother 
was very angry with my father that she'd landed up in this place - with him not 
being around... I just remember feeling very unhappy there. And very frightened 
because they were always fighting. My mother was fighting with him all the time, 
and he with her and she was shouting at him a lot. My main memory of that time is 
that he wasn't there so she was fighting with him or about him. And I remember my 
father telling me a story, of one day she was actually cooking something and she 
walked up the stairs with a knife and he got such a fright when he saw her that he 
actually threw me into the bathroom with him and locked us in there. And they 
always laughed about it, but there was actually nothing funny about it because that 
was the extent of what was going on, as she walked up those stairs he thought she 
was going to kill us. So that always gave me a very good indication of the fact that 
it really wasn't okay there at all. 
And then we left America at the end of that, and we came back to Johannesburg 
and we lived in a house, which, if I think about that house it makes me feel quite 
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physically sick because I just remember feeling so unhappy, and it was such a dark 
house and there was very little light that used to come in to it. And for me it was 
such a dark place - by that stage I just remember being so insecure and so 
unsettled that I just didn't know whether I was actually coming or going. And the 
sad - I think the worst thing was that my mother was there but she really wasn't. 
And now I see that the loss that I experienced was loss from when I was very , very 
little, and looking back at that time, that was the time really where I think it's impact 
started becoming strong. And I remember my parents starting to fight and that 
house just being so dark. The only sense of any light that I had was that I had a 
whole lot of fairies that I believed lived in the bottom of my garden and I used to go 
there everyday and sit with them. And I was so lonely. So much wasn't there. I 
don't even know if I can describe it as a loss because those words of course 
weren't there then and also there wasn't a sense that I'd actually ever had anything 
to lose - but there was just this incredible emptiness. 
And I remember that I had a dog there , a little poodle and my father had big Great 
Danes, so we had two Great Danes . And I remember that I gave my poodle a 
sweet and the Great Dane tried to grab it and the Great Dane took my poodle by 
the scruff of his neck in his mouth and shook him until I think the dog died of shock . 
And I remember the horror of that because I felt so guilty and responsible for that 
dog's death. And I was too afraid to tell my mother, and so I said to her they fought 
over a bone, and I remember that sense so much of being scared of her, and 
scared that if I just did anything wrong she would just turn her back on me 
completely. 
At that time I don't remember her ever walking out and I don't remember any of that 
stuff, I just remember that dark house and feeling awful . 
And in a sense, I think that while she was alive as a mother, she was very much 
dead for me- she was very much gone in a way. But she wasn't so completely 
gone, she always sort of played lip service to my emotions, in a way that I found 
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very comforting because it was all that I had. So she would comfort me - you 
know- she'd say" it's so difficult for you': and I often look back on what she said 
and I feel like she must have read one of those books on parenting, like 'Between 
Parent and Child' and learnt that you've got to be empathic and you've got to reflect 
how your children feel. So you've got to sit down and say I know it's very hard for 
you" or " you must feel very sad right now". But there was no point ever, at which 
she took what I was feeling and took my sadness and comforted it at all, or 
allowed me to express it, or allowed me to actually just show the consequences of 
how I was feeling or how I was actually feeling. 
I was allowed to feel sad, provided that I only cried a little bit, then she gave me a 
little bit of her sort of empathy and a little stroke then I had to be fine. But I wasn't -
I mean , I remember crying about nursery school and somewhere there was a 
message from her that enough was enough. Because I think she used to get 
desperate, because she didn't know what to do, but she'd get very irritated with me. 
I remember her feeling irritated - a sense that she was very angry or irritated, 
more with me - that I was a pain, because it had gone on too long. 
And then at the end of the year that I finished nursery school we also moved house 
- I think - yes we did, and I started at a new school. And we moved into our house 
in Hyde Park which was this beautiful house that they'd built and it was sort of this 
very unique, beautiful designed house, and everything was imported and 
everything was beautiful, and I was allowed to choose my bedroom and I was 
allowed to choose what I wanted and it was all this sort of, on the surface, this 
beautiful sort of palace for you know, a queen and king and the little princess. Then 
when we moved into this house, and I remember being very scared. It was awful, 
there were builders everywhere and it wasn't properly finished and I think that for 
me as a little girl there was a sense that I didn't have any ground underneath at all. 
And I went into the new school and I hated it. I was so scared at school, I was so 
scared of the teachers and so scared of the other children. 
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And I remember the mornings in that house being a horror because I wasn't 
allowed to speak to my mother in the morning, because my mother was not a 
morning person and she had to have a cup of coffee and cigarette before I could 
speak to her. There was this absolute silence on the way to school because she 
did not cope with mornings, and I would be driving to school absolutely beside 
myself anyway, because I was so scared of going and I didn't want to, but I 
couldn't tell her that I didn't want to go because she would have been angry with 
me and she would have gone to talk to the teacher. She would never have dealt 
with me. 
And at that time, I think that their fighting got a lot worse when we first moved into 
that house. I think also I was right next to their bedroom, my fancy pink and orange 
swinging bedroom, was right next to their bedroom. There was a bathroom that we 
shared that was in between us and that was the time I think, until I was about nine 
or ten and I was six when we moved in, that I just remember constant, constant 
fighting and them screaming at one another, I remember that we would sit down 
for a meal there would always be a tiff or an argument but not a full blown fight. 
And in the mornings there would always be some bickering that used to go on. But 
the worst fights that used to happen was after I had gone to bed. .And my father 
very often used to put me to bed, which I used to like. And he used to put me to 
bed and I used to go to sleep, and I just remember being, woken in the middle of 
the night by this shouting and screaming and the two of them fighting with one 
another. And I would get beside myself - I would just be desperate and I would be 
so terrified. And eventually I would get out of bed and I would just run to them. 
They had a dressing room which was right next to the bathroom and I used to close 
the door. 
I think in my mothers 'Between Parents and Child" it was told it was not good for a 
child to be exposed to too much conflict. And I remember eventually always 
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running into that dressing room and I remember saying "please don't fight, don't 
fight." And my mother would look at me, like down at me and she would say, "This 
has got nothing to do with you Isabelle." In a cold voice. "Go back to bed.". And I 
would go back to bed and I would lie there and my heart would actually pound and 
pound and I would toss and turn and I couldn't sleep and then I would fall asleep 
and I would have nightmares every single night. I can't remember nights for years 
where I didn't have nightmares. And my mother would come and say, "It's just a 
bad dream darling ". And then what I used to do was I used to go and lie in their 
bed for the rest of the night. And she didn't want that because she said I would kick 
her. So she made a little bed for me at the bottom of their bed, which I thought was 
just wonderful because at least I could be with them in the night. So I would wait 
and I would kind of wait until it was late enough and the fighting would start and 
then I'd go to their bed. Because it was the one thing where I felt that at least I was 
with the two of them and at least neither of them could leave me in the middle of 
the night, because I always used to worry that I would wake up in the middle of the 
night and my mother wouldn't be there. 
And then during the day she would spend a lot of her day talking to me about my 
father, and how awful he was to her. And if she got angry with me she would walk 
out the door. I used to get absolutely frantic. I was so frightened when she used to 
leave that I didn't adually know what to do with myself - I was just scared and 
desperate. 
She would always threaten that she's had enough - we would have had a little 
argument about something or I would have misbehaved once too often, and she 
would have said to me "I've had enough of you - I'm going ". And she'd just walk 
out the door and I would be running after her and saying " Mummy, don't go, don't 
go " and she'd say " I have had enough Isabelle" and she'd get in her car. And I 
remember standing behind that front door waiting for her and thinking that she was 
never going to come back. And I had a very sweet nanny, who'd come and say 
208 
"come and play, come and sit with me" and I couldn't. I used to stand at that door 
- but I was too afraid to say how scared r was that she'd gone, because I thought it 
was my fault. And I always had a sense with her that any loss and any leaving was 
because of something I'd done, which was what terrified me. And when she would 
come home, I would do anything in the world to make it better, and I used to sit 
and draw her pictures when she wasn't there because I thought it would make ie 
better, make her pleased with me and decide to stay. I used to make a little box of 
things because I would do anything to make her feel better - to take away that 
threat of her going. And I would draw her pictures. I would do anything, and I would 
leave notes on her pillow. I was prepared to do whatever it took. I would in a sense 
just shloop her to the endth degree to get her back. It wouldn't have made any 
difference to me what I had to do, because it would have made me feel better. 
You know because as long as she would be there again and not go away, it 
wouldn't matter what I would have to do. And that was sort of this most desperate 
thing for me - was to keep her happy all the time so that she wouldn't leave. And 
the slightest thing could spark her off. I'm sure that I was naughty at times and I'm 
sure that I was difficult at times but mostly I was this extremely good and well-
behaved little girl. But I was told from when I was so little that I was impossible that I 
- I don't actually know when I was, or when I wasn't, you know. 
I was just taught that I had to be good all the time. That was the way that I would 
avoid her leaving me. And I would be contained, and not only that, I would also be 
vety facilitating of her and I would be her therapist. And if I could sit - I mean I think 
I became the therapist when I was six, because if I could sit and talk about how she 
felt about me then she would love me, love me in her own way. But I would then 
fulfil her and she wouldn't leave and she wouldn't walk out the door and we could 
have some connection. And that was the only connection that we had. And I saw 
it as being connection because even later in my life I thought, "well at least mom 
does talk to me about how she feels." It was no connection for me though, in the 
sense that it wasn't what my mother should have done, but it was better than 
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having nothing and it was better than that disapproval and it was better than her 
walking out that door. It didn't ever prevent her walking out again though ... 
Looking back at all of it - throughout my life . . . I can never remember my mother 
sitting on the floor playing with me... I can never remember her doing anything with 
me. Except that she used to sit, she had this desk with a built-in sewing machine 
and she would sit behind there it was like in the centre of the house .. she would sit 
behind there and I was allowed to come and sit on the floor and I could make 
clothes for my doll. But I cannot ever remember her painting with me, she sent me 
to art classes. And I can't remember her drawing with me, I can't remember her 
playing any games at all. Not even snakes and ladders, I can't remember any time 
that she ever played with me. 
If I wanted to swim, she would call the maid to take me to swim. She would never 
get into the swimming pool. It was so funny, 'cause children used to say they're 
going swimming with their family and I didn't know what that meant. And through all 
of this I was anxious and shy, God, I was so shy ... I used to just ... they used to I 
used to hide behind my mother. I was so terrified, so shy. 
And I remember that I had a little dog, this beautiful little dog, a little Dashchund and 
I carry this dog around from when I came here from school, till when I left in the 
morning. I used to wanna cry in the morning, because I'd left the dog. I went to 
sleep with the dog, I used to want to be with the dog all of the time . . I think I used 
to half suffocate the dog with love because I just use to walk arounc.I with this dog 
and hold him by me the whole day, because the dog was at least something that I 
felt some warmth from. In all of this my father was there in the sense that he would 
come home and he would be very loving towards me - he always was. And he 
would be very happy to see me. For him I really was his little tootsie. And he 
would indulge me - my father indulged me my entire life with anything that I wanted 
and everything that I want. So, he didn't really set a limit from the day I was born, 
till the day that he died - I don't think he could have. That was another fight they 
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would always have - my mom would say "Michael, please discipline her!" And he'd 
say: "She's fine, darling" And she'd say "She is not all fine. She's impossible!" 
Huge fight about me and I would be standing right there. 
And I remember at one stage, she decided .. think I was about eight or nine, she 
decided that there was definitely something the matter and she sent me off to see a 
therapist. And I remember going to somebody every week. And I used to try and 
find ways ... I used to make myself sick, so that I wouldn't have to go. I was also 
very good at making myself sick so I could miss school. 
This therapist probably wasn't that hard but to me she seemed fairly hard. She had 
this hazardous sort of hairdo and she used to sit behind her desk and I used to play 
in this doll's house and draw pictures, and I used to absolutely hate it. I can't 
remember what she'd do with me, but we used to go through this whole thing, and 
we played with these dolls you know - the sort of usual play therapy thing, but I 
used to cringe. I used to hate it. And all I know was that I never talked about what 
was hard for me. Because that was what I learned, that you just don't do that 
anyway ... you don't really show. 
And it was what I also came to accept, was actually O.K. - that that was how you 
dealt with things, you went to therapy. What I learned was that I was never allowed 
to show how I felt ... that I was never allowed to express my feelings and that all I 
had to do, was cut them off and pretend they didn't exist ... and be a good little girl. 
So I went to this therapist and even later in my life, I went for therapy. I never 
spoke about what I really felt, I don't' think I even really knew what I felt like. I 
presented somewhere along the surface, knew always that I could mouth the right 
words, I could talk the talk, but I couldn't actually feel it. And, I don't think I even 
knew how I really felt about most things. I knew what I should feel, I knew what the 
appropriate response was. And .. I could feel a bit sad, I mean I wasn't totally cut 
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off and totally numb but I never knew what it really meant to feel any pain, because 
I had spent my whole childhood covering it up and making it fine. 
So I wasn't at any point allowed to express it. The only way that I could express it, 
was by going to therapy, or by being therapeutic. Was the only way I was allowed 
to express myself, really. 
When it came to Matric, I started working hard and I got the distinctions I needed. 
And went to university and I st111 did exactly what she wanted, what - in a sense -
she had set out for me to do. People would say to me : "What made you become a 
psychologist?" Well, I've been her psychologist from 5. I didn't become a 
psychologist - I was born a psychologist. I mean I think from when I could speak, I 
was a psychologist. I don't think that it was really an issue of whether I became 
something. I was that. And, that was acceptable. What I'd sit and do was to sit and 
therapize my mother and everybody else. 
I think that there was such a sense for me a/ways that my mother was dead but 
alive. And I think that she really was. And I think also that she told me that the way 
to do things was just not to worry. I remember one night having a light with my 
father. The one thing that I had with my father, was the ability to have a fight. He 
would scream - with him I would scream back and then it will be finished. But, what 
didn't finish for me was that fighting made me very anxious. So, for him it would be 
finished, and I would never have to go and make it better with him, because he 
didn't reject me for fighting with him. But I would feel very anxious. And I would 
go and sort of hang around my mother 'cause I was just scared, because we had a 
fight. And I've always been like that about fights. I remember till the day he died, if 
he and I had had a fight, I would have to make it better before I went to sleep, 
because I was scared that he would die in the night. That was a/ways my fear 
about fighting with people. That it would be the end of the world . . . or that they 
would go away and I wouldn't have had a chance to have made it better. Always 
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my thing, so with my father I also had it. But it wasn't something that he had done 
to me, it was something that I think it was directly from my mother. I remember one 
day going into my room after a fight with him and I was crying. My mother came 
and she said to me that "He has really hurt you, hasn't he darling? And I said "Yes, 
he had" I said: "I hate him" And she said to me: "I'm sure that you do" and I said I 
hated him and I'm never gonna let him do that to me. And she said to me : "One 
day you'll learn to just cut it off and he'll never be able to hurt you, and then you'll 
be fine." 
And I remember her saying to me when I used to fight with Alex, not even fight with 
Alex, when I used to get anxious about Robin in a way. For example if he worked 
late and I was on my own, 'cause I just, I couldn't cope with it at all. And she used 
to say to me: "You know what, darling, Robin's really silly to do that to you, because 
one day a part of you will die. And you must stop caring about him." And that was 
her way of me dealing with what I was feeling. 
You just cut it off and it would die and then you'd be fine. And you might be just 
totally unavailable,, but you would be fine. And that was what I also learned: When 
things are really sore .. you just push them away. And I think that probably when 
my father died, was the first time that I was physically ever allowed to be sore. It 
was the first time that I was ever allowed to really . . . experience pain. This was 
acceptable for me ... to feel absolutely awful, 'cause he was dead. 
And I think only when my father died I think that was the point at which I actually 
realised what it meant to experience pain. To experience emotion and to 
experience what it felt like to be desperate. 'Cause I had been desperate in my life. 
But, I had always covered it up so quickly. I had found a way to manipulate this 
situation to make it better for myself. I wouldn't manipulate a situation for any gain, it 
was to make it less scary, that was all. Not to get into that deep sense of _feeling 
absolutely desperate. 
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Even now for a long time if I was confronted with a desperate feeling I would try 
and manipulate the situation, so that it would be better, like if Alex had to go away I 
would try and manipulate it so he would go away for much less time so I wouldn't 
have to feel desperate. And when my father died I think it was the first time that I 
ever felt what it was like to be floating in a sea of - it was absolute darkness and 
desperation and absolute fear, and the fact that I couldn't control it. When he first 
died I did contain it, I was fine, I mean I had Jost my father but on the surface I 
seemed okay. But I knew that within me I wasn't okay, very strongly. And I wasn't 
so cut off from myself that I really didn't know when I wasn't okay, I knew that I 
wasn't okay but I never until that point knew just how terrible I felt and just how 
desperate I felt. Because I could feel sad - I learnt to feel those things, to 
experience those things but it was always in a way that I could still have them under 
control, that they didn't engulf me, that they didn't overwhelm me, that they didn't 
threaten me, because the minute - when I say threaten, the minute I felt that an 
emotion could overwhelm me it threatened me so much that it would almost back 
me into a comer. Because I would feel that I was going to drown, and I would 
never be able to get up. And when my father died that was how I felt, I felt that I 
was actually drowning, I felt I was never ever going to get better. I thought I was 
just going to descend into - I mean I was in this kind of blackness, and in this death 
and I just thought I was just never going to feel alive again, never going to feel life, 
never feel what it meant to actually live. And yet I had never really lived, I had 
never actually known what it meant, to actually live as a human being. 
I had known my whole life what it was like to be a contained little robot and looking 
back on myself I almost feel like I had the right amount of emotion programmed into 
me, like it was injected into me, you know, you could be sad for this long, in this 
quantity and you were allowed to cry for x number of minutes, and you were 
allowed to feel those things. So it wasn't as if my mother had said to me" you will 
never feel anything again in your life and you're not allowed to cry". I was allowed 
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to cry but for a very short time. And so I think that before he died I walked around 
in a shell. It was in many ways so much like my mother. And if I /oak back on how I 
was before I'd lost both of them I think in many ways I was so similar to my mother, 
in the sense that I was always well-dressed and I always looked good and I always 
had the right amount of empathy and I could always listen. My mother could listen 
and be very empathic and very- she had on the surface an incredible serenity. 
People used to say, "you know she was so serene and at peace " and I thought, " 
my mother, my mother who'd spent her whole life anxious and conflict-ridden and 
hysterical on many levels ", was on the surface very serene and contained. 
And I think I was very much like that, and that what I adopted in being a therapist 
was her therapeutic skill, her skJJ/ at feeling other people's emotions and I think I 
could do it with more depth than she could but it was a skill. And in many ways I 
think even when I did my M.A, it's a pity I didn't do it now - I mean it's nice that I've 
got it - but I think in terms of being a therapist I've become a therapist now, a real 
therapist. I was not a therapist. I had the qualifications, I had the title and I had the 
skills but I had absolutely no clue what I was doing if I look back on it. I think I did 
therapy relatively effectively in terms of the fact that it was an academic thing, it was 
academic thrown in with a bit of deep empathy, but it wasn't about me being alive in 
that room. It was about me being a therapist and I often think if I look back even on 
my internship, even if I was with a person I think I was behind a one-way mirror, 
thars how I always see myself, I might as well have been behind a one-way mirror 
because I never really made contact. I was too afraid to make contact, I was so 
afraid of making contact with people that I just couldn't do it. I didn't know what it 
meant, that was the part I really didn't know what it was about at all. 
In the absence of the seemingly stable relational space with her father, Isabelle 
also started constructing him differently. 
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I think in a sense although he was there for me, in that he is very loving and he was 
probably .. and I think I absolutely idealised him, because I saw him as being so 
much more than he was, as well, for so long. Because my mother was so rejecting 
and he was so accepting of me in that anything that I wanted, anything that I did, 
was acceptable. That it became, he became a lot more that I think, in reality, he 
actually was. And yet .... there was a warmth for me, and he was very much the .. 
but it was only in short period. And I think until recently I always felt that he had 
protected me, I now know that he didn't protect me at all. 
And in that sense he wasn't good with me either. He was there for me in a way that 
he knew how to be and it was a hell of a lot better than my mother. And ... he was 
there for me in there for me in the way that he knew how to nurture and how to 
love, and I always know that he loved me . . . . completely and absolutely ... 
unconditionally. I mean I could have done anything with my life, my father would've 
adored me, no matter what I would have done. And yet, in a very real sense - he 
didn't protect me from that fight and he wasn't really there for me in the way that I 
wanted to believe that he was, he was very much there for me in a very practical 
sense as well and he would always help me and he would always look after me 
and even as an adult, he would do it. But I didn't do a thing, I mean in terms of 
running my life he ran my life for me. But he never, he couldn't help to deal with 
how I've been. 
And I think that with my mother's death, because I was dealing with the death of my 
father and I remember - I mean, it was again my mother, there she was dying and 
nobody had mentioned it, there she was so ill with cancer and she'd had it for five 
years and nobody had spoken about the fact that she was going to die. And I 
remember you saying that I needed to speak to her, and I remember her coming to 
my house and I thought " I know I've got to do this, I know that I've got to say 
something about this ". I was so tense that I remember feeling like I wanted to 
vomit. I remember sitting there thinking, "I'm going to actually get sick". And she 
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sat down and I was sitting on the couch and I said "Mom': and it was the most 
unnatural thing that I'd ever done, because I'd never ever spoken to my mother. 
And I said " you know I went for therapy today " and if I look back on it, it was 
probably the only way I could have ever approached it because therapy was okay. 
And she said, "yes, I'm very pleased you're going". 
And I said (swallowing) "well, mom". And I just remember feeling so tense, I 
remember feeling physically ill, I was going (taking deep breaths), "you know mom, 
we spoke about you being sick". She said "yes, darling'~ I thought I can't pull this 
off. And she said ''yes darling". And I said, "Corinne said I must talk to you about · 
ir 
And she said "yes I think that's a good idea darling. Well I sat there and thought 
"well now what am I supposed to say, I don't have a script for this, I don't know 
what this means, I don't have a little box that I can haul out now 
and put in the tape and know how to say it like a robot. I didn't know what to say. 
And I remember - she said, " I think that's a good idea darling': and I said to her, " 
well you are very sick mom, and we both know you're going to die". 
And she said "yes". 
And I said "and I'm very scared" 
And I remember sitting there and there was just this silence, and I thought " oh, shit, 
uh, uh, I can't and then I actually from somewhere and I said to her 
" I'm very scared and I'm going to miss you so much". And we actually started 
talking about her dying, and we actually started talking about her being sick. We 
never did it enough, I mean the only time that we ever really did it enough was the 
week before she died. But I sometimes still think that in it I couldn't really let go. It 
was closer than we'd ever been, it was more connected than we've ever been, 
because we'd acknowledged one secret. But we hadn't begun to acknowledge the 
thousands of other secrets .. 
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and to really show feeling. And we'd shown the feelings around her dying, that it 
was the easiest thing to show the feelings around. Because it was so 
understandable the I would not feel okay with my mother dying in front of my 
eyes. So we could talk about that and she could talk to some extent about how 
difficult it was for her, but never really, never really. She could not get to a point 
where she could really acknowledge it. But we did cry together and we did talk 
about it together which was much more than we'd ever done, much, much more. 
And after she died that left me with a sense of tremendous peace about her and it 
was a peace that I couldn't make sense of but I actually felt so peaceful with her 
and I didn't feel desperate that she was dead. I didn't feel desperate like with my 
father, seeing my father lying dead in bed and I just remember standing there 
looking ,at him and thinking "uh, uh" and I started to shake him because I wanted to 
wake him up. 
And I said "uh, uh, Daddy, you can't, Dad you can't have gone'~ 
Wtth my mother I didn't feel that at all. 
And I just think to myself, not even in the last minutes of her life do I actually say, 
"don't go'~ I don't know now given how I feel about her if I wanted her to go or not, 
but at that point I didn't want her to go. At that paint we had some connection, 
more than we'd ever had and the last thing I wanted in the world was to watch my 
mother die. And I wanted inside of me to scream, " don't go mommy': like I had 
screamed for many years. I just couldn't do it - I sat there stroking her hand and 
telling her " you'll go soon'~ Her therapist - never mind her therapist, her daughter 
to the end, and my sister was sitting on the chair crying and she said "do you think 
mommy knows how much I love her" and I said "come and tell her". 
Giving my sister's inability to ever be able to speak to my mother, a space in the 
. midst of an absolute horror, and say "you can't leave me, you're not allowed to" and 
then I my sister who has a chance to speak to her. But when she actually died I 
felt-initially all I wanted to do was scream in that hospital, I wanted to scream and 
scream. When my father died I screamed that whole hospital down, and they put 
me in a room and said "you'll have a cup of tea" and I said, "I'll do no such thing, 
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I'm allowed to cry in this hospital, and I will cry, I couldn't care Jess about the 
patients or about you" - I thought fuck. you, I've just Jost my father. But with my 
mother, I mean the doctor came in - he was crying when he said "you may now go 
home and look after your child" and I said "yes I will". 
I should have said "how dare you tell me ", my mother's dead, but all the time I was 
still capable of doing it. But I wasn't that capable of it that I didn't fall apart, I fell 
apart far more quickly than with my father. But still through my grief for her and my 
horror of her being dead, had a feeling of a peace about her. I thought at the time it 
was because I had been able to speak to her. I think now I had that sense of 
peace, because I could stop struggling with her, I could actually stop that whole 
struggle, that I was actually free of that incredible struggle. That I was actually free 
to go off and find what I needed to find within me. And I would always think to 
myself that the peace - you know it's because we had some connection. And I 
think yes to some extent at least we had something, but we could never have truly 
connected. My mother could never have given that to me, because my whole life I 
had looked for her to give me some sense of - s0me connection - some sense that 
she was there and I had done everything in the world to get it from her and I never 
did. I was never going to get it ever and that's where another huge loss came in, 
which is the loss of, as you said the other day, of grieving a living mother. 
When she died it was actually such a relief because it was real because she had 
actually gone. And she hadn't abandoned me and she hadn't left me, and she 
hadn't walked out the door on me because I wasn't good enough - I hadn't lost her 
because I was wrong, I'd lost her because she was sick. And it was - that gave me 
a freedom, a freedom to be able to grieve for her, in a way that I had never been 
able to before because she had actually gone. 
I didn't experience it at all as a relief at the time when she died, but looking back on 
it now, it was - it freed me, it actually freed me to grieve for her. And it freed me to 
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also feel things about her, that I was never allowed to feel when I was little or 
throughout my life, because I was just taught that I had to be good all the time 
And the loss of a living mother is a loss, that's so different from them dying, from 
both my mother and father, from my mother dying. Because when I grieved her 
death I grieved the fact that she was no longer here. I felt pain that I didn't have a 
mother any longer, now I feel pain at the fact that I never had a mother and at times 
now I find myself calling for my mother. And realising, where all I want to do is sit 
up and call my mommy. And knowing that whether she is alive or dead she is not 
coming because she can't because she never ever could. And for me it is with out 
doubt the hardest loss that I have ever had to deal with. I think the pain of loosing 
my father which I thought was the point in my life at which I would die I use to think 
when he dies I go. It's completely different to this, because this is like looking back 
on the horror of my life On a life that on the surface of it looked fine. If I was very 
unhappy about their fighting I was told that I was imagining it. So I was left with this 
thing that it wasn't so bad. So for me to tum around and face it, look at it, to actually 
feel it, to experience it is a horror. I do not have words to describe it, because it is 
not a loss that happens in the normal course of ones life. It is a loss of something 
that is so intangible because it is a loss of something I never ever had. Of 
something I so badly needed and I did have, it is also acknowledging that I lived 
such an awful awful childhood. A childhood in a house that was like a hell. It was a 
house of bloody horrors and it was always a secret. I didn't live in a house of · 
horrors and it is al$0 the fact that for the first time I am actually not only 
acknowledging to myself but talking about it to other people, I have never ever 
been able to do this because I was always scared that if I really told someone what 
went on, he wouldn't like me. I would always feel that if I told anybody how terrible it 
had been for me that they would think I was lying, that they would think I was 
exaggerating and as a result they would go away, because I was at fault, because I 
was naughty, because I was ultimately responSJble. It spread over into so much of 
my life, into every aspect of my life. 
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And I also think in a way, I was grieving my dead mother that was an entirely 
different thing to grieve my living mother. And I think I had to go through the 
' 
process of grief of my dead mother to grieve my living mother, I could not have 
done it the other way around - I don't think I could have. I think it would have been 
academic, an intellectual exercise. I don't think it would have been about feelings, 
and pain and emotion, I think it would have been this thing - I better deal with my 
childhood in a little box because my mother's going to die one day- not about she's 
dead but she was never really alive. 
And I think had my mother died first and then my father it would have been so 
different for me and my father's death would have been even more desperate for 
me. But I also would have had to look after her which would have been a 
completely different thing. But apart from that just in terms of the loss the loss of 
my mother was a much greater horror but my sense of it was that the loss of my 
father would be a greater horror, and in some ways it was a greater horror 
because it was the first loss and it was the parent I was close to but at least it 
prepared me for this because this was a much, much greater horror. Not her death 
but the duality of it, the fact that there're two losses in one person, in one 
relationship. And had it not happened that way around I might not have got to this 
point. 
But there is a blessing - because, particularly if my mom had lived I would never 
had the courage - I can't imagine myself having the courage to face this and have 
to face myself. Because I don't know what I would do. But I am free now to face it, 
I don't have to deal with her in her flesh. I am dealing with her all day. But I don't 
actually have to go visit her, even if I go visit her she's not there, and I think that for 
me I thought so often - how would I do this if she was alive? Could I do it? Could I 
look at her, could I actually be with her and be dealing with it. Wouldn't I have to be 
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forced to split myself off in a way and be dealing with it here and facing her and 
being a gOod girl. Would I have had the guts for face. Would I have had the guts? 
Would I have had the guts to face it, to look at her and face that stuff because my 
mother's response would have been to blame herself, "oh I know I was such a 
terrible mother and then "but mommy you weren't such a terrible mother". And 
she'd say to me "Anne gets terribly depressed, deeply, deeply depressed, and she 
lives her life on antidepressants which don't even tend to help because she's still 
depressed. And my mother would often say Anne is so depressed and I failed her 
so badly, And she knew what she needed she knew she had failed Anne, me she 
thought she hadn't failed she thpught I was the model child, because I had done all 
the right things. Anne was the difficult one, but she was the oldest one and my 
mother used to say " but I failed her so badly". I don't even think she realised how 
badly she'd failed her, but as soon as she'd feel that I'd say" you know mum, they 
were terrible circumstances" and I don't know if I'd have the courage to not do it if 
she was alive. And in her dying and in me losing her, in a concrete sense it has 
given me the freedom, to break that cycle for the first time ever. 
I used to believe that people go away and they never come home and they never 
come back, and the only way they ever come back is if you're so .nice that in the 
process of being so nice if I do that now, I have lost myself I could not go back to 
that lovely little shell, you know, pretty on the surface and absolutely dead. And I 
can not go back to that because facing the losses have meant that I can live as a 
fuller person, not just in doing the right thing. Now I have a different sense of that 
leaving that would lock me up so. 
· And with my father there were times I think, if I look back on it, that I had lost things 
with him, that he was a father, but he was not really, really there for me. And that is 
even harder for me to face, because I can see my mother now so clearly and I 
can't see him so clearly. I know it will come and it is even more frightening for me. 
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Because he was - I made him into so much more than he was. And that is why 
that is frightening. So in a sense I think talking about loss I think I lost a childhood, I 
don't think I have ever been a child. I think the last time I was a child I was riding 
my bicycle up and down the street in Brits when I was three. I never knew what it 
meant to just run in the grass. I would run in the grass, but I would run so tense so 
agitated - I was always an adult. I lost being little at the age of three. And I am 
only learning at the age of 33 how to be little again. And it is still difficult. 
I lost being a person. I was never able to be honest about how I felt. Not that half 
the time I knew how I felt but I could never just be honest about it. So much of 
what happened in my childhood resulted in me losing so much. Losing the ability to 
be a person, losing the ability to feel , losing the ability to do so many things, and 
yet being so absolutely perfect. 
but really like a robot 
Really dead - lost. 
When I think what my sense of myself is now, the first word that I think of is that I 
am alive and I am actually real. I am sore, I am in pain. I feel awful but at least 1 
feel. And the feeling when you say who am I, I am just a real human being who is 
actually living for the first time. And my sense of myself is that I am alive. I can't 
funny enough, if you had asked me that question six or seven years ago I could 
have given you a whole long description of myself, now I can't do that. But I do feel 
real. And I do feel alive. And I feel very sore, enormously vulnerable. I feel like my 
skin is actually rubbed raw, I feel like somebody has peeled off the layers of my 
skin - like layers of a onion. I have got to the absolute core and that is how I am 
walking around. Uke my skin is actually raw, that the pain is there that I feel so 
transparent but that I have the gut s to do it . That I have the courage to walk 
around with it. Well I don't feel like I have a choice because I can't stop it. But that 
I am alive and I am living, and I am really feeling things. 
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I am able to be real with my children and able to actually be with them and feel 
actually to be able to love them and I am actually more able to be real in my 
relationship with Alex although it is harder. It is much, much harder. Because he 
gives me so many of my mother's messages. It is much harcJer for me to be real 
with him. It is also much harder not to fight him and in that way fight my mother and 
it is much harder for me to communicate what I need with him. But I am getting 
there and I also find that what is happening to me in the process is I am becoming 
more truly independent I am actually able to by myself for the first time ever . I 
could never be on my own, I use to get frantic if I had to be on my own, I would go 
out would do anything to avoid being on my own 
So in that sense it is enabling me to have a much more real relationship with 
myself. I can actually face being on my own. I don't die when I am on my own, 
and now I am actually able to just be in this with myself. And truly when I am with 
particularly with my children I feel that I am really with them. I am also able to get 
irritated I am able to tell them that I am in a bad mood, I am feeling awful. I could 
never have done that before. Because I was going to be a perfect mother and now 
I am a real mother and I get cross and I get irritated and I also get very happy. And 
I am able to hold my children and really love them; give them real love where I am 
not just holding them. Where I am able to walk up to Robin and Beatrice and say 
"please come here I have to have a kiss': and give them the hugest hug and kiss in 
the middle of the day. I could never do that but then I'm safe with them, because if 
I am myself and I am real and I am all these things it's so good for them and I'm 
safe there. Because they enable me to be little, we can roll in the grass we can 
play games we can laugh, we can tickle each other, we can have pillow fights. I 
never did that, the only person who ever did that with me was my brother. I don't 
know what those things mean. I don't have a sense of what it means to do those 
things with little people at all. I can sit on the floor and play games I can do things 
with them for the first time in a long time and actually be there. Not be there as a 
model mother who is stimulating her children but actually be and it is absolutely 
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wonderful, it is so freeing. And that is why even when I feel absolutely desperate 
and overwhelmed with pain I just think I have to go through this because at the end 
of it I am not prepared to land up with them sitting where I am now, talking about 
loss. I can't. I'll make plenty of other errors I'll make it from being a person though. 
You know fast week when I left you I got home my Uncle had phoned to say my 
Uncle in Israel had died, my father's brother and for the first time, in so long in my 
life, I burst into tears on the phone. 
And you know it was the most extraordinary thing,· nobody knew what to do with 
me, my secretary did not know what to do because they have never seen me like 
that. And I cried and cried. Because I was feeling so awful as it was, it was just 
added to it. And then I phoned Alex and said Uonel had died and he said I am so 
sorry, I am so sorry for you. I said I am even sorry for myself I feel so shit, I 
fetched Annie from school we got in the car and I said I am feeling very sad today. 
She said why mommy? And I told her. And she said it is very sad when people 
die. I burst into tears. We had a whole conversation about death which is 
something I would never have being able to do had I not gone through this 
process. And we manage to talk about death in a very real way, I could have never 
done that !4. And she said to me was it sad for you? I said yes I was sad. But at 
least I could talk about it. Not sit there and say it wasn't terribly sad because it is 
actually okay which was my mother. 
And she did not hesitate to ask me the question. I was so terrified of my mother that 
if she was crying I would comfort her or run away because I could not cope with it, 
because she cried all day. It makes my connection with people around me much 
more real. I can show myself, I don't have to hide, I could never do that before. I 
· think with my sister for the first time we talk like sisters talk, not like the therapist and 
the victim, like before. and its very much happened with you. Where with other 
therapists I would hide, it would be so easy to hide. I never had to hide from you 
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and I am able to tell you I feel awful. I could never do that before. I would only tell 
what I wanted to as soon as I got uncomfortable I would say I am fine. 
The losses also became explicit. 
I think it is through the loss of my father and my mother that I am able to face and 
look at the other losses because my losses - they did start when I was very small. 
They have almost gone to the beginning of my life. 
Some months after Isabelle told this story, she also tells that her relationship with 
Alex is much easier and friendlier and how his regular leaving on business trips 
also does not fill her with distress now. 
Isabelle's story reflects how the losses of her parents in different ways constituted 
for her a loss of a sense of community and of how it brought a new sense to her of 
that which \Nent before, triggering a mourning of unmet needs at different times in 
her life. This encountering of discontinuity, not only in relational patterns, but also 
in her previously held meanings about her life and about important others, serves 
as source of social reorganization and triggers the transformation of her senses of 
her self and her usual patterns of relating. The same issues and processes are 
portrayed in Anders's story. 
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Anders's Story 
Anders ( 46) is a Svvedish psychotherapist, family therapy trainer and supervisor. 
He lives in Stockholm and has been 'v\IOrking in the field of psychotherapy in the 
region of 20 years. 
Our association started when vve vvere in the same training group with Maurizio 
Andolfi i"n Rome during 1990. Over the years since then we have been together in 
numerous training situations in different contexts. 
Anders's history reflects much physical movement. His father was a Svvedish 
diplomat and they lived in many different countries on many different continents as 
a child, amongst them Colombia, Tanzania and New Zealand. 
The personal issues Anders has typically been grappling with in his 'v\IOrk and 
personal life, can be described to revolve around a central thread of struggling to 
stay in intimacy. During his training with Andolfi, his 'v\IOrk on his own 
personal/professional handicaps revolved around the way he ts constantly 
oscillating in his relating, moving closer and further in some constant rhythm. At 
times his struggles have taken on a meaning of having to decide whether to live or 
to die. 
Anders told his story of loss on a tape, Wiich he subsequently sent to me. The tape 
~tarts with a strong instrumental piece of music depicting a receding thunderstorm. 
He comments on this choice of music: 
This music has been very important to me over the past few months. There is a 
very strong metaphor in it, the thunderstorm receding into the distance, its still there 
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but the gestalt is the beauty of these voices and of life. It expresses very much what 
I'm going through right now and what I'm struggling with. 
Anders describes the typical pattern of his own relating over many years as 
follows: 
I became very self-sufficient very early, and proceeded to walk around protecting 
myself in different ways, especially from disappointments. I've also always had to 
find quite a large distance to other people and I think that in my line of work it 
became possible to be close to other people and yet stay safe. 
Anders's interpersonal struggles have often been attributed to the fact that his 
father had committed suicide early on during Anders's life. He tells this part of his 
life story: 
When my father died, he jumped into a river into the rapids. My mother still 
maintains that it wasn't suicide. The night before he died, he gave me two poems, 
both of them about separation. He was depressed at the time, very much pulled 
into himself. It was in the summer in Colombia where he was posted. I was there 
for the summer holidays. 
Our driver at the embassy heard in other ways that when my father was driving up 
there he was driving very fast. My father was an extremely careful driver, he was 
not a very good driver, but he drove very slowly and he'd been driving like mad on 
the way up. So I think there must have been some very strong feeling - anger? -
that he was carrying. 
I had a very strong sense of guilt, because what happened was, that on that day in 
the end he wanted me to come along fishing and I opposed him, maintaining my 
wish to go to a bull fight instead. t got dysentery a while later with a very high fever 
and in my talking in that fever my guilt came out that I blamed myself for not coming 
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along because I would have saved him and so on. When we came back from the 
bull fight there was a lot of commotion in the house and something had happened, 
but there were no clear messages. The driver, my mother and I got in the car. My 
sister stayed behind from her own choice and we went up to Rio Guasca. And 
when we got up there in the town centre, there was a city hall and there were a lot 
of people standing in the town centre. We got out of the car, no, now I remember, 
my mother told me to stay in the car. She and Elisu (the driver) went into the town 
hall but of course I didn't stay in the car, I went after and there was my father in a 
coffin, very simple wood coffin, and he was dead. 
And I also told my mother when we left the village and went to Bugetau we 
stopped on a bridge crossing this river, and I told my mother, don't worry, I'll take 
care of you. I was 14 at the time. And I realize now that the way for me to handle 
the shock was to devote my energy to somebody else. 
Anders describes how an ecology of disconnectedness grew in his family. 
After we came back from Rio Guasca I have a strong memory of my sister and I in 
tht; evenings sitting beside each other on some steps in the house with some very 
strong feelings between us, but not finding a way to put any words on it. During the 
summer we went home for two weeks for the funeral. The funeral was of course a 
very official business. We got to Arlanda airport and the coffin was standing in the 
hangar and there were lots of official people around. Anders tells of how this picture 
from his memory muld for many years bring up an immense feeling of loneliness. 
The cut-offness he experienced all around him at the time, is also illustrated 
paradoxically by the 'Way a single opposite event stands out from the rest in his 
memory: We were met at the airport by Ola Unstra, one of the first very strong 
woman politicians in Sweden. There was something she conveyed of sympathy 
which was a very strong experience for me, 'cause there was some honesty, some 
understanding, something ... , it made a very great impact on me. 
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Then we went back to Colombia and my brother came with us. Something 
happened there that is hard for me to look at. There was ... , not a fight, my brother 
was much older, but there was some tension between us. When I was sick with the 
high fever, I attacked him with words, asking him what the hell he was doing here, 
because father didn't want him here, or something like that. We never resolved that 
issue. We never did anything about it and nobody helped us either. 
After that summer I went back to school in Sweden. That year was terrible. 
couldn't get any help to cope with my father's death. My mother, when she called, 
she couldn't even know what day it was or know what was happening, she was so 
high on drugs and booze. My brother had already finished with school and so had 
my sister, so I was alone there and I got more and more pulled into myself. That 
was my way of tackling it, of handling it. I pretended not to think and feel so much 
about it, but of course I did. 
But when I felt sad I just pretended I wasn't. This also meant not being able to 
speak to my mother about this. And having the role of being there for her needs I 
got further and further away from my true inner feelings around my father's death. 
After that year I moved to Stockholm and lived with my mother. The family's way of 
coping with this whole thing was very dramatic. We had Sunday dinner every 
Sunday and it always ended with a fight, and then my brother would leave and my 
sister would leave and I would stay behind with my mother and her sadness. 
Also, in the summer holidays after I'd finished school in '69, we went on a car trip to 
Spain, all of us. And I remember very clearly that it was impossible to talk about 
father. My mother would always come with little comments that gave a very 
· negative picture of him. And of course it was her way to keep the family together, 
but emotionally it was a catastrophe. 
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I felt even more lonely. There was no way to reach the other people in the family 
and something that had a quality of true feelings. I know my sister and I were the 
closest, but we couldn't find words. 
The patterns of disconnection in this relating served as template for Anders to 
construct very strong meanings around 'Nhat was possible and not possible in 
terms of 'Nho he was in the 'NC>rld, betvveen others. 
The years went on and I went through life being self-sufficient and not really 
allowing myself to let the feelings of loneliness and a longing for a closeness to 
other people make itself present. Of course on one level I made a lot of good 
things, but this issue of loneliness. abandonment and not allowing the true feelings 
any space, formed a lot of my life. 
Anders also remembers his struggle to find and stay in connection, and also his 
continual hidden fear of the disconnection. 
I remember an episode. I was together with Ulrike, a girl from my mother's home 
town. We were engaged but I broke it off. So I got rid of my flat and went to the 
Alps. I was studying economics and got headhunted by the IMF. They offered me a 
tremendous salary, a flat in New York, etcetera. I got a fright. So I decided it was 
too early to settle down. I broke up, sold my flat and decided to go and climb in the 
Alps to see if I could work myself along a couple of years. I got into feeling 
extremely lost so I went to Germany to see Ulrike. And she was settled and in her 
own life. And that instance was the first instance I got caught up in the 
abandonment, in the totalness of the despair. I got psychotic. I stayed there. There 
· was a girl, a drug addict I met, she helped me in a way I don't understand to find 
myself again. 
Now the death of my brother had also happened a couple of years before. It was 
not the same kind of loss I experienced with my father. My brother and I had a very 
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complicated relationship and I felt and still feel I was far away from him. it's not just 
the difference in age, its also that he was very shut off, also from himself, extremely 
intelligent and creative. He was like on a deserted island. He took sleeping pills and 
lay down in my mother's bed, my mother was away at the time. Some friends 
must've gotten some kind of signal, because they went and called at the door and 
he didn't open. Eventually they got the police to open the door and then it was too 
late. My brother was still alive physiologically even though he was brain dead. 
When I got to the hospital the doctor there had put my brother on a respirator. I 
was away in the Alps climbing. My mother sent several poste restante messages to 
a local post office. And the people at the post office, when they saw three 
telegrams to the same person had arrived, decided it must be important. They saw 
it was from Sweden so they found out where the Swedish climbers stay and finally I 
got the message. When I heard there was this telegram, I knew my brother was 
dead. I even said that to the friend who was with me. So I called home and got the 
story and took a flight home. We went to the hospital, said goodbye to my brother 
and then the doctor turned the respirator off. The doctor explained that he had 
done it like this, because he waited for me to get home more for the sake of my 
mother than anything else. 
This loss is complicated in the sense that I don't know whether I liked my brother. 
This is a very painful feeling. Maybe we never really had a chance. I have some 
memories of him being caring, but I think he was so caught up in looking after 
himself. The family's official myth about his death is that Eva, his daughter, (he 
wasn't IMng with Eva's mother at the time) that her mother had gotten a new 
boyfriend and Eva liked him, and that was so painful for my brother, that he killed 
himself. That still doesn't explain why he went to lie in my mother's bed, but that is 
my mother's official myth. 
From Germany after the psychotic episode I decided to go to Tanzania to my sister. 
That was another disappointment, because going to my sister I thought now we 
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can really meet. But she was so lost from herself too so there was no deeper 
connection. And when I went home I started studying psychology. Perhaps to try 
and understand something more about all these things. 
Anders's shift in constructing an identity and a VvOrld for himself through 
psychology, rather than economics, can be seen as evolving from his urgent, but 
hidden needs for connection, for a place to counteract his lostness. The world of 
psychology, however, also suited his already set sense of himself and his relational 
patterns, because it also offers a seemingly legitimate way of keeping distance or 
getting out of intense encounters. In this vein he says later: 
I think in my work being close to other people, has been a way to express my ways 
of coping with loss in a creative way, but there has always been something that's 
missing. 
So he takes steps to find more useful spaces for himself, but these never entail 
moves outside of the parameters of his senses of who he is and of his patterns of 
relating, as they have been built in his rhythms of his encounters with others over 
many years. Even the loss of his brother becomes another instance in what has 
now already become a familiar pattern of disappointment and disconnection in his 
VvOrld. After his brother's death he makes some effort to escape the ever more 
stifling caretaking role that had become part of his identity with his mother: 
After my brother's death I decided that this time I'm not going to be there for her. So 
I simply stayed for a week and then went to my place. 
This effort does also, however, take the form of more disconnection without 
showing himself, and in that way becomes yet another echo of a set pattern 
instead of being transformational. 
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It took a painful experience outside of the usual patterns and parameters of his 
webs of relatedness, for a transformational context to emerge for him. This came in 
. the form of finding a way to truthfully mourn the loss of his father. The story built 
around Anders's father, also the story perpetually given to him, was a very negative 
one of a man vvho wasn't there, vvho didn't care enough, and vvho, as proof of his 
selfish disloyalty, had left his family behind in the worst possible way. This story 
also served to stop Anders from encountering the fullness of the loss of his father. 
If his father had been such a negative figure, it diminishes vvhat was lost, the sense 
of lost possibilities. His father, also as a living figure, became just another story of 
disappointment and disconnection. 
Later, an incident of synchronicity enables him to shift the socially constructed 
meanings around his father for the first time. In this, he also becomes able to build 
a story that contains the idea that he has lost something precious, and in that, he 
encounters the loss of his father for the first time. 
It took me many years to allow myself a more direct and deep sense to mourn the 
loss of my father. And for many years my mother forced onto me a very negative 
picture of my father. I went to therapy. My therapist was an older man who by co-
incidence had an old friend with whom he had dinner and they talked about the war 
and the Swedish delegation in Berlin during the war. My father was stationed in 
Berlin as a diplomat towards the end of the war. So my therapist's friend told him 
about this man ... {his father's name] whom he had worked with there and whom he 
had admired and liked very much and could give my therapist a very concrete and 
clear and colourful picture of my father. Then what happened was that the next 
time I came to therapy, my therapist gave me back another picture of my father. So 
in a sense he gave me back my father. By co-incidence or whatever. It was a very 
very strong moment for me and it also helped me to take hold of the issue of the 
loss, the longing for my father, the anger at his betrayal. 
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In this process Anders also becomes able to shift the meanings he held around his 
father. 
Finally I could get a clearer picture of his motives and his desperation. ! think that 
one part of his desperation had been that he came from a very poor family in 
Northern Sweden, became a diplomat and the problem was in this class migration 
with no way back. 
Anders tells of how his father was required to officially change his surname, since 
his own name was typical of too low a class to be a diplomat. Anders understands 
this as contributing to his father's sense of not being good enough, and to his 
despair about fulfilling loyalty expectations. 
He was very estranged from his brothers and sisters and not feeling at home in his 
new context and I think it put an extra burden on his loneliness. I think his life 
history, of having left something and finding no way back; being lost where he was, 
I think that was what caused this drastic step in his desperation. 
That also connected to my parents' marriage where my father was very lonely also. 
They didn't reach each other. So he had to carry the burden of his life history by 
himself. 
Having found this description and this understanding gave me a new sense, new 
feeling around my father's abandonment or the loss. I think that when I can identify 
with his life history, the loss doesn't hurt less because its pain is still there, because 
I've needed him many times in my life and he wasn't there; so the pain is there but 
there is no blame in it. I can still feel the anger, its like the thunderstorm, its 
receding, its pulling away. And I don't know whether you can talk about forgiveness. 
I don't really understand what the word means. 
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In one way my way of tackling it has been, well, from the beginning, to do as I 
always do and did and that was to put my energy into other people and then the 
despair and the anger and the longing would catch up with me. But I had no really 
good way of handling it, so I was kind of swamped in all these feelings and it just 
gave me sense of despair. 
Being able to encounter the loss of his father, brings profound shifts in his 
abstractly-constructed meaningmaking community, and with that in his sense of 
himself and \'Vho he can be in the presence of others. This brings new shades of 
meaning in his reflecting on himself, his life ·and his past. Amongst this, are new 
identities he attributes to people, such as his mother, and a new interpretation· of 
\A/here in his life he encountered loss. 
This issue of loss is for me mainly connected to something that seems more 
important now, in one way. If you can compare I don't know, you actually can't 
compare. But for me this thing is much more central right now than the death of my 
father and brother. And that is the deep deep sense of loss due to the 
abandonment I felt inside of relationships, like that with my mother. Even if it took 
on actual forms of abandonment like when I was sent off to boarding school, it was 
much more an abandonment of not being emotionally present. That to me contains 
a lot of pain. 
Thus encountering the loss of his father, brings about transformational shifts in his 
meaningmaking communities. Also, the telling of some new stories make the telling 
of some old stories impossible. Before his story about himself of having to take 
care of his mother, constructed within the patterns of interaction, contributed to 
· making it impossible to question her negative story about his father. Now, being 
able to tell another story about his father, it becomes impossible to only tell a 
protective story about her anymore. 
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Even though my father abandoned me by committing suicide, he was also the one 
who was present, who was steady and who could show me or teach me the sense 
of belonging. I was sitting a couple of months ago trying to write a letter to my 
mother and I started looking through some old letters. It was '56, '57, shortly before 
we left for Nieu-Zeeland and my father wanted to make a trip around Northern 
Scandinavia and my mother went to see her relatives in Germany and I was sent 
off to some friends on the west coast of Sweden. I have a lot of letters that my 
father wrote from his travels. He was conveying many things, he was conveying 
that he missed me, telling about what he was doing and seeing and experiencing. 
He was building a bridge to the time we would see each other again, 'cause he was 
always referring to it. 
As a contrast I have a lot of postcards from my mother in which she's telling me not 
to be sad, not to cry, to be a big boy and so on. I was six years. I think this record 
from the history of the summer of '56 mirrors something that has been there much 
earlier. Now I see more of my mother's emotional absence and how I always only 
could be there for her in her needs. 
So the loss of my mother was not derived from someone dying or disappearing, but 
the loss of never having had. I'm reminded of this issue a couple of times a year 
when I have to go for medical controls on my back. [Anders has serious cancerous 
growths on his back, which has to be treated and controlled continuously. 
Medically these growths are attributed to the fact that, as a very young child, his 
back got seriously burnt in the sun due to his mother's negligence.] That keeps this 
issue very very alive for me. 
·~The consequence of this very much has been that I early became competent and 
self-suffident. Say;ng that doesn't mean I gave up the hope of reaching my mother 
or trying to get some real response from her, but trying on and on, experiencing 
disappointment after disappointment, created an issue which is also something I 
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have been struggling with and that is how to handle disappointments. And these 
disappointments have left me over my life with a very deep sense of despair. On 
the one hand deeper inside of me I still carried my joy and optimism and hope but it 
has been overshadowed by this feeling that when I really hope for something, it 
never turns out that way, it always ends up with disappointment. And of course in 
different parts of my fife I have created the disappointment just to make the pieces 
fit. 
~ 
I think that loss, the loss of never really having had a mother in that sense, is 
probably the strongest feeling that often gets hold of me in this period sometimes. 
I can also see how the loss of not having had a feeling relationship with my mother, 
lay a foundation for the stuck way in which I tackled the more apparent losses of 
my father and brother. · 
The new meanings recursively bring shifts in his meaningmaking webs, also his 
historical ones, allowing him to, in this changed social context, evolve new and 
different meanings about himself. 
So I talked about the despair and with the despair is a despair is also a big anger. A 
big anger at being abused and a big anger connected to the feeling of "onmacht" 
[helplessness], .of not being able, there is no way I can do something about it, 
frustration, and well I tried to handle this in many different ways during my life. I 
think something which is a very very ·big change in my life is that I am recapturing 
the hope and the beauty as a central part of my existence. I saw this during my day 
in Dalaro [referring to a specific training experience] where I really got connected to 
· the feeling and believing that I could trust, trust the relationships with other people. 
He refers to an incident that formed part of a painting experience during the 
training in Dalaro, where I was also present: 
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When you conveyed something to me when we were painting and you provoked 
me to kind of take the shit by pulling the paper away - it was a small incident but the 
fact that it took me a while to realize that I could take the paper back has come to 
illustrate to me that I don't have to be frustrated, I can take responsibility for myself 
in relationship to others and that's a deep consolation. I don't know if that's the right 
word but it also leaves me with a sense of a new sort of competence which also 
means that this shift is a process that has started and grows. The strongest change 
and the one that makes me the happiest now is not only that I'm able to be really 
close to other people and stay put, but also that I need closer relationships. And the 
trust is there, the sense that I can take care of myself I won't be beaten up, I won't 
be hurt, I can defend myself and take care of myself in that manner without things 
turning into a catastrophe. 
Moves in his sense of self, again, recursively, necessitates moves in his webs of 
relatedness which were constructed in the erection and in the wake of previous 
meanings. 
That's given me lot of hope, it's also meant that I've made a decision to divorce 
Anna [his wife], because our relationship is or was based on the distance I needed 
10 years ago. And to me it was a kind of enactment of my solitude and when i've 
tried to reach out and to change this position, it has not been possible. 
The shifts do not only entail practical shifts in his position in his social webs, but 
also shifts in terms of his relational repertoire of patterns of connection and 
disconnection. 
· One example entails a different way of encountering his mother. 
Now I got to understand more of the relationship with my mother, and finally I asked 
Tom [another therapist who knows his mother too) for help to speak to her. And it 
became so apparent how the way of communicating there, the consequence was 
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that I get caught up in double binds all the time. And whichever way I would try to 
convey something about myself or to get a response or a dialogue, it would show 
itself to be impossible. Being able to evolve this understanding/meaning around his 
relationship with his mother, also frees him from continuously trying to make that 
relationship better. 
Another example of shifts in his relational repertoire and recursively in his social 
webs, entail his situation in his marriage. When things started moving in me, I felt 
stuck in this relationship, and for a time didn't even consider other ways of changing 
the situation. And I feel very embarrassed, because I walk around and have and 
give the picture of myself of someone who knows a lot about himself, can be full of 
insights, ideas and options, but when the realization finally came to me that I can 
divorce, it was like 'A-hah, Eureka'. It was kind of embarrassing that I couldn't see it 
before, but maybe that's the way things happen. 
Shifts in his senses of himself and in his patterns of relating also echo into his 
formal 'MJrking domains. 
I'm so bloody tired of being the consultant, the teacher, the therapist, always 
untouchable, always having to perform. More and more I need to be Anders, not to 
have different roles all the time, but to be more home when I work. 
In the process different messages also echo from within the social webs within 
'Nhich his new meanings take on form, strengthening the transformational 
meanings . 
. I was very happy because this summer I was away for a week with a group that 
Gunilla and I had in training. I regard them now more as colleagues, even though 
I'm leading the group. We were away working on some central life issues. And I 
was very happy afterwards because I heard later through another channel that one 
woman in the group had commented that I was so different, so much more 
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personal, not private, but personal, more spontaneous and easygoing and that 
made me very happy because that was also my ambition. 
Uke in the music, for a big part of my life until now the storm has been present, 
trying to survive in these strong forces. Now it is receding into the background. It is 
still there as part of my life history. But other parts of optimism, above all, of another 
form of creativity is coming in place of having to find storms or the demons or 
whatever you'd like to call them. 
Some Brief Reflections 
The telling of both Isabelle and Anders's stories reflects a process of 
meaningmaking within the flow of expected and unexpected ebbs and tides in 
encountering closeness and distance in relationships. 
Their stories can be read to portray how their senses of who they are and can be 
or should be in the presence of others, and of how the 'NOrld 'NOrks, have always 
evolved within the complexities of their social webs. It also contains some 
reflections in how they participated in this co-creation of meaning, performing in 
ways that 'NOuld keep the assumptions about their 'NOrlds intact. Similarly, they tell 
in a personal language of how an experience of loss can disrupt the 'NOrlds we 
depend on {even grudgingly). They tell of how this brings the pain of having to deal 
. with the immense shifts in our communities of belonging and translation, and in 
that, of a disruption of the readymadeness of previous meanings. Isabelle and 
Anders both reflect on the shifts in their senses of themselves and in that of their 
patterns of relating after encountering most unwanted losses. These stories are not -
portrayals of problemsolving, but of transformation. 
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These stories also serve to remind us, beyond sophisticated and multiworded 
explanation or reflection, of the wordless pain that constitutes the space of 
encountering loss. 
Furthermore, the different language of the stories give some hint of the complex 
multilayeredness of lived human experience - a web always too complex to be 
adequately portrayed in the reduction of the talking cure or of written language. 
There are many intriguing nuances in these stories Vv'hich remain unstoried here, 
partly because they lie beyond the ambit of this discussion. Questions emerging 
from a reading of these stories Vv'hich might be usefully raised in other discussions 
or writings, include: A hypothesis about people primarily forming and re-forming 
their patterns of connection and disconnection within their vertical 
(transgenerational) relationships, and perpetuating these patterns within their 
horizontal relationships; and questions about the connection between cancer and 
certain patterns of hiding stories of pain. Perhaps most importantly, I need to reflect 
on the waves through my own meaningmaking patterns Vv'hile involved in the 
bringing forth of this manuscript. 
In Summary 
These stories also serve to illustrate how experiences of connection-disconnection 
become the template (as discussed at length in the previous three sections) 
. according to Vv'hich people's senses of themselves, the patterns of their relating 
and also the meanings they construct about life in general are formed. There are 
rhythms of presence and absence - Vv'hich 'Ne help to perpetuate - that constitute 
our usual communities of translation. Echoing from the senses of Vv'ho and Vv'here 
the Yous in these communities are, our senses of ourselves are formed and 
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perpetuated as \Nell. Cosmetic changes, and efforts at shifting these patterns easily 
become engulfed by the usual discursive habits within these meaningmaking 
communities. Transformation becomes possible when disruption of these usual 
patterns of connecting-disconnecting within such communities occurs. Such 
disruption can be brought about by the experience of loss, as illustrated in the 
stories above. Thus loss can be seen as one of the (few?) experiences that, in its 
impact on our discursive communities, has the potential to bring about in depth 
transformation of our senses of ourselves and of our patterns of relating. 
The connection of the experience of loss to change and to therapy and therapists 
is also suggested by the stories recounted above. Therapists, as all people, evolve 
in their personhood from certain patterns of connecting-disconnecting. Ho'Never, it 
can be said that their senses of themselves and of who they are with and to others, 
evolve in such a way that their therapisthood becomes subtly predestined. Thus 
they become therapists not so much because of explicit career decisions or 
success at professional selection procedures. They start playing roles - no matter 
whether it takes the overt form of being helpful or of being problematic - within the 
vvebs of their discursive communities, that serves to help (themselves and others) 
deal with the repeating struggles of connection and disconnection. They 
themselves, in their senses of who they are and of how they can find meaning, are 
motivated by these struggles and the pain they have encountered (and do 
encounter) within it. Thus therapists, in their professional movements, play out in 
some form the patterns learned within their meaningmaking communities. The 
relational habits and meanings they bring with them, can, as much as it motivates 
their professional being, unwittingly serve to perpetuate set and stuck patterns. 
Thus, the journey of finding and believing in transfonnatory processes, is 
especially central for the therapist. 
As shown above, experiences of loss can often serve to help therapists evolve not 
only in their own lives, but also professionally, from being a seemingly effective 
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mental health professional, to finding a way of being part of a healing process (see 
also the discussion on wounded healers in Chapter 5). 
Most essentially then, the meaning - theoretical and otherwise - portrayed and 
explored in this manuscript involves a perspective on the ability of an experience of 
loss to usefully transform meanings we have attached to ourselves and our world. 
In one simple way, it portrays once again that pain is not simply something that 
should be avoided or taken away as quickly as possible. Rather, it shows that loss 
is not only something that can not be avoided but that, beyond that, we may also 
need it in our living. 
Because I could not stop for 
Death, 
He kindly stopped for me; 
The carriage held but just 
ourselves 
And Immortality. 
Emily Dickinson 
(Beeton, Kossick & Pereira, 
1984, p. 241) 
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